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ABBREVIATIONS 
In the footnotes at the bottom of pages, the following 
abbreviations of the titles of Wittgenstein's works have 
been used: 






= Blue and Br.own Books 
= Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
- Philosophical Investigations 
a On Certainty 
= Zettel 
My practice in referring to the Philosophical Investi-
gations has been to give section numbers for Part I and page 
numbers for Part II. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein 
wrote: 4.112 "Philosophy is not a.body of doctrine but an 
activity." This is a thought which to a lesser or greater 
extent governs all his work. Its full implications only be-
came apparent to him after he first enunciated the maxim, and 
it could be said I think, that his life's work in philosophy 
consisted in recognizing these implications and in scrupulous-
ly and ultimately successfully following them through in his 
practice. To do this he had to give up the idea that philo-
sophy could give us any knowledge about the world which we 
had not possessed before, and in fact to stress the opposite: 
that it could only give us insight into what we have always 
known. Its function was to render the obvious acceptable to 
the philosopher or rather to enable the philosopher to see the 
obvious clearly. Such a role for philosophy could not have 
been as readily palatable as this rather anodyne description 
makes it sound. The radical nature of his redefinition only 
begins to strike home when it becomes apparent that there will 
no longer be any place in philosophy for the:ory or hypothesis, 
discovery of new facts or denial of the truth of old theories. 
We may assert nothing "philosophically" and when we do assert 
I 
that such and such is the case the assertion does not derive 
its authority from philosophy. Both the discovery of new 
racts and explanations or the workings or nature rall outside 
the competence of philosophy. 110ne might also give the name. 
'philosophy• to what is possible·BEFORE all new discoveries 
. 1. 
and inventions." Wittgenstein states in the Philosophical 
Investigations!· nrf one tried to advance THESES in philosophy, 
it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone 
would agree to them." 2 • Philosophy is neither scientiric 
nor super-scientific· and is powerless to impart new inrormation. 
The seeds of this insight are already to be round in 
Hume but the rruit which they bear in his writings are a strange 
1 ~ P.I. 126 




inedible hybrid. When Hume advises us to commit to the 
flames "any volume of divinity or school metaphysics," which 
does not "contain any reasoning concerning quantity or number", 
nor "any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and· 
existence,n3 • he unwittingly condemns his own Treatise to the 
fire. His greatness consists in having seen the connection 
between the growth of knowledge and the practice of experi-
mentation. The tragic flaw in his work is the confusion be-
tween science and philosophy - a confusion which Wittgenstein 
penetrated. ·On the one hand Hume wanted experimentation to 
provide us with the sort of certainty proper only to logical 
investigations and Kolakowski argues, correctly I feel, that 
in opposing the pretensions of 17th. Century metaphysics he un-
successfully attempted to show that experiment produces a high-
er degree of certainty than did metaphysical speculation. He 
writes, ·~he destruction of knowledge which Hume•s doctrine 
was lead· to by its own premise$ is thus accounted for by his 
striving to endow •true• knowledge with.the very character that 
.. 
the seventeenth century-metaphysicians had claimed for it, 
namely, an absolutely compelling character." 4 • On the other 
hand the success of the experiments he performed were more or 
less guaranteed a priori, so undercutting the whole point of 
any empirical methodology. Jean Piaget has remarked on this 
score, 11If empiricism thus opened the way to a whole group of 
fundamental and extremely useful enquiries, it has itself pro-
ceeded somewhat apace, remaining satisfied with a minimum of 
effort. In fact the kind of observations and experiments 
which it was looking for only started in a methodological 
fashion in the 19th. Century and it is still for most of the 
important questions at the phase of a first approximation. 
The empiricists were themselves contented to proceed more 
philosophico, i.e. reflecting much and appealing to facts by 
way of examples and justification: in such cases the facts, 
3. Hume, "Inquiry concerning Human Understanding." 
Section XII. Part III. 
4. Kolakowski "Positivist Philosophy". Page 53 
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of course, always confirm the hypotheses." 5 • So Hume ad-
vanced in the name of philosophy a quasi-empirical psychology, 
which, though brilliantly and penetratingly formulated, could 
only result in a welter of conceptual confusion and a mass of 
assertions poorly supported by insufficient experimental evi-
dence. 
The point that I am trying to make with r~spect to 
Wittgenstein is that when he says that philosophy is an acti-
vity unproductive of theories·he breaks once and for all with 
metaphysics, Humes postivist metaphysics included, and with 
I 
all the debates, nominalist - realist, empiricist - idealist, 
etc., internal to metaphysics. But what does he leave us 
with? Is philosphy to be self justifying activity in vacuo? 
Is it· to contain nothing but great, simple and beautifully 
expressed statements of the obvious? In Zettel Wittgenstein 
answers both questions as to the point and structure of 
philosophy: 11How does it come about that philosophy is so 
complicated a structure? It surely ought to be completely 
simple, if it is the ultimate thing, independent of all ex-
perience, that you m~e it out to be. Philosophy unties knots 
in our thinking; hence its results must be simple, but philo-
sophising has to be as complicated as the knots it unties." 6 • 
Strictly speaking its results are. not philosophical- they· are 
statements of what we have always known but what we come at 
one time or another to doubt or to misunderstand. 11Philoso-
phical 11 is an adjective descriptive of an activity not of a 
result·. The concept of philosophy has been so transformed 
by Wittgenstein that 11philosophising" in his sense of the word 
is an activity which largely concerns itself, not with answer-
ing the questions raised by metaphysics but with dissolving 
the problems and confusions belonging to 11philosophising" in 
the old, metaphysical sense. These problems are never factual, 
although metaphysics conceives them to ~e so~ but they are 
always conceptual, or, as Wittgenstein sometimes prefers to 
5. Piaget, ninsights and Illusions in Philosophy", Page 53. 








put it, grammatical. They never turn on an insufficient 
testing of data nor on a simple paucity of factual evidence. 
They arise out of a confusion about the way we use language. 
Wittgenstein•s recognition of this fact was an 
essential precursor to .. the development of his philosophical 
technique. One could say that he made philosophers aware 
that the very nature of their traditional activity was large-
ly a result of conceptual confusion. In other words, not 
only were there confusions about traditional philosophic 
problems, like the mind-body problem, but the philosophers 
concept of the practice whereby he attempted to resolve these 
problems was itself confused. Hence, in the case of Hume 
for example: the unsatisfactory amalgamation of logical and 
empirical investigation leading to a radical scepticism and 
the loneliness of solipsism. 
I use Hume as an example because the revolution which 
Wittgenstein achieved through a reconceptualization of philo-
sophy and through a new kind of practice (his "treatment" of 
philosophic problems) to a large extent took the form of· a 
break from and a critical engagement with "philosophical 
psychology" which had received considerabl~ impetus from 
Hume•s writing. His concern with the other-minds problem, 
the question of the privacy of sensation, the concept of in-
tention and volition is evidence of this. He talks of the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language and finds 
this bewitchment.particularly prevalent in philosophies which 
are involved with concepts pertaining to psychology or to our 
use of psychological predicates. Chief cause of this puzzle-
ment is a tendency to seek out a physical object to which 
psychological terms are thought to refer. There are many 
metaphorical and analogical uses of ordinary language which 
reinforce this tendency. Take for example the instance he 
gives us in Zettel: 11The soul is said to LEAVE the body. 
Then, in order to exclude any similarity to the body, any sort 




be incorporeal, non-spatial; but with that word 'leave' one 
has already said it all. Show me how you use the word 
'spiritual' and I shall see whether the soul is non-corporeal 
and what you understand by •spirit•."7 • 
tent. 
The tone of this remark is as important as its con-
The last sentence especially has the tone of a doctor 
about to treat a patient, and, as is well known, Wittgenstein 
conceived of metaphysical problems as symptoms of a kind·of 
illness - an illness deep-seated in the grammar of our language. 
But his intention was never to present his investigations as 
the final cures of all philosophic illnesses. Rather, he 
wanted those who read them to treat that reading as a sort of 
apprenticeship during which the skills and techniques requisite 
for the treatment of problems could be acquired. 
My attempt in this thesis will therefore be twofold. 
I shall try to outline the problem of the privacy of sensation 
as a special case of philosophical scepticism of our having 
knowledge of other minds. Certain ramifications of this 
question, particularly the problems of lin~uistic meaning, and 
intentional action will also be discussed. Secondly I shall 
try, in discussing Wittgenstein's treatment of this problem, 
to show that his technique is a satisfactory one, not only for 
"curing" this problem, but for handling all philosophic prob-
lems. In other words the unity of Wittgenstein•s philosophy 
will be stressed. This unity is not the one which is receiv-
ing a great deal of attention at the moment, viz. the unity of 
the Tractatus and the later.works. But I refer rather to the 
fittedness of Wittgenstein•s philosophical activity to his 
domain of interest - conceptual investigations. In these in-
vestigations he discovers no new fact, gives no new piece of 
information. What he does is to prac_tice philosophy in a new 
way and initiate us into a new form of activity. In this, it 
seems to me, his work is supremely original and greatly valuable. 
7. Zettel 127 
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PART I 
THE OPENING SECTIONS OF THE 
"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 11 
The opening sections of the Investigations contain 
a number of themes which are central to the later thought of 
Wittgenstein and which deserve lengthy and detailed treat-
ment in their own right. At the same time this first part -
up to paragraph 243 - is an indispensible introduction to the 
discussion of privacy and sensation which immediately follows 
it. A large part of the section is concerned with breaking 
the spell of the atomistic conception of language which 
Wittgenstein had formulated in the Tractatus. The importance 
of this for the treatment of sensation emerges later when 
Wittgenstein proposes that sensation - language is expressive 
and not descriptive and that there can be no such thing as an 
. h" 1 • b t h h 1.somorp 1.sm e ween a sentence sue as 11 I have a toothac e" 
and some nstate of affairs." By breaking·with the atomistic· 
theory Wittgenstein achieves a second result, equally important 
for the treatment of the problem of sensation: he dispels the 
force of that Lockean variant of the theory which suggests 
that the problem of meaning can be overcome by interposing a 
') 
mental object or image between a word and the world. 4 • 
Wittgenstein continually points out the fruitlessness of this 
device in explaining the meaning of words, and begins to point 
to the danger~ of the mental picture being tJeated as a private 
objec1; .. a metaphysical peg on ~hich to hang a variety of 
philc,sophic prob:J.ems including the problems. t):f sensation. 
Two other important topics are dealt with. He gives 
a valuable insight into what he considers to be the character 
of a philosophic problem : the impression it gives of having 
an unplumbable depth and the apparent conflict between the aim 
of a philosophic inquiry and the nature of the object of the 
1. Erik Stenius, 1'Wittgenstein•s 1 Tractatus 1 11 , pp.91-96 
2. Locke, "An Essay Concerning·_:Hwnan Underst.apding 11 , Bk. ·III, Ch. I. 
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inquiry, the latter seeming to resist the attempts of the 
former to penetrate its essence. His discussion of this 
topic is not only important as a statement of his position 
with respect to philosophy, it also givesus the atmosphere 
of a philosophic "disquietude" - such as can lead to a man 
striking his breast and crying ·~ut surely another person 
can't have THIS pain". 3 • (Both Wittgenstein and Wisdom 
place great store on· capturing the psychological atmosphere 
o( a philosophical perplexity.) He also suggests here 
that the solution to the 11Problemtt of sensation may well be 
grammatical and not empirical. 
Thirdly he discusses what is involved in ufollow-
ing a rule 11 , and this is extremely important because it pre-
pares the ground for his refutation of the private-language 
argument which forms one of the underpinnings of the theory 
that sensations are private. The discussion shows once 
again how the understanding as a generator of private mental 
images is fruitlessly employed as a device whereby philoso-
phers try to explain how we learn rules and how we fol.low 
them. We find that his discussion recurs at a number of 
points in the Investigations and is pursued in the "Founda• 
tion of Mathematics" (F.M. 1•5) and I shall treat it at some 
length. 
My method of dealing with the first section will be 
to stick as closely to Wittgenstein•s text as possible, giv-
ing something in the nature of a running commentary on it. 




THE ATOMISTIC CONCEPT OF LANGUAGE 
"4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality 
A proposition is a model of reality as we 
imagine it 
4.0311 One name stands for one thing, another for 
another thing, and they are combined with 
one another, In this way the whole group .. 
like a tableau vivant • presents a state of 
affairs. 
4.032 It is only in so far as a proposition is 
logically segmented th~t it is a picture of 
a situation,u 1. 
Wittgenstein begins the Investigationsby trying to 
discourage certain rigid and artificial ways of treating langu-
age. He shows that language always transcends the confines 
drawn for it by an atomistic t~eory. T~e philosophical idea 
that language is made up of words which name objects can, he 
argues, be made a definition pf language only if we are prepared 
to accept that a great deal of what in the ordinary way we call 
language, will be excluded by ~he definition. And even if we 
invent a language which conforms to t~is'definition w~ can see 
that a great deal more is involved in:teaching, learning and 
, I 
using this language than is suggested by a theory of simple 
name-object correlation. 
Let us take for example the language-game ·.described 
in Philosophical Investigations 2 and 8. Here a builder A 
calls out words "block" npillarn, "slab 11 and 11beam 11 and his ' ' 
assistant is trained to bring him the appropriate object. In 
addition, the language contains numerals, {the letters of the 
alphabet); also the words nthis" and "there" used with a point-
ing gesture; and a chart of colour samples.· A gives an order 
like: nd - slab - there." At the same time he shows the 
assistant a colour sample, and when he says "there" he points 
1. Tractatus. 
.- 9 -
to a place on the building site. From the stock of slabs 
B takes one for each letter of the alphabet up to "d", of 
the same colour as the sample, and brings them to the place 
indicated by A ..... 2 • 
Even in a primitive language as simple as this one 
a diversity of operations is to be found. For instance it 
can easily be seen that the meaning of the names can only be 
discovered by seeing how they are used and how they are· taught. 
"Block" and 11slab 11 are neither used nor taught in the same 
way as· the names of the numbers of the stones "a", "b", "c", 
"d" are. The context of linguistic usage and· the type of· 
training employed to teach the use of words, determines the 
meaning of the word. This is what Wittgenstein is driving 
at when he employs one of his favourite illustrations: 
'"I set the break up by connecting. up rod and lever' ... Yes, 
given the whole of the rest of the mechanism. Only in con-
junction with that is it a break-lever; it may be anything or 
nothing." 3 • 
.. 
At this stage his position seems to be stated rather 
than argued, but its force comes out if we consider whether 
the command "Slab1 11 is a word or a sentence. The expression 
can function· in either way - which way will be determined by 
how it is used. We might say that it was a degenerate 
sentence but if this tempts us into saying that it must be a 
contraction of our sentence "Bring me a slab1 11 then we should 
remember that there is no reason why the latter expression 
should not be considered an expansion of the former. When we 
say that "Slabl" means 11Bring me a slabl" then all we are 
asserting· is that it can sometimes be used in the same way and 
applied in the same context. The expressions differ when 
"Bring me a slabl" is used •.•as four words" in order to dis-
tinguish it from ... oth.er combinations such as, "Bring him a slabl" 
etc. But here too lurks a temptation to think that when we 
2~ P.I. 8 









use it by contrast, the other sentences float before our minds, 
as do the birds in Plato's aviary in the Theaetetus,
4
• and 
that we "mean" this one by singling out in thought and taking 
hold of it with the immaterial hands of the understanding. 
In fact the contrast can be made because of the context of 
"Bring me a slabn in our language. Because we have a mastery 
of English the other contrasting combinations exist as possi-
bilities in our language. Someone lacking this mastery and 
so being unaware of the possibility of using the expression as 
a contrast to others might always utter "Bring me a slab1 a as 
one word. His do~ng this NEED not involve his having any 
different mental concomitant from ours - need not inv,olve any-
thing mental happening at all. The same sense and different 
senses depend on the use in the context of the language. 
' 
The focus of his discussion has changed somewhat and 
he is now concerned to ~ettle accounts with the idea that 
psychological processes are a n~cessary and sufficient hypothesis 
for the explanation of how words mean. He is aiming over.tly at 
Frege•s theory t~at every sentence contains an assumption which 
is asserted. Frege states his position as follows: 
"An interrogative sentence and an indicative one 
~ontain the same thought; but the indicative con-
tains something else as well, namely, the 
assertion ••• Therefore two things must be dis-
tinguished in an indicative sentence: the content 
which it has in common with the corresponding 
sentence question, and the assertion. The 
former is the thought, or at least contains the 
thought. So it is possible to express the 
thought without laying it down as true ••• 
Consequently we must distinguish: 
1. the apprehension of a thought - thinking 
2. the recognition of the truth of a thought - judgement 
3. the manifestation of this judgement - assertion". 5 .. 
This implies that something takes place in the mind 
which is expressed by the assertion sign (a vertical bar) 6 • in 
addition to the word.s: "such and such is the case." Wi ttgenstein 
4. Theaetetus 199. 
s. Frege, nThe Thought: A Logical Enquiry~' Mind Vol. LXV No. 259 
6. Frege, _nBegrif:fsschrifti'S2 trans. P.T. Geach. 
I 
- 11 • 
replies: 11And if' I write not 'It is asserted that ••• 1 , but 
1 It is asserted: such and such is the case,' the words •It 
. is asserted simply become superf'luous. 11 7 • So the game of' 
asserting something does not require a· mental state- the 
"asserting staten - if' it is to be played, anymore than a 
particular set of mental pictures are necessary to playing a 
game of' chess. 
• 
And here Wittgenstein introduces the concept of' the 
language-game in order, nto bring into prominence the f'act 
that the speaking of' language is part of' an activity or of' a 
f'orm of' lire." a. Just as a f'orm of' lire contains a diver-
sity of' practices, so with language. The primitive language 
game which we described earlier, belies a fairly complex set 
of' practices which are necessary in order that the language 
may be used and another set in order that it may be taught. 
Wittgenstein considers the teaching practice an important 
linguistic feature to be described in an investigation into 
meaning. ni used at one time to say that in order to get 
clear how a· certain sentence is used, it was a good idea to 
ask oneself' the question, 'How could one verify such an 
assertion.• But this is just one way among others of' getting 
clear about the use of' a word or a sentence. For example 
another question which is of'ten very useful to ask oneself' is, 
•How is th~s word iearned? How would people set about teach-
ing a child this word? :1 n9• 
One type of' teaching which the builder's assistant 
might need will involve the. giving of' ostensive definitions 
and even the ostensive definition game presupposes a knowledge 
of' the meaning of certain words on the part of' the pupil. 
e.g. If' I define •two• by pointing to two objects then this 
might be taken as·re:t:erring to just these particular objects, 
or to their colour. I can then say "This number is called 
• two • n, but then • number' must be understood or .it too needs 
7. P.I. 22 
a. P.I. 23 
9. From, "Ludwig Wittgenstein 11 by D.A.T.G. and A.C.J., 
The Australasian Jou~nal of' Philosophy XXIX, 2, P.79, 
quoted by Hartnack. 
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to be defined. The series of definitions will vary in length 
according to whether the pupil "gets" a definition or requires 
a further one which will depend· on what one might call his 
linguistic experience. 11So one might say: the ostensive 
definition explains the use - the meaning - of the word when 
the overall role of the word in language is clear". 10• 
If it is argued that such prior knowledge is unnecessary 
and that the meaning can be learnt by seeing or guessing what is 
being pointed to, then descriptionsmust be given of what, for 
example, ''Pointing to the shape" or "pointing to the colour 11 
consists in. One might answer·by saying, "I fix my attention 
on the colour", but this can involve doing very different things 
and the 11mental act of attention" is not sufficient for us to 
be able to say that someone is attending. The c~iteria of 
someone•s attending will be his actions within a certain context -
moves in a game. Similarly we can say that some<>ne is 11solving 1 
a chess problem" not by hypothesising about his inward state I 
but by watching· what he does and referring that to the context 
of his actions. Further, if "meaning the colouru always in-
volves my doing just these things (moving my eyes· in this way, 
gesturing like that) and having just these sensations, it is 
still quite conceivable that the person whom I am teaching may 
observe my movements, feel my sensations, and yet interpret my 
ostensive definition in a way I had not foreseen. And here 
Wittgenstein enunciates in the clearest possible terms one of 
the great philosophic temptations to nonsense •••• 11because we 
cannot specify any.one bodily action which we call pointing to 
the shape (as opposed for example to the colour) we say that a 
spiritual (mental, intellectual) activity corresponds to these 
words. Where our language suggests a body and there is none: 
h h ld lik t ;s a . "t n 11. t ere, we s ou e o say • sp~r~ • 
Closely connected with the giving of ostensive 
definitions is the use and teaching of names and the temptations 
to oversimplify and to spiritualise are as powerful, here as 













The relation comes out in the use, and is not "some remarkable 
act or the mind, as it were, a baptism or the object". This 
view makes us think that this state of mind is expressed by 
the words •this• and •that• since they are always used in nam-
ing ("This ·is called •. •") ·and so are thought to signify a 
necessary mental correlate - a nomenative state of mind one 
might say. We should remember Wittgenstein argues that 'this• 
and •that• are not used as names -we don•t say 11That is called 
• this • • n ·· 
The other form or over simplification - and the more 
persuasive one, I think • is that a name signifies a simple 
to which it corresponds, or that ir it signifies a structure, 
and the elements of this structure become detached £rom each 
other, then the name stands for these simple elements - this 
one, this one, and that one. This view is one which I take 
to be held by Russell 12 • and which is illustrated by his 
following statements on the topic: 
11When I say that an unspecified member. or a class 
occurred, my statement is significant provided I 
know what class is meant; but in the case or a 
true proper name, the name is meaningless unless 
it names something, and ir it names something, that 
something must occur. This may seem reminiscent 
or the ontological argument, b~t i t::is really only 
part of the derini tion or "name". A proper name 
names something or which there are not a plurality 
or instances, and names it by a convention ad hoc, 
not by a description composed of words with 
previously assigned meanings. Unless, therefore, 
the name names something, it is an empty noise, 
not a word.n 13. 
This position, says Wittgenstein, confounds the mean• 
ing or a name with the bearer or a name. "When Mr. N.N. dies 
one says.that the bearer or the name dies, not that the mean-
ing dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for ir 
the name ceased to have meaning it would not make sense to say 
•Mr N N ·s d d 1 n 14 • In very th · of • • • ~ ea • many cases e mean~ng · 
12. Stenius, op. cit. p.ll9 
13. Russell~ "An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth", Pelican, p.30 
14. P.I. 40. 
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a word is its use, and at most we can say that the meaning of 
a name is sometimes taught by pointing to its bearer. The role 
of naming is such that it makes the language-game of descrip-
tion possible - but the actual naming is not a move in the 
language-game but a preparation for the game. When one names 
an element one makes it a paradigm which serves as a means of 
representation in a language, rather like any standard of 
measurement does in measuring (the standard metre rule in Paris). 
The element itself has no extraordinary properties such as its 
being eternal and indestructible, rather one might say that it 
has grammatical properties assigned to it in order that it may 
serve as a representative paradigm. "And to say, 'If it did 
not exist, it could have no name• is to say as much -·and as 
little as: if this thing did not exist we could not use it in 
our language game ••••" l5. 
So a man can die and his name still mean something; 
therefore the so-called •indestructible elements• must be con-
strued as paradigms used·in the language-game without which the 
name would have no meaning because it would have no use. This 
conclusion however, can tempt one into thinking that if no 
paradigm exists as part of the language - (as a patch on a 
colour chart, say) - then it flashes before the mind the same 
every time, and is in this sense indestructible. But since we 
often remember incorrectly, or .alternatively, since memories 
fade, the mental picture is no more permanent and indestructible 
than the physical picture. · The "solution" to the "problem" 
of finding an indestructible paradigm is attempted on the basis 
of a misconception. When we say that one cannot say "Red 
exists" because if there were no red it could not be spoken at 
all, we think we are talking about a particular property of 
red - its eternal and indestructible character. In fact we 
are making what Wittgenstein will later call a grammatical pro-
position about the way the word is used in the language-game. 
What he has shown so far is that (a) language involves 
far more than a combination of names (b) that 11naming 11 and 











ostensively defining are different but related practices, 
(c) that names do not "stand for 11 indestructible simples, 
(individuals, objects)·but that these objects are paradigms 
and there paradigmatic role is indicated by the way the names 
of the objects are used, and by the grammatical nature of 
the propositions which we make about paradigms such as nred 11 
or 11blue11 • 
The material we have dealt with so far has'been 
collected in order to launch an attack at one of the strongest 
citadels of logical atomism, namely the contention that analysis 
' 
always yields a mor~ fundamental form of sentence. The atomist 
says that the names in sentences correspond to indestructible 
elements of reality. Wittgenstein points out how odd this 
idea is since we have no notion of what such an element would 
be like. All we.have seen are components of structures. 
e.g. the legs, arms and back of a chair. In the Tractatus 
he had written - "Every statement about complexes can be re-
solved into a statement about their constituents and into-pro-
positions that describe the complexes completely (2.0201). 
Objects make up the ~ubstance of the world. That is why they 
cannot be composite (2.021). Objects are what is unalterable 
and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and 
unstable" (2.0271) and a little further on 11A proposition has 
one and only one complete analysis" (3.25).· He now calls this 
theory into quest ions with the famous nbroom in the corner" 
example, which has aroused the ire of Professor Marcuse 16·• 
whose force of attack on it seems to me to be in inverse pro-
portion to his understanding the point he is attacking. We 
can analyse the sentence, "My broom is in the corner" into 
statements about the broomstick and the brush, but this should 
not lead us to think that the two sentences are contained im-
- plicitly in the one sentence. As Wittgenstein says one would 
probably reply to a request for 11the broomstick and the brush 
which is fitted into it" with 11Db you want the broom? Why do 
you put it so oddly?" 
One might want to say that in the unanalysed sentence 
one missed the analysis, but the reverse might be equally true. 






A description of a configuration of red, white and blue 
stripes just would not have the same point or meaning as the 
words liThe Union J~ckn. 
Behind the idea of the complete analysis lurks 
another: that the essence of language can be revealed by the 
dissection of sentences and can be expressed in terms of a 
theory of the general forms of all,propositions. This 
general form is supposed to be revealed in the component argu-
ments of a truth functional compound. But as we have just 
seen, the sentences of an analysed sentence and the "sarne 11 un-
analysed sentence, often belong to different language games. 
How then are we to find the essence of language? Wittgenstein 
argues that the essentialist endeavour is misguided. Instead 
of searching (in vain) for the essence of language we should 
recognise that languages are related, as games are, by family 
resemblances. The hopelessness o.f a search for the essence 
of language might lead us into saying such nonsense as, that 
the disjunction of all the properties of language games is 
what is common to them. "Something runs through the whole 
thread - namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres. 11 17• 
Wittgenstein caustically remarks. 
Of course I can give the term •game' a rigid defini-
tion if I decide to draw a boundary~ The boundary cannot 
however be found, it can only be drawn. Stace deals with 
this point very well in his defence of empiricism. He writes: 
"For all classification, and therefore all 
oefinition, is relative to some purpose, which 
may be justifiable but may also be founded on 
mere prejudice. The decision to draw the 
line at any particular point is not dictated 
by the set of facts being classified, though 
of course it cannot ignore facts." 18. 
We might teach someone how to use the word "game" by telling 
him about. the game~ we know - we could not perhaps do better 
17. P.I. 67. 
18. Stace, nSome Misinterpretations of Empiricism". 
Mind VOL. LXVII, Oct. ~958. 
1-
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than this, "But this is not ignorance. We do not know the 
boundaries because none have been drawn." 19• 
When I "see what is common" to a number of instances 
I may have a picture of something which I use as a paradigm 
of essence. But the picture needs to be used in a certain 
way in order to be a paradigm of essence. i.e. it is by con-
vention, or by my decision that THIS is considered to be the 
essence. "Essence is expressed by grammar.u 20 • When I say 
I know what· a game is, but can• t say exactly·, this does not 
mean that I have a vague picture which will eventually become 
trimmed to the exactness of a definition. My knowledge is in 
fact expressed in all the possible examples I could give. 
"Vagueness" writes Waismann, "should be distinguished from open 
texture ••• ·open texture •• is something like a possibility of 
vagueness. Vagueness can be remedied by giving more accurate 
rules, open texture cannot. .An alternative way of stating 
this would be to say that definitions of open terms are always 
corrigible or amendablen 21 • He goes on to explain what he 
means by the open texture of a definition, and his account 
summarises Wittgenstein1 s point so exactly that I should like 
to quote from it at some lenth: 
"Supp.ose for a moment that we were able to describe 
situations· completely without omitting anything (as in chess), 
then we could produce an exhaustive list of all the circumstances 
in which the term is to be used so that nothing is left to 
doubt; in other words we could construct a complete definition 
i.e. a thought model which anticipates and settles once for all 
every possible question o£ usage. As, in fact, we can never 
eliminate the possibility of some unforeseen factor em~ging, 
we can never be quite sure that we have included in our defini-
tion everything that should be included, and thus the process 
of defining and redefining an idea will go on without ever 
reaching a final stage. In other words, every definition 
stretches into an open horizon ••• Thus the result is the in-
19. P.I. 68. 
20. P.I. 371. 
21. Waismann, •rveri£iability11 , Logic and Language First Series. 
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completeness of the definition of the terms involved, and the 
incompleteness of the definition is rooted in the incompleteness 
of empirical description; that is one of the grounds why a 
material object statementPcannot be verified conclusively nor 
be resolved into statements s,s2 •••• s which describe evidences 22. n 
for it. 
Ttiese quotations from Stace and Waismann express the 
two ideas which Wittgenstein has used all through his attack on 
the atomist theory of language. Firstly, the definitional 
lines which mark off what is essential from what is non-essential 
are drawn by us, not found in the object. Secondly, the nature 
of all descriptions and definitions which apply to empirical 
objects is such that they are never complete. The philosophers' 
failure to remember these points results in a problem or 
"disquietude", for 11in philosophy we often compare the use of 
words with games and calculi which have fixed rules," 23 • and 
then forget that the rules of linguistic usage are not nearly 
as strictly predetermined as are the rules of the propositional 
calculus, or the rules of poker. It is, therefore, with these 
philosophic problems that Wittgenstein goes on to deal, in order 
to throw more light on what causes them and how they are to be 
treated. 
22. Ibid. 
23 P.I. 81 • • 
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C H A P T E R II 
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS AND GRAMMATICAL ILLUSIONS 
"Indeed, can't we define a philosophical discussion 
as a discussion as to whether any of us know what all of us 
know we all know.n 
110ther Minds 11 - 111 Pages 60 & 61. · 
Wittgenstein's approach to the discussion of the 
character and causes of philosophical problems seem at first 
reading a little odd. He does not say explicitly that he is 
beginning a new section and so my division is perhaps a bit 
artificial. What he does say is that before we can achieve 
any clarity on the question of the aim and method of a logico-
philosophic investigation we must examine what is involved in 
meaning, understanding and thinking something. The reasons 
for this will become clearer later but, anticipating a little, 
I should say that these topics are used as "reminders" of the 
attractiveness and compulsion of philosophical misconceptions -
particularly the so-called essentialist misconception which 
Wittgenstein constantly attacks. The idea that there is only 
one way - one process - one interpretation, and that this one 
way is the way it ~be, exercises a power over the intelligence 
which can only be removed by reminding ourselves of alternative 
ways, processes and interpretations, etc. which ~also be. 
So he starts by discussing what it means to understand 
or follow a rule. The nrule by which someone proceeds" could 
mean: (a) the description we are able to give of this method 
after observing what he does (b) the table of the rules he 
consults (c) the answer he gives when we ask what rule he uses. 
* But (a) we might not be able to observe any clear rule by watch-
* * ing what he does (b) he might consult no table (c) he might 
have no answer to our question or be prepared to alter the one 





expressions would indicate to Wittgenstein that one was in the 
grip of a philosophical problem and that one was about to talk 
in an extraordinary (nonsensical?) way. A situation in which 
* * * (a), (b) & (c) apply might seem to be one in which there was 
no certain way of knowing what rules are being employed, if any, 
and whether they are being employed correctly. One might want 
to say that this particular game was a very loose one - hardly 
a game at all·. In fact this situation applies to a lesser or 
greater degree in every game. In some games we make up· the 
rules or alter them as we go along. And even in a game tightly 
bounded by rules such as chess or poker we can imagine a doubt 
as to how to apply the rules, i.e. we can imagine the need for 
rules for the use of rules. Whether this need arises is an 
empirical matter: some rules leave room for doubt, others do not. 
Every definition, for example, might itself stand in 
need of definition, but not everyone does. An explanation 
only requires to be explained if a misunderstanding occurs. 
This applies to orders as well e.g. 11Stand roughly here 11 might 
achieve its purpose very satisfactorily. If one is tempted 
to say "But it is inexact -it leaves·too much leeway for mis-
understanding" then we must see what we mean by "inexact" in 
this context,- and what the point of a greater exactitude· would 
be. A thin line might be drawn on the ground but it still has 
breadth. Delicate instruments might be used to measure when 
someone had crossed the edge of the line. "But has exactness 
still got a function here: isn•t the engine· idling?n 1 • 
11Exactnessn is used as a term of praise when a particular goal 
is in mind·, so it is the goal which determines what exactness 
will mean. One might say that the logic of 11exactness 11 varied 
according to the circumstances in which the term was used, and 
that the logic of the word revealed the meaning of the word. 
This last statement about the logic of the word 
(vague as it is) has a strong attraction, in Wittgenstein's 
opinion, for the philosopher. Logical investigations seem to 
1. P.I. 88. 
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penetrate deep into things and to lay bare a necessary founda• 
tion which explains why things must be as they are. This sort 
of investigation does not involve the discovery of causal 
connections but rather the illumination of a priori patterns 
within things themselves, somewhat on the lines of Leibniz's 
11Mondology"• Logic seems to lie at the heart of phenomena 
which need only to be penetrated for their natures to be re-
vealed and their necessity made plain. And yet logical in-
vestigations are not like those of natural science. The 
character of their problems, what Althusser calls their 
11problematicn, is toto coelo different. As an example 
Wittgenstein· asks us to compare Augustin's problem with 11 the 
nature of time": (si nemo ex me querat scio, si quaerenti 
explicare velim, nescio") with any empirical problem. 
Augustin's problem seems, as Wittgenstein often says, to have 
. 2 
the character of depth. • Its solution dangles before our 
noses and yet we do not come any closer to solving it. Why 
is this? 
Wittgenstein suggests that this state of affairs 
arises when the nature of the investigation is mistaken. 
11We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investi-
gation, however, is not directed towards phenomena, but, as 
one might say, towards the 'possibilities• of phenomena. We 
remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of sta~ement we 
make about phenomena". 3 • From this one can see that philo-
sophical investigations are not concerned with natural science, 
but the grammar of· their probiems makes it look as if they 
were problems of natural science. It is this very similarity 
of grammatical form which Wittgenstein holds to be responsible 
for many of the misconceptions in philosophy and which should 
itself be the object of an investigation. So telling is this 
insight that it is illustrated by the very practice of 
philosophy itself which misconstrues its own role because the 
grammar of its problems is, on the surface, similar to tha~ 
of natural science. 
2~ P.I. 111 
3. P.I. 90 
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"Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. 
Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing 
misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use 
of words, caused among other things, by certain analogies be-
tween the forms of expression in different regions of language. -
Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of ex-
pression for another:· This may be called an •analysis• of 
our forms of expression for the process is sometimes like one 
of taking things apart. 11 4 • The mistake of the Tractatus is 
to think that there is something like a complete analysis 
which will give the meaning of an expression without any possi-
bility of ambiguity arising. To think this is to make the 
same mistake as we saw could be made with, 11Stand roughly here 11 • 
It is to seek what Aristotle warns against in the Ethics: an 
exactitude and precision which is out of place in the subject 
matter under consideration: nFor example it is absurd to 
demand logical demonstrations from a professional speaker; we 
might as well accept mere probabilities from a mathematician." 5 • 
ideal. 
Logical precision seems to stand before us as an 
Our philosophical investigations must leave no room 
for ninexactnessn or undefined terms. But when language is 
approached philosophically from this point of view it appears 
in a strange half light: on the one hand all the words and 
sentences are familiar, and ·On the other, they seem to have a 
·hidden core which is what they are "in essence". We begin to 
look for the general form of a proposition, or·we think that 
a proposition must be, na pure intermediary between the pro-
positional signs and the facts. Or we even try to sublime 
. 6 
the signs themselves." • Thought too is treated in this way. 
Thoughts seem to be pictorial correlates of the world whose 
logical form they share. If this logical order did not obtain 
how could words have fixed meanings? 
nthis order is a super-order between 
Wittgenstein replies, 
so to speak - super-
concepts. Whereas, of course, if the words 'language', 
•experience•, •world•, have a use it must be as humble-a one 
as the words, •·table•·, •lamp', 'door•." 7 • 
4~. P.I. 90 
5. Aristotle 1'Nicomachean Ethics 11 , Bk. I, trans. J.A.K. Thomson. 
6. P. I. 94 
7. P.I. 97 
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This is the bewildering ambiguity of a philosophical 
perplexity. On the one hand we see that our ordinary sentences, 
sometimes vague, sometimes open-textured, have just the order 
they have, and operate pretty successfully. But on the other 
hand we want to say that if they have sense then the sense must 
be complete and perfect. "An enclosure with a hole in it is 
as good as none. • But is that true?" 8 • This is a brilliant 
analogy and if it is pursued it makes the point all the better. 
Fish nets for example are made with holes of varying sizes, 
depending on what they are used to catch. A fish net of 
tightly woven canvas or better still, of plastic sheeting (the 
plastic•s texture conforming to the ideal of "perfect sense"} 
would not be of very much use and might be so· cumbersome as· 
to be useless. The idea of nthe perfect sense" is the same 
as the ideal of the perfect game, one completely bounded by 
rules. But this misconstrues the part that the ideal plays 
in language. It leads us to say that, rrstand roughly here" 
bas no sense. We think that the ideal must be found in the 
language (in the signs} but since we do not find it there we 
come to think that the pure sense exists in the medium of the 
understanding, which is then conceived of as the intermediary 
between the propositional signs and the world. 9 • Thoughts, 
as it were, float between the inner and the outer worlds, being 
grasped by the former (the understanding} and reflecting the 
latter. Thus Frege writes: 
·~o the result seems to be thoughts are neither 
things of the outer world nor ideas. 
A third realm must be recognised. What belongs 
to this corresponds with ideas, in that it cannot 
be perceived by the senses, but with things, in 
that it needs no bearer to the contents of whose 
consciousness to belong •••• When one apprehends 
or thinks a thought one does not create it but 
only comes to stand in a certain relation, which 
is different from seeing a thing or having an 
idea, to what already existed beforehand." 10. 
Here we have one form, a very sophisticated one, of 
trying to reduce thought and meaning to a bed-rock, to a level 
8~ P.I. 99 
9. B.B. p.3 
10. Frege, "The Thought; A Logical Enquiry. rr 
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where we can say, 11Well it must be like that otherwise language 
and thought are impossible.n nThe ideal as we think of it is 
unshakeable •••••• Where does this idea come from? It is like 
a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we 
look at. It never occurs to us to take them off." 11 • Now 
of course glasses can be very useful, but not if we don•t re-
quire them, and not if we are given reading glasses when we are 
rather short sighted. Wittgenstein treats the philosophic 
problem as a conflict between the requirements of the investi-
gation and the object of the investigation. The general form 
of the conflict emerges in the specific case of the philosophy 
of language out of the attempt to distil a crystalline logical 
purity out of the set of grammatical analogies and v~gue similari-
ties which are found in ordinary language. The result is that 
language is tailored to the requirements of the investigation. 
11We have got. on to slippery ice where there is no friction and 
so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just 
because of that, we are unable to walk.. Back to the rough 
ground.n 12 • i.e. back from the ideal of "perfect language" to 
ordinary language, language at work, in use. He goes on to 
make a rather enigmatic and highly compressed statement, "The 
preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by 
turning our examination round. ·(One might say: the axis of 
reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the 
fixed point of our real need)" 13 • This implies, I think, an 
almost literal Copernican revolution in philosophy. The axis 
of reference of our investigation is indeed that clarity of 
which he speaks later. But our real need is to remove the 
puzzles which occur in philosophy because of misleading surface 
similarities between the grammars of sentences in ordinary 
language. The mistake hitherto has been to "perfect" language 
in various ways or to invent "ideal" languages so ignoring our 
real need and leaving the philosophical problems untreated. 
Philosophical problems he argues, are to be solved, 
nby looking into the workings of our language." 14 • They seem 
to be deep problems, incapable of ordinary solution, and our 
11~ P.i. 103 · 
12~ P.I. 107 
13. P.I. 108 












inability to come up with extraordinary solutions leads to a 
frustration which Wittgenstein describes when he writes, n •But 
THIS isn•t how it is,• we say. •Yet THIS is how it has to be.• u15• 
When we read the phrases, 11the branch of the tree" and "the top 
of the tree" in the ordinary way, we know perfectly well what 
they mean (we know nhow things are" with each phrase). But 
when we are doing philosophy we ar~ 'disquieted' by the fact that 
there is nothing in the tree which we could cut .. off" and take 
home as 11the top 11 • We don't seem to know our way about· any 
more. 
16
·• If we look into ·the workings of the phrases when 
they are used in ordinary language we see "That though we can 
use quasi-descriptive phrases to enable us· to state where some-
thing is, that the thin~~s there is a relational. character of 
the thing and not itself' a subject of characters" 17 • So that 
what appeared as a problem is shown up as a mistake about grammar. 
The most pervasively misleading mistake in the philo-
sophy of language is to construe all sentences as being funda-
mentally propositional in character. The reduction of language 
to one general form of propositions becomes a requirement of the' 
investigation which blinkers the philosopher to the extent that 
"One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's 
nature over and over again and one is merely tracing round the 
frame. through which we look at it.n 18 • An alternative way of 
stating this which Wittgenstein us~s in the Blue Book and again 
here is to say that we derive a picture from a linguistic ex-
pression which we try to transpose into another area of language, 
when in fact no application has been found for the picture there. 
Pole interprets this form of argument as being an attack on all 
pictorial ways of thinking. "Wittgenstein," he writes, "seems 
to recognise no positive r8le at_all as belonging to them; they· 
are nonfunctional themselves, but block our vision of the 
functioning of words. He constantly appeals to us to ignore 
the pictures which we associate with our words and look instead 
h . 19. at t e~r use." He goes on to say that he finds this approach 
15~ P.r. 112 
16~ P.r. 123 
17. Ryle, "Systematically Misleading Expressions". Logic of 
Language, First Series. 
18. P.r. 114· 





implausible but that it is in line with Wittgenstein 1 s "trade" 
which is demolition. 
Pole•s argument is persuasive at first but it seems 
to me that it is neither accurate nor consistent. It is in-
accurate for the reason that Wittgenstein distinguishes between 
11idle pictures" and pictures which have particular uses. 20• 
It is therefore incorrect to say that he considers all pictures 
to be non-£unctionale Furthermore, he is not concerned to 
disguise the fact that we constantly operate with pictures in 
the course o£ our ncalculatingn with words. The argument is 
inconsistent because Pole has earlier correctly stated that it 
is not with pictures as such but with their application or 
lack o£ application which Wittgenstein is concerned. He ex-
plicitly says, 11To achieve his end, to wean us from our pre-
conceptions and· break the power o£ those pictures which have 
come to dominate our thinking, Wittgenstein also employs various 
imaginative devices.u 21 • 
These devices are used to show us cases o£ linguistic 
usage which might not otherwise have occurred to us. They aid 
us in our attempts adequately to describe the workings o£ 
language, for it is Wittgenstein•s contention that philoso-
phical problems cease to puzzle us when we get a clear view of 
these workings. 
of our language 
So we must give "perspicuous representations" 
by n£inding and inventing intermediate cases.n· 22 • 
In doing this one does not so much solve problems as dissolve· 
them, by seeing them for what they are. What is required is 
that the problem be adequately described. When for example 
we lay down rules for a game and then rind that things do not 
turn out in the game quite as we had expected (when we make 
logical purity a criterion of what makes sense in language) 
then it is our entanglement in the rules that we must get a 
clear look at. The WHOLE entanglement must be clearly seen. 
20~ P.I. 291 
21. Pole, op. cit. p.28. 
22. P.I. 122 
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As Wisdom notes, this point was made by Freud and I think 
that the psycho-analytic method throws quite a bit of light 
on what Wittgenstein means when he says that " .... the 
clarity we are aiming at is. indeed complete clarity. But 
this means that the philosophical problems should completely 
disappear.n 23 • This clarity is to be achieved by "assembling 
. d f . 1 . 24 • . b . reml.n ers or a part1.cu ar purpose." That l.S, y pol.nt-
ing to examples which simply do run· against what we are in-
clined in philosophy.to say, must be the case. 
Wisdom remarks, in a note to the Black-White debate, 
on how we come to know the invisible and what meaning is attached 
to, nknows what•s going on in the mind of another," "The whole 
difficulty arises like a difficulty in a neurotic;· The forces 
are conflicting but nearly equal. The philosopher remains in 
a state of confused tension unless he makes the effort necessary 
to bring them all out by speaking of them together. It isn't 
that people can•t resolve philosophical difficulties but that 
they won•t. In philosophy it is not a matter of making sure 
that one·has got hold of the right theory but of making sure 
that one has got hold of them all. Like psychoanalysis it is 
not a matter of selecting from all our inclinations some which 
are right, but of bringing them all to light by mentioning them 
and in this process creating some which are right for this in-
dividual in these circumstances." 25 • 
·I 
I 
To bring the various t~eories to light may of course 
require various techniques - some~eories lending themselves 
to diagrammatic representation and others not, for example. 
This is I think what Wittgenstein means when he says, 11There 
is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed· methods, 
like different therapies.u 26 • These therapies cannot them-
selves be characterised as forms of theorising or of explanation -
they merely put before us what we have always known. 
23. P.I. 133 
24r; P.I. 127 
25. John Wisdom, uother Minds", p.l24 
26. P.I. 133 
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C H A P T E R III 
FOLLOWING RULES 
"Why are people so strongly drawn to believe, in 
the face of their own daily experience, that the 
intelligent execution of an operation must em-
body two processes, one of doing and another of 
theorising? Part of the answer is that they 
are wedded to the dogma of the ghost in the machine. 
Sin6e doing is often an overt muscular affair, it. 
is written off as a merely physical process. On 
the assumption of the antithesis between •physical• 
and •mental•, it follows that muscular doing can-
not itself be a m~ntal operation. To earn the 
title 'skilful,• •cunning,• or 'humorous,• it 
" . " 
must therefore get it by transfer from another 
counterpart act occurring not •in the machine' but 
• in the ghost; • for • skilful, • -• cunning, • and--
- - . . -
I humOrOUS t are ··certainly mental ··prediCateS e II 
Gilbert Ryle. 11The Concept of Mindtt P-.32 
The discussion of what is involved in following a 
rule, serves a variety of purposes. (a) It throws light on 
what sorts of things rules are and so clarifies how a_philo-
sophical entanglement with rules may come about. (b) It 
shows the inadequacy of the hypothesis of a mental mechanism 
to explain what Ryle calls "intelligent execution and 
operation". (c) It strengthens Wittgenstein•s argument that 
the meanings of signs are to be found in the way they are 
used. (d) It introduces the discussion of privacy by attack-
ing the notion that it makes sense to talk of obeying a rule 
privately. 
Puzzled by "the nature of language" the philosopher 
tries to ease his discomfort by introducing a rule in the 
guise of a definition. He says that the general form of 
propositions is, "This is how things are 11 • He argues that 
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although this is itself an English sentence it is used as the 
propositional variable "P" is, in symbolic logic. But we 
.can see immediately that we do not say that "P" is the general 
form of propositions because part of our concept of a proposi-
tion is that it should sound like an English sentence. The 
correct thing to say is that there are many kind of propositions 
and we can give examples of these different kinds. But the 
question still nags at us, "How do you know whether they are 
all propositions? Isn•t one of the tests of a proposition 
that it must fit the concepts of true or false?" . This says 
Wittgenstein is a misleading picture. "True" and "Falsen 
might belong to our concept of a proposition just as "sounding 
like a proposition" belongs to it, but they do not "fit" it. 
They are not the forms into which the wordy matter is fitted so 
as to make that matter propositional in essence. 11Th is is how 
things are," fits in the way that L fits after K wh·en we recite 
the alphabet. And we might say to a child when teaching it to 
'"~ 
pick out a proposition," 1 Ask yourself ~:t' you can say "is true," 
after it. If these words fi"!: then it is a proposition.'" 
1
• 
Another tack would be to say that the meaning of a 
word fits the sense of a sentence which I understand. If the 
meaning of a word is the way it is used then this statement 
obviously makes no sense: the picture of something fitting 
something else is inappropriate. A tendency to think of 
meaning as some sort of shadowy picture grasped by the under-
standing is revealed here. This way of thinking ignores that 
every picture can be applied and interpreted in various ways. 
For example, I may seem to misuse the picture of a cube if I 
point from it to a triangular prism, but with a suitable method 
of projection the picture does 11fit 11 the prism. , 
Even when a schema is supplied to represent how a 
picture is to be interpreted the possibility of the schema 
itself being interpreted remains wide open. When I teach 
someone an interpretation I judge whether he has understood 
me by the use he makes of the diagrammatic schema_ I give him 
l. P.I. 137 
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or of the image he carries in his head. 
tions are fulfilled or they are not. 
Either my expecta-
Only in the normal case, 
where he has ngot my meaning" is there no doubt as to the 
interpretation and just because of this the abnormal case 
illuminates the normal case. · 
Wittgenstein now moves to attack the idea of a mental 
process which is supposed to explain understanding. He 
suggests the following language-game: 
A teaches B the series of natural numbers. What 
does it mean to say that B understands the teaching of A? 
This, that he consistently writes down the series in the 
correct order. - Suppose I teach someone a series and he 
eventually continues it. How far must he go before I say 
that he•s got it -the thousandth place? One is tempted to 
say that continuing is only applyin_g the understanding and 
that "understanding is a state which is a source of the correct 
use,u· 2 • just as an algebraic formula may be ,thought of as the 
source of the series. 
If we have the idea that we know the series or the 
application of derivation rules apart from actual derivations, 
then we can be asked when we know the application - always? 
Sometimes? only when we think of the rule? We can only 
answer by saying that knowledge is a state of mind, a con-
dition of a mental apparatus which explains our knowing. But 
as Ryle points out, nto possess a propositional property is 
not to be in a particula:r state, or to undergo a particular 
change; it is to be _pound or liable to be in a particular 
state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular 
condition is realised.n 3 • And besides as Wittgenstein says,u 
•••• there are objections to speaking of a state of mind here,· 
in as much as there ought to be two different criteria fqr 
such a state: a knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, 
quite apart from what it does,n 4 • and a kn~wledge of the 
2. P.I. 146 
3. Ryle, "The Concept of Mind 11 , p.43 
4. P.I. 149 
I . 
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former is lacking to ·most of us. 
A more fruitful approach is yielded by his insight 
that the word 11knows 11 is often used like 11can" or 11is able to," 
and that its grammar· is also closely related to that of 
"understands". And here he uses a very good example. When 
I understand· how to continue this series 1, 5, 11, 19, 29, the 
following things might happen: 
(a) I try various algebraic formula and light on 
an = n 2 + n - 1 which is confirmed to be correct. 
{b) I find the series of differences 4,6,8,10, and 
say "Now I can go on" and do so. 
(c) I say, "Yes, I know that series as well as I 
know the series 1, 2, 3, ~' 5 11 and I continue. 
(d) I say no~hing but simply continue the series 
with the feeling, 11that•s· easy." 
But are these possibilities really understanding? 
We feel that there is something hidden behind (a), {b), (c) & 
(d) which is "understanding THE PRINCIPLE of the series,n and 
< 
yet we cannot· find this proce~s. We don 1 t know how o:r where 
to look for it. Wittgenstein suggests, ·~ry not to tnink of 
understanding as a •mental process• at all. - For THAT is the 
expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what 
sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, 'Now I 
know how to go on,• when, that is, the formula HAS occurred to 
me?n 5• It is the circumstances under which we have the ex-
perience which justify us in saying we understando Strawson 
e.::1ters a caution here agairtst exactly the sort of misinter-
pretation which Wittgenstein would want us to avoid. He 
writes, "This obviously does not mean that the words 'Now I 
can go onl' are short for a description of all these circum-
stances, or that they mean 'I have had an experience which I 
know empirically to lead to--the continuation of the series;• 
5. P.I. 154 
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my certainty that I can go on is not a matter of induction. 
What we need (here I interpret a little) is to look at such 
first person utterances in a radically different way from 
the way in which we look at the corresponding third person 
utterances: to see them not as reports about myself for giv-
ing which I have to apply criteria, but rather as 'exclama-
tions• or •signals•, naturally and appropriately made or 
given-in certain circumstances ... 6 • 
The attractiveness of the hypothesis of a mental 
mechanism as it is used in philosophy is very clearly illus-
trated in the case of explanations as to what reading con-
sists in. We want to say that the difference between a 
fluent reader and a child who guesses correctly at words or 
knows the passage by heart is that there must be a different 
mechanism at work.in each of them. Now in the case of a 
reading machine we could say that it was reading when its 
mechanism was correctly adjusted, but in the case where we 
teach someone to read our cri~erion will be whether he con-
sistently reads correctly and the concept of reading here 
will be independent of any hypothesis of a mechanism. 
"The change when the pupil began to read was a change in 
his behaviour.n 7 • If we fall prey to saying that the 
criterion of a·person•s reading is the presence of a certain 
conscious process with its various accompaniments such as 
hesitating, looking more closely, misreading, etc. then 
Wittgenstein asks us to remember that it is conceivable that 
someone should read an unfamiliar passage with a feeling 
that he knew it by heart. 
A slightly different but equally inadequate approach 
would be to say that in reading we derived sounds from letters 
according to a rule and that it is this derivation .which is 
characteristic of reading. But this only reproduces our 
difficulty for there is no one feature which is essential to 
6. Strawson, "Review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
lnvestigations,n Mind_Vol. LXIII (1954) 
reprinted in Pi~~her, p.36. 





deriving. A derivation schema can take all sorts of forms. 
In the same way there are a number of cases for which we use 
the word "reading". 
The psychological hypothesis reasserts itself with 
the suggestion that reading is characterised by the feeling 
of being guided by the letters. When we read English we 
nfeel the influence of the letters" in a way in which we do 
not when we scan Linear B: "••• that is really meant to imply 
that I, as it were feel the movement of the lever which connects 
seeing the letters with speaking." 8 • This feeling is of 
course not always or even often present in the case of fluent 
readers, so that it is quite impossible that it should be a 
criterion of reading. Saying that it is there unconsciously, 
or that closer inspection will reveal it is irrelevant as 
Wittgenstein shows when he says, "If I am supposed to describe . 
how an object looks from far off,- I don't make the description 
more accurate by saying what can be noticed about the object on 
closer inspection." 9 • What in fact happens in this case is 
that we latch on to one out of a variety of cases of being 
guided and refer to this as "the essence of being guided 11 • 
So we think perhaps of rails· guiding a train, or of the sensa-
tion we get when we are led blind-folded and we try to apply 
these pictures in the case of reading or writing. Since these 
pictures do not really apply at all in this case we get the 
idea that the guiding takes place, - but not in a visible or 
tangible way. "'For surely,• I tell myself, 1 I was being. 
guided.• -Only then does the·idea of that ethereal, intangible 
instance arise." 10• 
This discussion of nbeing guided" is extremely im-
portant to his treatment of following rule· and o£ understand-
ing and meaning something, to which we must now return. The 
idea of a guiding influence is closely related to the idea. 





10. P.I. 175 
(An argument with similar force is used by 






carry out are predetermined by our order to him, in the sense 
that all possible steps in accordance with the order are some-
how present in our minds, "As if they were in some unique way 
predetermined, anticipated·- as only the act of meaning can 
t . . 1 . 11. . . h . 1" k an ~c~pate rea ~ty.n The mean~ng ~s somet ~ng ~ e a 
final cause which determines the "end product in the beginning". 
This Aristotelian - Hegelian idea·, can be illustrated by the 
example of a machine, the movements of which may seem to some-
one with a metaphysical squint to be in it before ever it moves. 
One is apt in this case to forget the possibilities of the 
machine•s melting, breaking, etc.; or at least the philosopher 
forgets·· them, - the mechanic does not. It begins to seem as 
if the "possibilities or movement" are something very close to 
real movement. The possibility of a movement is 11supposed to 
be like a shadow of the movement itself"• 12 • It· is not 
sufficient that the possibilities of movement be represented 
by a diagrammatic drawing ror this can be interpreted in various 
( 
ways. No, the movements must be represented by what 
Wittgenstein calls in the Blue Book, a ·~icture by similarityn. 13• 
Such a picture permits of no interpretation and so is thought· 
to determine movement with the rigidity of the "logical must". 
This is an idea which is beautifully developed in the Founda• 
tions of Mathematics: "Suppose we represented the movement of 
the 'perfectly rigid 1 m~chanism by a cinematographic picture, 
a cartoon film. Suppose the picture was said to be PERFECTLY 
HARD, and this meant that we.had taken this picture as our 
method of description - whatever the facts may be, however the 
14 parts of the real mechanism may bend or expand." • And he 
goes on to say "The connection which is not supposed to be a 
causal, experiential one, but much stricter and harder, so 
rigid even, that the one somehow already is the other, is al-
. ~ 15. ways a connect~on o .... grammar." 
11~ P.I. 188 
12~ P.I. 194 
13. B.B. p.36 
14~ F.M. 121 
15. F.M. 128 
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In just this way one wants to say that when someone 
grasps what we mean, all the steps which we mean him to take 
are somehow determined. Wittgenstein objects to the "somehow" 
because this ma~es it look as though there is a "queer·u 
mysterious connection between what we say when we mean· some-
one to do something (continue a series, play a game of chess) 
and what he does; when in fact there is no strange, super-
rigid, mental shadow which determines what is to be done. 
intention and the thing intended, 
game of chess," exists, "••• in the 
teaching of it·, in the day to day 
The connection between my 
when I say, 11Let 1 s play a 
rules of the· game, in the 
practice of playing." 16• This bri~gs us to a clear view of 
the puzzle. It had·begun to look as though any rule could be 
interpreted in an unlimited number of ways, each perfectly 
justifiable, with the result that the idea of obeying a rule 
or following a rule became evacuated of meaning: "••• no 
course of action could be determined by a rule because every 
course of action can be made out to accord with the rule." 17 • 
What Wittgenstein has led us to see is that a rule 
and an interpretation of it do not constitute what we call 
obeying the rule, or ,following it correctly. A rule can 
only be obeyed in so far as the practice of doing so is part 
of an established system of such practices. This indicates 
two things, (a) "obeying a rule is a practice" 18• different 
from interpreting a rule (Wittgenstein prefers to reserve the 
latter for the expression of the rule); (b) a rule cannot be 
obeyed privately so that, "to think one is obeying a rule is 
not to obey i tn. 19• He asks whether, if mankind never played 
games, I could· invent a game which nobody ever played. The 
answer is •no•, because part of what we mean by a game is that 
. . 
it should have publicly ascertainable rules which are obeyed. 
So it is by reference to the common behaviou~ of 
mankind that languages, games and systems of rules generally, 
16~ P .I. 197 
17 ~ P.I. 201 
18~ P.I. 202 
19. P.I. 202 
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are interpreted. And when we teach someone what a rule is 
we employ such words as "regular", "same", nuniformn, the 
meanings of which we teach by reference to that system of 
behaviour. We give in other words, "examples and practice" 20 • 
as the groundwork of our t~aching. We cannot do more tharr 
this, for we know no more of the matter than this. A point 
is always reached in teaching a rule where either the lesson 
is understood or we say, '~ell I can't give you any more 
teaching than .I've given,- this is simply what I do when· I 
obey the rules. 11 All attempts at inventing an unambiguous 
way for teaching rules are futile. The voice of intuition 
for example also has to be understood before it can be obeyed, 
just as an ordinary teacher must be understood. Intuition 
does not provide us with a reason for obeying a rule which is 
somehow more fundamental than any other sort of reason. 
Similarly to say that when a pupil merely has to do the SAME 
.. 
every time there can be no failure to follow the rule correctly, 
is really to say nothing at all. For example, we might say 
that in the series in 2, 2, 2, 2 •••••••• every step is the 
same and so there 'is no room for an interpretation: when you · 
see a thing you see an identity. Wittgenstein•s answer is 
quite devastating: ·~hen are two things the same when they 
are what one thing is? And how am I to apply what the one 
thing shows me to the case of two things?" 21 • 
This discussion of identity is extremely important 
for the treatment of whether two people can have the same ·pain, 
and we will return to it in a later chapter. For the moment 
what he is concerned to show is that the law of identity is a 
blind alley as far as the question of teaching rules is concerned. 
Ultimately the teaching of a rule is a practical 
matter. Rules are grounded in a customary system of practices. 
The reasons I give for how I know how to obey a rule will come 
to an end some time and my practice alone will remain. In 
20~ ct. P.I. 337 on "intending". 











this sense my practice is 11groundless 11 • I take this way of 
putting it from On Certainty in which· Wittgenstein says a 
great deal which is significant for the concepts of under-
standing, doubting and making a mistakeo Particularly im-
portant for·the present discussion is the emphasis he lays 
there on established structures on beliefs and practices, 22 • 
and on the way that these structures are grounded on what is 
itself groundless. The close connection between what he is 
saying in the Investigations and what he is saying in On· 
Certainty can be seen £rom these two quotations. 11How can 
he know that he is to continue a pattern by himself - whatever 
instructions you give him? - Well, how do I know? - If that 
means •Have I reasons?• The answer is: my reasons will soon 
give out. Then I shall act, without reasons. 23 • 110ur 
rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak 
£or itself." 24 • 
22~ o.c. 102 to 111 
23~ P.I. 211 






The next five chapters are devoted specifically to 
discussion of certain aspects of the other .. minds problem -
aspects which Wittgenstein comes to grips with in his later 
writings. My method of handling this part of the thesis will 
be rather different from Part I. I shall not follow the text 
of any particular work of Wittgenstein although the ·source 
material for these chapters, whether remoulded by other philo-
sophers or not, comes in the main from the Blue and Brown Books, 
the Philosophical Investigations, Zettel and On Certainty. 
For instance, though the chapter on communication and in-
tention is largely a summary of Professor Strawson•s inaugural 
lecture, my justification for using it in a· thesis ··on 
Wittgenstein is that, as I am sure Strawson would admit, the 
ideas and arguments which·he marshals so efficiently are ones 
which spring from Wittgenstein•s philosophising. 
I think a fairly close textual commentary on the 
middle sections of the Investigations, in which the private-
language argument and the argument for private mental objects 
are discussed, would be possible·. . Wi ttgensteiri' s remarks 
only appear to have a certain randomness about them. In fact 
they are more often than not extremely closely integrated and 
it is the compactness rather than the looseness of his writing 
which makes the drift of his thought hard to follow. Instances 
of this seeming looseness and incongruity are in part attributable 
to his remarkable use of examples. Norman Malcolm says in his 
memoir that Wittgenstein was often amused by the bizarre 
examples with which he illustrated the points he was making, 
but that he would become concerned if his students were similarly 
amused. He wanted them to see the relevance of these examples 
to the topic under discussion. It is frequently very difficult 
not to mistake a fantastic example of his illustrative of one 
topic, for the beginning of a completely new topic. So I have 
decided not to use the commentary method of Part I, not because 
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such a commentary is not possible but because for one thing 
I want to discuss a number of arguments and points of view 
which have appeared in the literature subsequent to the pub-
lication of the Investigations e.g. Strawson on meaning and 
truth, Ayer and Rhees on private language, Wisdom on doubt 
{although his essays pre-date the Investigations) etc. 
For another thing I have found reference to 
Wittgenstein•s latest writings in Zettel and On Certainty 
very valuable in trying to give an account of his dealing with 
problems arising out of the philosophical debate on privacy. 
They provide fresh examples and even an invigorated vocabulary 
(e.g. the use ofuground/groundle~s"; and "system of convictions" 
in On Certainty)··from which I have· drawn.- Also they contain 
further developments of his views on the character of conceptual, 
as opposed to factual, investigations. 
In what follows Wittgenstein•s views on language-
meaning and the nature of philosophy, which were discussed in 
Part I will be constantly adverted to. In this way I hope 







C H A P T E R IV 
THE CONCEPT OF A CRITERION 
His grace looks cheerfully and smooth this morning; 
There's some conceit or other likes him well 
When that he bids good-morrow with such spirit 
I think there's neer a man in Christendom 
Can lesser hide his love or hate than he; 
For by his face straight shall you know his heart. 
What of his heart perceived you in his face 
By any livlihood he showed to-day? 
Marry, that with no man he is offended; 
for were he he•.d have shown it in his looks. 
Shakespeare. Richard 111. Act 111 Sc.IV 
One of the most important and at the same time most 
elusive concepts in Wittgenstein•s post-Tractatus writings is 
that of a criterion. Its importance lies, for one thing, in 
the fact that it helps to clarify how we can know the sensa-
tions of another person. I shall, however, argue in Chapter 10 
that the role which the concept of a criterion plays in the 
problem of other minds has been badly misinterpreted. It is 
an elusive concept.because Wittgenstein typically does not de-
vote himself to a sustained theoretical discussion o~ criteria 
and what he means by them. The most direct statement from him 
on this topic occurs on pages twenty-four and five of the 
11Blue Book", and there is good reason to think that his notion 
of a criterion changed significantly in the "Investigations" 
from what it had been in the 11Blue and Brown· Books". Albritton 
writing on the notion of criterion in the "Blue and Brown Books" 
says that Wittgenstein•s ways of speaking there "imply that to 
be a criterion of X is-just to BE (what is called) X, in case 
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there is only one criterion of X, or to be (what is called) 
X, under certain circumstances, in case there is more than 
one criterion of X11 • 1 • He quotes a large number of in-
stances where Wittgenstein speaks that way of criteria. 
Later he suggests that, "The dominant conception of a criterion 
in the •Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics• and the 
•Investigations• is •••• : A criterion for a given thing's 
being so is something that can show the thing to 'be so and show 
by its absence that the thing is not so; it is something by 
which one may be justified in saying that the thing is so and 
by whose absence one may be justified in saying that the thing 
is not son. 2 • This seems to me to be an accurate description 
of what happens to the notion of a criterion and it shows that 
Wittgenstein was not from the first entirely clear as to how 
the term should be used, or at any rate it indicates that he 
chose to use it more than one way. 
In order to get some bearings on the question of what 
is meant by a criterion I should like to take as a starting 
point the following characterisation of Wittgenstein•s notion 
of criterion by Chihara and Fodor, although in the nature of 
the case it can be no more than a starting point. 11X is a 
criterion of Y in situations of type S if the very meaning of 
definition of 'Y' (or as Wittgenstein might have put it, if 
the grammatical rules for the use or 1 Y') justify the claim 
that one can recognise, see, detect or determine the applica-
bility of 'Y' on the basis of X in NORMAL situations of type So 
Hence, if the above relation obtains between X andY, and if 
someone admits that X but denies Y, the burdon or proof is 
upon him to show that something is abnormal in the situation. 
In a normal situation, the problem of gathering evidence which 
justifies concluding Y from X, simply does not arise." 3 • 
Now this characterisation, which they say is only 
nro.ugh and schematicn, is not sufficiently detailed to provide 
1. Albritton, 110n Wittgenstein•s Use of the Term •Criterion"' 
l'he Journal or Philosophy, VOL. LVI· .. (1959) __ . 
2. (Albritton) Ibid~ 
3. Chihara and Fodor, "Operationalism and Ordinary Language 
American Philosophical Quarterly 
VOL. II (1965). 
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the answer to a number of difficulties which arise out of the 
concept of a criterion, although coupled with Albritton's 
statement it gives a very neat account of the concept. · The 
difficulties in discovering how Wittgenstein uses the words 
11cri ter ionn and "criteria" can I think be listed as follows: 
(a) If X is the criterion of Y, then is X, Y? 
i.e. is the criterion identical with that of 
which it is the criterion? 
(b) If a criterion is not of type (a) then what 
is its relation to Y? Does asserting that 
X entail asserting that Y? 
(c) If a criterion X is not of type (a) and its 
relation to Y is that of entailment, how 
does it come to be related in that way? 
(d) Is there always only one criterion X or one 
set of criteria for Y or is there nQ one 
criterion or set of criteria which is both 
a necessary and sufficient condition for Y? 
(e) What is the difference between a criterion 
and a symptom? 
Before I attempt to come to grips with these problems 
I should note that it is completely foreign to the spirit and 
intentions of the 'Investigations' to propound a completed 
theory. I partly ··agree with Anthony Manser that the notion 
of criterion presents a difficulty, "•••• only if it is assumed 
that Wittgenstein had a fully worked· out doctrine of criteria 
which has to be discovered from the scattered remarks in the 
'Investigations•. If instead it is treated merely as a use-
ful way of expressing certain insights there is less danger of 
puzzlement." 4 • On the other hand his statement (directed 
against Professor Norman Malcolm) is unhelpful from two view 
4. Manser, "Pain and Private Language" 
Philosophy of Wittgenstein. 
Studies in the 
ed. Peter Winch. 
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points. Firstly, the problem with the concept is to.discover 
~ it is employed to 11express certain insights" - what the 
function of a criterion is in Wittgenstein 1 s thoughts. 
Secondly, it is misleading to talk of n~ useful way" when there 
seem to be a variety of ways in which 11criterionn is used. 
And despite the fact that the remarks on criteria are scattered 
in the •Investigations•, they are sufficiently liberally 
scattered to warrant serious attention. 5 • 
At a number of points in the •Investigations• 
Wittgenstein talks of a criterion of identity and of identi-
fying something by criteria. What precisely does he mean? 
Is the criterion of anything that, by virtue of which, it is 
what it is. To take an example adapted from Wisdom. Suppose 
a housewife goes in to the larder, sees two objects there, 
feels them, smells them and tastes them and then comes out and 
says, with no intention of deceiving, "Yes, there ar.e two 
loaves of bread there alright". Now as Professor Austin says, 
she has not discovered the signs or symptoms of bread, but the 
bread itself. 6 • ' And in the 110ther Mind" debate White quite 
correctly concludes; "•••• there is no way of finding out 
whether there are two· loaves in the larder superior to that of 
going and having a look, there is no other process suitable 
for this purpose which it is proper to dignify with the name 
of •coming to know•, in opposition to mere •concluding from the 
testimony of• our ~enses which happens in s~eing 11 • 7 • The 
question we must ask is whether that set of features of the 
object in the larder which (we will assume for the sake of the 
example) make up bread, and which the careful housewife checked 
on before she made her statement, could be called 11criteria of 
breadn in any Wittgensteinian use of the term "criteria". In 
other·words is there a use of the words "criterion of Y11 which 
makes them synonomous with "Y", so that where I say 11He· knows 
what the criteria of Y aren· r· could just as well have said; 
"He knows what Y isn? 
So At a rough count the word is used about fifty times. 
6. Austin, "Other Mindsn, Philosophical Papers 2nd. ed. 
7. Wisdom. ~·Other Minds.". p.66 
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I suggest that this is how Wittgenstein uses the 
words when he talks about a criterion of identity. But if 
this is the only use he makes of the concept then its im-
portance is considerably diminished since we can only say 
that X is a criterion of Y when X is Y, which is comparatively 
trivial. It is not trivial to decide what we are going to 
call nyu but we have not said very much when we state that 
what we· call uyn is also the criterion of Y. In fact this 
use of 11cri terionn makes giving the criterion for Y the same 
as giving a definition of Y. Wittgenstein himself relates 
criteria and definitions when he talks about "meaning": 
·"For a large clas·s of cases - though not for all - in· which 
we employ the word •meaning' it can be defined thus: "The 
meaning of a word is its us"e in a language." 8 • Then later 
he writes, "What is the criterion for the way the formula is 
meant? rt· is for example the kind of way we always use it, 
the way we are taught :to use it.n 9 • 
At this point it seems to me, it is possible to make 
a serious oversight in interpreting Wittgenstein. If one 
says th~t the relationship between a criterion and that of 
which it is the criterion is one of logical entailment, or if, 
in even more fasionable terms, one says that any statement 
giving the criterion of anything is a grammatical statement, 
and if one leaves it at that, then one glosses over and dis-
guises another use of the term 11criterion11 o This second use 
is certainly very closely related. to the one I have just dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph but at the same time it is 
subtly and importantly different from it. It is vital, I 
hope to show, to make this distinction in order to answer the 
question of whether Wittgenstein is a behaviourist and in 
order to deal with his attitude towards mental states and 
processes. A discussion of the second usage also serves as 
a good introduction to his "theory" of the relationship be-
tween certainty and language-games·. This is important for 
its bearing on sceptical doubts about other minds. 
a~ P.r. 43 
9. P.I. 190 
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To make the distinction clearly I want to consider 
the difference between the following two cases. (a) Smith 
goes for a walk and sees $heets of water pouring from a 
cloudy sky. He goes back home and in answer to his wife's 
question as to why his clothes are wet he says, 11ft's been 
raining again 11 •· (b) Jones goes for a walk and sees that.the 
streets are wet, that all the trees are dripping, that the 
houses are wet, that there are pools of water in the fields, 
that the sky is an ominous grey, and he hears peals of thunder 
in the distance. He goes back home and in answer to his 
wife's question as to why his shoes are muddy he says, 11It 1 s 
been raining again." 
Now one could argue that Smith had the criterion 
for saying that it had been raining, viz. the fact that there 
were drops of water falling from the clouds, but that Jones 
had no criterion. Smith saw that it was raining, while Jones 
only assumed that it had been raining. And the argument 
might continue that while one circumstance justified Smith in 
saying that it was raining, however far Jones extends his 
description of dripping trees, p~ddles, etc., so long as he 
missed seeing the falling drops, he does not have a criterion 
for saying that it was raining. At best what Jones has is an 
experience of a very convincing set of symptoms from which it 
is possible to make the hypothesis that it had been raining. 
Here one could quote Wittgenstein in the Blue Book when he 
says, "I call a •symptom• a phenomenom of which experience has 
taught· us that it coincided in some way or other, with the 
phenomenom which is our defining criterion. Then to say, 
'A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him,• is a 
tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of 
•angina•. But to say, 'A man has angina whenever he has an 
inflamed throat• is to make an hypothesis." 
The argument outlined in the previous paragraph is 
in line I think with the concept of a criterion which seems to 
have been most prominent in Wittgenstein•s thought at the time 
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of the lectures which form the 11Blue and Brown Books". But 
when we look at this argument in the light of his subsequent 
writings, particularly in the Investigations, then we can 
see that it is based on a concept of a criterion different 
from that which he later developed. He would not have said 
that his first usage was wrong (he seldom says that about a 
form of expression) but he clearly thought that it.was too 
limiting, and· found the need for another use. 
With the second use of •criteria~ it would be proper 
to say that Jones, having given a·suitably·detailed descrip-
tion of his surroundings, had criteria for saying that it had 
rained. Given the prevailing climatic conditions (cloud, 
low pressure, etc.) it would be absurd to ask Jones, 11Are you 
sure that it had been raining?" Jones is not making an 
hypothesis which is more or less probably correct. He is 
fully justified in saying that it had rained even though he 
did not see what Smith saw. Jones can be certain that it had 
rained. In the Investigations, when the knowledge of other 
peoples sensations is under discussion, Wittgenstein makes the 
sceptic ask, 111 'But if you are certain, isn't it that you are 
shutting your· eyes in the face of doubt?' "·· His reply is apt 
10 and curiously simple: "They are shut." · ·• We must interpret 
this to mean that they are shut by the· blinkers of the language-
game. It is only in the context of a language-game that 
"certainty" has a meaning. (The break lever is such only 
given the rest of the mechanism.) This implies further that 
what is to count as a criterion will depend entirely on the 
language-game which we happen to be playing. 
Having said this we are in a position to raise the 
question of the nature of a criterion in a slightly different 
way, and a problem which I have avoided dealing with up till 
now must be raised. It is this: does a proposition describing 
criteria entail (in the technical sense) a proposition asserting 
the occurence of that of which they are the criteriao This is 
10. P.I. Page 224 
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the question which Professor Malcolm raises with respect to 
the behavioural criteria of pain. He writes, •IDo the pro-
positions which describe the criterion of his b~ing in pain 
logically imply the proposition, •He is in pain•? Wittgenstein's 
answer is clearly negative. A criterion is only satisfied 
in certain circumstances. If we come upon a man exhibiting 
violent pain behaviour, couldn't something show that he is not 
in pain? Of course. For example, he is rehearsing for a 
play; or he has been hypnotised ••••••" 11 • This is a strong 
point but it is unfortunate that Malcolm defines a criterion 
in terms of the circumstances in which it is found: 11The ex-
pressions of pain are a criterion of pain in certain •surround-
ings• not in others.n 12 • He should not, therefore, ··say that 
a criterion is satisfied in certain circumstances, but rather 
that something IS a criterion o~ Y only in certain circumstances. 
Having made the co'ncept of a criterion dependent by definition 
on the situation S, he goes on to argue that we can never know 
the totality of circumstances in which a criterion (in this 
case pain behaviour) occurs. This argument is obviously 
circular since something IS a criterion only given the situation 
s. If, therefore, we can never know for certain when S is 
prevailing, we can never know for certain when a criterion X is 
present, and it makes no sense to talk as he does, of X occurring, 
as though X were independent of s. Finally he emerges with 
the conclusion that because the list of circumstances which make 
up the situation, is indefinite in length no entailment con-
ditions for the criterion can be formulated. There are no such 
entailment conditions. 
In fact his argument, as it stands, has nothing to 
do with entailment conditions. It has to do with how we can 
know when a criterion occurs. Patently he asks what the 
criterion for a criterion is, so reproducing the original problem 
by pushing it back a step and making the concept X (what we 
normally call a criterion) dependent on the open textured concept 
of a situation, s. The conclusion which, as I have said, one 
11. Malcolm, uwittgenstein•s Philosophical Investigations" 
12. Ibid. 
;i.n "Wi ttgenst~in", ed. George Pitcher 1968. . 
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would expect him to come to, is that we cannot know for certain 
what a criterion is, nor whether it is occurring. But this 
conclusion is strictly opposed to a statement he makes earlier 
about criteria viz. "What makes something into a symptom of Y 
is that experience teaches that it is always or usually associated 
with Y; that so-and-so is the criterion of Y is not a matter of 
experience but of definition. The satisfaction of the criterion 
of Y establishes the existence of Y beyond question." 13 • 
This certainly implies that there~ cases in which· we ·can say 
that the criterion is occurring, and say so with certainty. 
If the concept of a criterion is not an empirical but a gramma-
tical concept, and if the definition of any criterion is to 
serve the purpose of linking it with that of which it is the 
criterion, then the definition must include a statement that 
the occurrence of the criterion, X, entails the occurrence of 
y. The confusion in Malcolm's argument arises because he does 
not seem to be sure whether the concept of a criterion is an 
empirical, or as I would rather say, open-textured concept, or 
one given by a stipulative definition. When he makes knowing 
the criteria dependent on knowing the whole situation (which is 
impossible) then he treats c~iteria as open-textured concepts. 
When he contrasts criteria with symptoms then he treats the 
concept as one delimited by a stipulative definition. 
Wittgenstein is well aware of the possibility of this 
confusion occurring. He says that, 11The fluctuation of 
grammar between criteria and symptoms·makes it look as if there 
were nothing at all but symptoms." 14 • This leads us to say 
for example that since we can only know a phenomenon through 
sense impressions and since our sense impressions are corrigible 
we can only form hypotheses as to whether Y will occur when X 
has occurred. In fact we can only say that it is 11highly 
likely" that X itself has oqcurred since our impression of 1 X1 
could have been faulty. So that in the case o.:( say rain, 
we fail to see "that the fact that the false appearance is 
13. Ibid. 
14. P.I. 354 
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precisely one o£ rain is rounded on a definition. The point 
here is not that our sense impressions can lie, but that we 
understand their language. (And this language like any other 
is rounded on convention.)" 15 • This seems to me strongly 
to argue for there being a· relationship o£ entailment between 
X andY. But the problem still remains as to how this entail-
ment can be known, or makes itself apparent, in experience. 
It might seem as though there was a way out o£ this 
difficulty which happily combined the empirical and stipulative 
elements. It might be argued that the definition told one 
what the criterion o£ Y is, but whether the criterion was 
occurring was something which could only be empirically deter-
mined. But this seeming way out is a cul-de-sac. It 
represents precisely the kind o£ argument which Wittgenstein 
attacks in the 'Investigations• and in •on Certainty'. In 
. -· . . 
effect it leads --to arguments such as the following: -
·~e come across the victim o£ a motor accident who 
has a smashed kneecap. He is screaming in what sounds like 
agony. We know that his behaviour and his injury are in 
normal situations o£ this type, criteria o£ pain. What we 
do not and cannot know for certain, is whether this situation 
is normal. So we give him a pain-killer because there is a 
high probability that this is a normal situation, that therefore 
his behaviour is a criterion of pain, and we assume in con-
sequence that he is in pain." 
There are two things wrong with this argument. 
Firstly and most importantly it is nonsense. Secondly it 
implies that only symptoms really occur in the world, -
criteria never. Malcolm does not suggest that we employ the 
above argument as a way out. He shows quite correctly, I 
think, that it is inimical to Wittgenstein•s approach and quotes 
the following passage from the •Investigations• to prove the 
point: 
15. P. I. 3 54-5 
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"A doctor asks: iHow is he feeling?• The nurse 
says, 1 he is groaning.• A·report on his behaviour. But 
need there be any.question of whether the groaning is really 
genuine, is really the expression of anything. Might they 
not, for example, draw the conclusion 'If he groans, we must 
give him more analgesic• - without suppressing a middle term? 
Isn•t the point the service to which they put the description 
of his behaviour? '16• 
It is important to add to this the next little 
paragraph (Malcolm doesn•t do this) because it makes the link 
between the notions of criteria, certainty and language-games. 
Wittgenstein makes his interlocutor say: " •But then they 
make a tacit presupposition.• " To which he replies, "Then 
what we do in our language-game always rests on a tacit·pre-
. . 17. 
supposJ.tJ.on. 11 
A large portion of Wittgenstein 1 s writing in both 
the 'Investigations• and in 1 On Certainty•· centres very closely 
around this theme, and is characterised by his saying "The kind 
of certainty is the kind of language-game." 18 • This· idea is 
linked with another, perhaps t.he most important in Wittgenstein 1 s 
philosophy, namely that, ·~hat has to be accepted, the given, 
is - so one could say - forms of life." 19• I shall return to 
this topic later particularly in Chapters 10 and 11, but for the 
moment I should like to take up the Smith and Jones example 
again in order to characterise the second use of "criteria" 
more fully. 
If Jones did not see a shower but could give a full 
description of certain circumstances, then he did not see rain 
but was justified in saying that it had rained. He was justi-
fied in so saying because the question: 1 Are you sure?' has 
no place when once he has given his description. 
16. P.I. page 179 
17~ P.I. page 179 
18. P.I. page 224 Also o.c. 370 and 328-9 




isn't one of the doubts in our game." We reach the bed-
rock of conventions, and the conventions are such that a 
doubt is simply out of place in the circumstances we have 
described. 
In this case as in most others Jones makes the 
statement "It has been raining" on the basis of a number of 
criteriao ·This is another important point to noticeo Most 
interpreters of the notion of a criterion seem to agree that 
there is not always one criterion which must be satisfied, 
but rather that, "•••• we apply descriptive terms on the basis 
of several criteria which may be present or absent in varying 
degrees and no set of'which is both necessary and sufficient 
condition for the application of the termo" 21 • This state-
ment, however, is true of both the uses of· "criterion". What 
distingu~shes the second notion (developed in the Investigations) 
from the first is the fact that the criteria are not necessarily 
parts of the phenomenon. The phenomenon need not be present 
to us for us to be able'to say that it is occurring or has 
occurred. 
criteria. 
The phenomenon is not necessarily reducible to its 
The importance of this-second usage for the dis-
cussion of sensation and privacy is that it enables Wittgenstein 
to describe how· human behaviour'· and this includes a certain 
form of, what for want of a better expression I shall call 
verbal behaviour, is a criterion of sensation. When once this 
has been clearly described, he argues, then we can by-pass the 
theory that the only way of knowing whether a sensation is 
occurring is by introspection. This theory leads to scepticism 
since we cannot introspect another's pain, nor for the matter 
of that any of the other mental events and processes which the 
sceptic claims to identify in himsel·f o As we shall see, 
Wittgenstein discounts this claim by the sceptic to be able to 
know from his own case, but in dismissin_g it. he does not 
20. P. I. 288 
21. Wellman, 11Wittgenstein's Concept of a Criterion", 
l'he Philosophical Review, VOL. LXXI No .• 4. 1962. 
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dismiss the hypothesis that there are mental states and pro-
cesses. He expressly says that he does not want to deny 
these states and processes, he merely considers them irrele-
vant to the use (the grammar) of such terms as "consciousness", 
"understanding", "sensing", "feeling", etco When he says 
that "An inner·process stands in need of outward criteria," 22 • 
he is· pointing to the fact that without human behaviour which 
is publicly observable all talk of these inner phenomena is 
senseless. The grammar of inner states is such that it-in-
volves reference to outward, behavioural criteria, which 
means that, it. o. o in order to understand the grammar of these 
states it is· necessary to ask: 'What counts as a criterion 
f b . . h . - ? 23. 1 or anyone's eJ.ng J.n sue a state.• " For examp ewe 
verify that someone understands the-principle of a series by 
getting him to continue it; or we verify that Jack has a sore 
knee by seeing how he winces when it is'pressed. "Asking 
when and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular 
way of asking 'How d 1 you mean?• The answer is a contribution 
to the grammar ·of the proposition. n ·24 o 
Again one is tempted by these and similar passages 
to ask whether he is denying the reality of inner states -
trying to reduce them to the criteria by which they are veri-
'· 
fied. Are there in fact two sets of phenomena, the inner and 
the outer, and if there are, is Wittgenstein guilty of saying 
that the inner are fictions? "If I do speak of a fiction," 
he says, "it is a grammatical fic;tion." 25 • It is a gramma-
tical fiction in so far as the inner process is nothing with-
out its criteriao Or_ to put it less dramatically and less 
misleadingly; we could say nothing.about it were it not for 
its criteriao It only makes sense to say that I am feeling 
this, thinking that (even thinking it to myself) because there 
are behavioural criteria for this thinking and feeling. 
Wittgenstein argues that it makes no sense to give oneself a 
22~ P.I. 580 
23. P.I. 572 
24~ P.I. 353 
25. P.I. 307 
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direct, private exhibition of pain'itself through intro-
spection. It is not so much that when we look in this way 
we find nothing but that we don't know how to look for it 
in the first place. (I shall deal with this more fully in 
later chapters) 
Of course this makes the case of inner states and 
their criteria different from our e~ample of the criteria 
which we would normally accept for the statement that it had· 
been raining. It is. possible to see rain falling whereas 
it is nonsense to say that we observe a sensation. (There 
is a use of sensation words in which we talk of seeing a 
sensation; 11 I saw the pain in his face" but this is not.the 
use I have in mind here) We say, 11 I saw a shower of rain," 
but never say 11I observed a pain." As Ryle puts it, 11To 
have a sensation is not to be in a cognitive relation with 
any object." 
26
• The point of my example was to show that 
Y is not always synonomous with its criteria. Wittgenstein 
does not want to say that pain behaviour is·synonomous with 
pain, and he does not want to deny that there are mental 
states of that mental proc?SSes take place. He merely argues 
that to talk about the mental state as though it was the sort 
of thing we could become acquainted with through closer observa-
tion of our sensations, is not to talk about what is physically 
impossible, but to misconstrue·the grammar of "mental state". 
A mental state is not something like a frozen state. The · 
same goes for mental processes. We construe the mental pro-
cess on the model of such processes as take place when an acid 
reacts with a base. We can come to learn how a salt is pro-
duced by observing what happens when the acid and the base re-
act together, and so we think that we can observe the mental 
process in a similar way, when in fact the nature of that pro-
cess is totally different. Wittgenstein gives a b~illiantly 
lucid account of how the resultant puzzlement occurs: 
••How do~s the philosophical problem about mental pro-
cesses and· about behaviourism arise? - The first step is the 
26. Ryle, 11The Concept of Mind" 
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one which altogether escapes notice. We talk of 2rocesses 
and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime we 
shall know more about them - we think. But that is just 
what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. 
For we have a definite concept of what it means to know a 
process better. (The decisive move in the conjuring trick 
has been made, and it was the very one that we thought was 
quite innocent) - And now the analogy which was to make us 
understand our thoughts falls to pieceso So we have to deny 
the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. 
And naturally we don•t want to deny them." 27 • 
Just how important this Pcassage is, particularly the 
underlined sentence, I hope to show when dealing with 
Wittgenstein•s investigation o£ the concept o£ a human being. 
(Ch. 10) r-point out there that he never intended to give out 
that the other-minds debate could be resolved by a behavioural 
criteriology, as Chihara and Fodor seem to think. The im-
portance o£ the concept o£ a criterion is not that it serves to 
bridge the Cartesian gap between body and mind, but rather that 
it show that the gap is .a metaphysical fiction. 
\ 
\ 
27. P.I. 308 
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C H A P T E R V 
PRIVATE LANGUAGE 
Professor Norman Malcolm writing on Wittgenstein's 
treatment of the private language argument says, 11 In order · 
to appreciate the depth and power of Wittgenstein1 s assault 
upon this idea you must partly be its captive. You must 
feel the strong grip of it. The passionate intensity of 
Wittgenstein•s treatment of it is due to the fact that he 
lets this idea take possession of him, drawing out of him-
self the thoughts and imagery by which it is expressed and 
defended - and then subjecting those thoughts and pictures 
to fiercest scrutiny." 1 • Not only is this a very accurate 
description of the character of Wittgenstein's attack on pri-
vate language, it also gives a good insight into his method 
and recalls strongly what Wisdom says about the treatment of 
a philosophical problem. The difficulty is not to hit on 
the right theory but to gather together all the theories and 
that in such a way as to be able to get a clear view of them. 
Wittgenstein puts it very graphically in a down to earth 
metaphor: "A main cause of philosophical disease - a one 
sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind 
of example. 11 2 • 
In those parts of the Investigations in which pri-
vate languages are discussed it is difficult to decide at 
first just where Wittgenstein stands - which of the voices 
which ask questions, make suggestions, argue for and argue 
against, is his. This initial difficulty in locating 
Wittgenstein•s position is an index o~ the mastery with which 
he practiced his philosophy. He assembles the whole problem 
by presenting all the arguments which have, each in their own 
way, constituted the problem, and the very moment the problem 
is completely assembled it falls down. I don 1.t think it 
1. Malcolm, •rwittgenstein' s Philosophical Investigationsn .. p.67 
2. P.I. 593 
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would be unduly stretching his analogy (Investigations 118) 
if we said that the houses of cards which he destroys fall 
. because they are built too completely: the moment the card 
house is extended to the desired proportions it collapses. 
The same holds for the· philosophical problem - no sooner are 
all the arguments which go to constitute it as a problem 
assembled, than the problem collapses into nonsenseo "My aim," 
he says, "is to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised 
nonsense to something which is patent nonsenseo" 3 • Whether 
the nonsense is disguised or not depends on the· completeness 
with which the philosophical problem is presented. 
In the case of private language the point of 
Wittgenstein•s method is often lost and to talk, as Wellman 
does of his "refutation" of the private language argument 
4
• 
does not make it any easier to find. To say that he ·~efutes 
the argument" rather makes it sound as though he shows· that a 
set of perfectly sensible statements are simply false, as 
though private languages do not happen to exist because they 
are clumsy, or hard to learn, or confined in usefulness, etc. 
But the effectiveness of Wittgenstein 1 s treatment resides just 
in this, that it is a grammatical and ··not an empirical treat-
ment. He is trying to get us and himself to reject a way of 
talking. He is not saying that that way of talking as such 
is false, "What could 'false• mean here?" we can imagine him 
asking. Rather he wants to --show that it is a nonsensical 
way. This needs to be shown since in philosophy n•)nsense 
parades as sense, and words which have every semblance of hav-
ing a meaning have noneo As we saw in Chapter 2, what fre-
quently happens is that we try to apply sentences and the 
pictures they suggest in areas where they have no application. 
The sentence appears to be in use when in fact it has no 
function at all. A somewhat analogous situation would arise 
if we put an animal in an evacuated box. . It would be odd to 
say that there is something wrong with its breathing, when we 
have put it in a situation where breathing is impossible. In a 
3~ P.I. 464 
4. Wellman, opo cit. 
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similar way it would 'be incorrect to say that propositions 
asserting the feasibility of private language are false 
since the propositional signs are not really in use ('The 
engine is idling• ). "Truth-or-falsity, are characteristics 
of a use of a sentence·." 5 • The sentences are being placed 
in an environment in which they cannot function. Sometimes 
the uselessness of the expressions we are using strikes us 
without our being.able to 'get a clear view' of what the 
matter is. nso in the end when one is doing philosophy. one 
gets to the point where one would just like to emit an inarti-
culate sound" 6 • But of course this is not enough - a cure 
for our puzzlement needs to be effected, and the cure is 
grammatical and not empirical. 
For the reasons sketched above it is mistaken to 
accuse Wittgenstein of ambiguity, obscurity or of creating 
confusions. He does not create the confusions he merely 
describes them. Strawson, for instance, says that when 
Wittgenstein deals with private language and sensation, "one 
\ . 7 
may well feel one•s capacity to learn coming to an end.n· • 
This feeling seems to me to result from a misunderstanding of 
Wittgenstein•s intentions •. It makes it seem as though the 
unclarity were his fault, whereas it is his achievement. 
Professor Cook argues quite correctly, I think, that 
Wittgenstein does not try to make the notion of a private 
language clear, "because the idea under investigation turns 
out to be irremediably confused and hence can only be suggested, 
8 
not clearly explained." 0 
The idea of a private language is very closely linked 
by Wittgenstein with the idea of a private object, and he links 
the latter idea with the notion that sensations are private:· 
he describes a theory in which sensations are tre~ted as 
5. Strawson, "On Referring", Logico Linquistic Papers, p.9-10 
6~ P.I. 261 
7. Strawson, "Review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
lnvestigations,u Pitch~r p.41 
8o Cook, "Wittgenstein on·Privacy 11 , Pitcher p.286 
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private objects. Professor Cook gives a brilliant and clear 
account of Wittgenstein•s position on private language from the 
point of view of his treatment of the privacy of sensations. 
This is what one might call an organic account, explaining and 
illuminating Wittgenstein•s thoughts on private language as 
they actually develop in the Investigations. ~nother method 
of dealing with private language is to show that it rests on 
an untenable theory of linguistic meaning. This method can 
only give an incomple·te account of his treatment and needs to 
be connected,·as Coo~ argues, with a treatment of the notion 
that sensations are private. In this chapter, however, I shall 
stick to the first point, viz. that the notion of private langu-
age is in part the result of a mistake about language. In the 
following chapter I shall connect this with the notion of the 
privacy of sensation. 
Anyone who tries to present the Wittgensteinian 
position with respect to private language, and who tries to 
present it as the correct position, is immediately faced with 
the insoluble problem of trying to give an intelligible account 
of a notion which he holds is nonsensical. As far as 
.Wittgenstein is concerned the words "private language" have 
as little meaning as the words "square circle". One cannot 
then try to make sense of the d~scriptions of private languages 
offered by the protagonists of the notion, nor out of their 
arguments, because they are nonsensical. Wittgenstein warns 
us against the absurdity of trying to force sense out of non-
sense when he writes, "When a sentence is called senseless, it 
is not as it were the sense that is senseless. But a com-
bination of words is being excluded from the language, with-
drawn from circulation." 9 • So in this instance the only 
recourse is simply to describe and exemplify the arguments of 
the private language protagonists, and in so doing try to show 
'~he bumps which the· understanding has got by running its head 
10. . 
up against the limits o£ language." 
9. P.I • 500 
10. P.I. 119 
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How then might a ~rivate language theoretician de-
fine a private language? Possibly like this: a languag.~ L 
is private if, when it is used by an individual I, the mean-
inq of what ~s said in L by I is necessarily unintelligible 
to anybody but I. The point of adding "necessarily" is to 
distinguish this use of "private language" from the one where 
it is used to refer to some secret code or esoteric set of 
signs. When "private languagen is used philosophically it 
is used in such a way as to make it nonsensical to say that 
what is said in it is understood by more than one person 
yiz. the speaker. It is atlogicallytt private and not merely 
contingently so. This obviously means that it is impossible 
,, 
to describe or exemplify such a language. A description of 
a language must include a description of the rules for the 
use of the language, and this it is impossible to do in the 
case of a private language. Ayer in his well known essay 
ucan there be a private language" purports to describe such a 
language as used by a solitary individual, but when we examine 
this description and the linguistic presuppositions on which 
it is based we come to see that the attempt to make clear what 
a private language is, is misguided. 
Ayer•s Robinson Crusoe uses this language to describe 
fauna and flora as well as using some of the words in it to 
nstand for his sensations". In the latter case Ayer says 
1t •••• where these sen'sations are entirely private, in the 
sense that they have no 'natural expressions 1 which Man Friday 
can identify, it may well be that Crusoe fails to find any way 
of teaching him the use of the words which he employs to stand 
for themo But from the fact that he cannot teach this part 
of his language to Man Friday it by no means follows that he 
has no use for it himself. In a context of this sort, one can 
teach only what one already understands. The ability to teach, 
or rather the ability of someone else to learn, cannot therefore 
be a prerequisite for understan~ing." 11 • For·the moment I 
11. Ayer, ncan There Be A Private Language? 11 , reprinted 
from Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soc. 
VOL. XXVIII (1954) in Pitcher p.261 
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want to ignore what he says about the objects referred to in 
the language, whether palm trees or pains, and concentrate on 
just those features of our definition which he reproduces in 
his example. · 
Firstly, we are told that Crusoe uses the language to 
describe things and therefore he must use it in a certain way 
i.e. according to some rule of description. Secondly, he 
says things to himself which he and only he can understand 
i.e. the meanings of the signs in the language are private. 
Accordingly the first question to ask is whether it 
makes sense to say that one can follow a private rule? How 
does one know one is following it correctly? Wittgenstein 
asks how we undertake to use the word in a rule-governed way. 
11 Is it to be assumed that you invent the technique of using 
the word; or that you found it ready made? 11 12 • It might 
seem as though one could answer quite straightforwardly 11Yes 
of course, I invent the technique,u but such an answer only 
sets the problem back to the question of what could be meant 
by a technique here. If it is used in the ordinary way then, 
nusing a technique" means, among other things, working to a 
rule, and the meaning of "rule" is related, as we saw in 
' Chapter 3 to words like "same"·, "regular" and 11uniform 11 • The 
meanings of these words is, in turn, taught by·making reference 
to the "common behaviour of mank.ind;, 13 • But in the case of 
a private rule there can be no question of any reference to 
any pattern of human behaviour. What this means is that the 
combination of the words ''Private" and "rule" into a phrase 
is not a move in the language-game - it is like trying to 
promote a pawn to a king in chess. 
It is of course possible to invent a new word, but 
it is absurd to say that somebody has invented a customary 
usage of that word. The word comes to be used in this or 
that way, but its so being used is not something that an 
12. Po I. 262 
13. P.r. 206 
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individ~al can invent. The point may be put in another way 
by saying that dictionaries primarily describe rather than 
prescribe uses of.words. The contents of a dictionary are 
derived from the practices of those who speak and w,rite the 
language. The lexicographer can prescribe how a word ought 
to be used only on the basis of a description of how it has 
been used. If someone invents a new word, and not just a new 
' 
sound, then he must invent a use for this word. Or if he 
wishes to retain a familiar word, but give it a new meaning 
then he must prescribe a new use for this word. This might 
seem contrary to what I have just said about the lexicographer 
but it is noto Everyone (lexicographers included) can in-
vent new words and new uses of words, but no one can invent 
a custom of linguistic usage. 
To make what I have just said a bit clearer I shall 
take an example fro~ Lewis Carrol: Humpty Dumpty and Alice 
are discussing the former 1 s peculiar use of the word "glory'': 
• "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather 
a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to 
mean - neither more nor less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you CAN 
make words mean different things·.u 
"The question is,u sa:Ld Humpty Dumpty, "which is 
to be master - that•s all." 1 
He goes on to discuss the "temperaments" of different 
parts of speech and then exclaims: 
' "••• Impenetrability~ That's what I sayt" 
"Would you tell me please," said Alice, "what that 
means?" 
"Now you talk like a sensible child," said Humpty 
Dumpty, looking very much pleased. · 11 I meant by 
•impenetrability' that we've had enough of that 
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subject, and it would be just as well if you'd 
mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose 
you don.' t intend to stop here all the rest of 
your life. n ' 14 • 
So not only does Humpty Dumpty know the meanings of 
new words, such as those in Jabberwocky, but he invents uses 
for old words, and what is more, he teaches them to Alice, who 
understands them. What he does not and cannot do, is invent 
the technique of usage. He can invent languages but he cannot 
invent language. And he cannot do that because it makes no 
sense to say that someone invents a custom of using words, or 
that someone invents an established practice of usage. What 
enables him to use a word in a new way, according to a rule 
different from the normal rule, is the fact that there exists 
a practice which is the practice of following rules. Within 
that practice enorm~us varieties of uses of words are possibleo 
The problem is that we are too apt to forget what is involved 
in the phrase "within that practice." We forget that all 
particular uses of language, such as· naming, describing, ~ying, 
asserting, asking questions, etc. presuppose "a great deal of 
stage setting." 15 • This stage setting is one or other form 
of social life~ Social life is the terminus a quo for language. 
Language is part of a social practice. This is what Wittgenstein 
means by saying that when human beings agree in the language 
they use, 11this is not agreement in opinions but in forms of 
life. n 16 •· It is one thing to invent words and uses for them, 
it is· another to invent forms of life. As Rush Rhees argues, 
one can invent a vocabulary, 11in circumstances of a social 
life which has in fact grown up with language and could no 
b . t d th J.~ CO''lld.11 17 • more e 1nven e an anguage ~ 
The private language argument must exclude the 
possibility of the language being part of a social practice. 
The consequence of this exclusion is that it can make no ·sense 
to talk of following the rules of the language for the simple 
14. Lewis Carrol, ."Through the Looking Glass." 
15~ P.I. 257 
16. P.I. 241 
17. Rhees, 11Can There Be a Private Language?" Pitcher p.276 
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reason that there is nothing which could count as a correct 
or as a mistaken application of the rule. Being private, in 
the sense of the definition, means that there can be no check-
ing by another on whether a word is being used correctly or 
not. In fact the notion of correct and incorrect is out of 
place here. With private languages there is no criterion of 
what is correct. 110ne would like to say: whatever is going 
to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here 
we can't talk about •right'•" 18 • From this we must conclude 
that the statement that a private language is used in a par-
ticular, rule governed way, is nonsense. The basis for this 
conclusion has been laid by Wittgenstein in his treatment of 
rules: where any action can be made to accord with a rule, no 
course of action can be said to be prescribed by the rule and 
the concept of a rule becomes inappropriate in these 
circumstances. 
The stock objection to Wittgenstein•s argument is 
that it IS quite possible for an individual to check his own 
use of a private word. The protagonists of this argument, 
like Ayer for example, usually concentrate on private 
languages which they treat as descriptive of private mental 
states and processes, namely sensations and/or sense data. 
They argue that the private language user can check whether 
he is using his private word correct1y by remembering the cir-
cumstances in which he "undertook" to use the word in the 
first place. Wittgenstein•s rep1y, so often quoted, is that 
such a man is like someone who buys several copies of the same 
newspaper in order to check that what the first copy said was 
true. This is meant to show that as long as there is no 
standard against which to check the use of a word on any par-
ticular occasion, it makes no sense to talk of "checking" at 
all. Ayer•s reply does not really seem to me to be a counter 
to those he·is attempting to refute. First, he admits that 
the important difference between private usages and newspaper 
reports is that, "••• the facts which the newspaper reports 
are independently· verifiable, in theory if not always in 
18. P.I. 258 
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practice. But," he continues, "verification must stop some-
where. As I have already argued, unless something is re-
cognised, without being referred to a further test, nothing 
can be tested.. In the case of Crusoe•s.sensations, we are 
supposing that beyond his memory there·is no further test. 
It does not follow that he has no means of identifying it, 
or that it does not make sense to say that he identifies it 
·19. right or wrong.n But a memory must surely be a memory 
of some object or event, the existence or occurrence of which 
must be capable of a verification other than the testimony of 
that memory. And I do not mean that the object or event must 
IN FACT be independently verified but that is possible in 
principle to verify it. If this is not so then whatever one 
remembers to have been the case must have been the case -
memory would be incorrigible. 
however. 
We do not treat memory this way, 
Wellman formulates the same argument as Ayer's slight-
ly differently. Like Ayer he argues that one memory can be 
used to check another, "provided that each has some initial 
probability." 20• Now· one would expect this to mean: provided 
each is a memory of some objective, publicly observable event. 
But apparently this is not what Wellman has in mind. The 
criterion for the correctness of the memory need not, in his 
view, be independent of the memo~y - the memory is its own 
sufficient warrant: "Wittgenstein seems to assume that any 
genuine criterion must ·be something independent of that of 
which it is the criterion, external to the person using the 
criterion, and accessible to all persons equally. Until some 
reasons are produced for this view it remains a dogmatic 
essumptio•l which must he questioned.a 21 • He then goes on to 
restate Ayer's argument that Wittgenstein's view results in an 
. 
infinite regress since each act of checking the use of a sign, 
itself stands in need of checking. "Are there standards for 
the use of standards? Unless at some point there is no longer 
19. Ayer, op.cit. pp.260-61 
20. Wellman, op.cit. P• 
21. Wellman, op.cit·. 
' \ 
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any need for an external standard all criteria become point-
less." 22 • 
Both Ayer and Wellman seem to imply (a) that 
Wittgenstein has given no justification for insisting upon 
the publicity of criterial standards; {b) that he is unaware 
of the problem of regressive verifications; (c) that their 
view, which I shall call sense datum empiricism is not beset 
by any of the difficulties with which Wittgenstein argues it 
is beset. Leaving aside the last point for the while we 
should notice that both (a) and {b) are major topics of in-
terest in the Investigations and in On Certainty. The fact 
that the latter was only published in 1969 perhaps accounts 
for their overlooking Wittgenstein•s treatment of these topics. 
In On Certainty Wittgenstein constantly stresses 
that verifications alway·s take place within a structure of 
nconvictionsu.· 23 • Unless this system is given, no judg-
ments are possible, because no confirmation of hypotheses 
would be possible. 24 • This system of convictions arises 
out of specific conditions of existence - it is a function 
of a specific societal practice. Language is a part of this 
practice. In a language-game some judgments are not put in-
to question, ·they are the groundless grounds which make the 
practice of language possible.. Our assent to these grounds 
is not primarily an intellectual assent - the ultimate 
criterion for what we accept as certain is what we do: "Sure 
evidence is what we accept as sure, it is evidence that we 
go by in acting surely, acting without any doubt." 25 • Thus 
a language-game can only be played on the basis of a form of 
life in which certain things' are not put into question: 11 I 
really want to say that the language-game is possible if one 
trusts something (I did not say •can trust something')" 26 • 
22. Wellman, op. cit. 
23. o.c. 102 
24~ o.c. 105 (This theme recurs throughout the book). 
25~ o.c. 
26. o.c. and 344 and 524. 
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The parenthetical remark is very important. It shows, I 
think, that Wittgenstein is not committing himself to a 
static and idealistic theory of knowledge. He is not saying 
that human knowledge constitutes reality i.e. that what we 
take to be the case (what we "trust~')becomes the case. All 
he is asserting is that that knowledge can only be knowledge 
within a structure. The structure itself may change when 
what served as foundations are put into question and a new set 
of evidences take their place. The structure is what he 
calls a world picture. Propositions describing the world 
picture are from one point of view prescriptive: "••• their 
role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be 
learned purely practically, without learning any explicit 
rules." 27 • The game is the abstract expression of a practice. 
When the game changes, the practice changes. That at any 
rate is the way the change is thought, in theory. In practice 
the division does not really exist. 
These themes need a development which is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. What I wish to establish as far as 
the present discussion is concerned .is that the regression of 
doubts must come to a halt if a language-game is to be played. 
But further, that it cannot come to a halt in private experience. 
If the word ntruen could only be used .on the basis of private 
experience then there could be no sense in talking about agree-
ment in judgments. If the verification of whether a word has 
been used correctly is_ultimately a private affair then it is 
very hard .to see how language (public as opposed to private) 
functions. Wittgenstein•s remarks in the Investigations are 
intimately connected with ··those in On Certainty. · His reply 
to critics such as Ayer and Wellman comes in the form of a 
question which he puts to himself: 11 •so are you saying that 
human agreement decides what is true· and what is false?• " and 
an answer: "It is what human beings SAY that is true and false; 
and they agree in the language they use. That is not agree-
ment in opinions but in form of life. If language is to be a 
means of communication there must be agreement not only in 
definitions but also (queer as it may seem) in judgments." 28 • 
27 ~ o.c. 
28. P.r. 241 
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Another line of objection to Wittgenstein•s treat-
ment of rule-following and checkability, is that taken by 
Judith Jarvis Thomson in her essay, "Private Languages". 
The essay is interesting in its own right, but her criticisms 
also make necessary a close examination of Wittgenstein on 
privacy and rules, and this re-examination requires, I think, 
that the interpretation of his thought given.by Malcolm be, 
if not revised, then made somewhat more rigorous. The view 
which she is attacking and which she attributes to the 
Wittgensteinians, particularly to Malcolm, is the following: 
11A man•s use of a sign is not governed by a rule unless it is 
not merely possible that he should violate the rule but more 
that he should violate it unwittingly. That is it must be 
possible that he should think he is following the rule and not 
in fact be following it; from the fact that he thinks he is 
following the rule; it musn•t follow that he really is follow-
ing it. 11 29 • Now it certainly does seem to be part of 
Wittgenstein•s conception of a rule that it must be logically 
possible for ··the rule to be broken, and the possibility must 
therefore remain open, in some cases, for someone to think he 
is following a certain rule and to be mistaken. I say "in .. 
come casesn because Thomson tries to show that there 'are· rules· 
which it would be impossible to break without knowing one was 
doing so. This sort of rule is meant to provide the exception 
to the maxim that i't must always be possible to think one is 
obeying a rule and not be doing so. As an example she gives: 
"Always decide to do what you think at the time it would be 
most fun to do.n 30 • It is obviously impossible to think one 
is deciding when one isn•t, and one can accordingly classify 
under this heading all rules of the type: ·~hink X whenever 
••• o ", "Decide Y whenever. o •.. o ", "Imagine Z whenever o • o. 11 and 
•, 
so on. · Generalising these into· a formula one might say· that 
there was a class of rules which were of the type: 11Do X, 
which it is impossible to do without being aware that ·one is 
doing it whenever ••••" 
29. Thomson 
30: Thomson, op. cit. 
68 
Now Malcolm's statements on rules imply that cases 
such as the above are not rules. He says that, "••• the 
concept of a rule implies that there be a difference between, 
•He is following a rule• and •He is under the impression that 
.. . 31 
he is following a rule• ··••• ...... • I suspect that Malcolm 
overlooked cases such as tho-se put forward by Thomson, and 
that he had only those rules in mind, obedience to which can 
be checked independently of a report by the person who is 
supposed to be following the rule. This is quite a large 
oversight but it is not mortally damaging to Malcolm, Cook 
and Rhees•s arguments against private rules and private 
languages.; The possibility of a rule of this type 't' 
being broken still remains open. For instance, if the rule 
is: "Remember me when I am gone away", it is surely possible 
that it should be broken? Whether or not it has been, can 
be discovered by asking the person who is supposed to have 
followed the rule. But Thomson disagrees. She formulates 
her counter argument as a dilemma. Either, she argues, it 
is not possible to break such a rule knowingly, or, (should 
this not be thought a serious objection) that such a rule 
cannot be broken at all, it can only be forgotten. She writes, 
nfor notice that one can't even violate this rule unwittingly 
unless one has, in a sense forgotten the rule. And now what 
rules - however private - can't be violated in this way? 11 32 • 
I do not see that the first horn of her proposed dilemma· 
really constitutes a problem. No one (except Malcolm through 
an oversight) has claimed that one must be able to know one is 
breaking a rule at the moment of breaking it. Wittgenstein 
certainly never argued that it must be nossible in all cases 
to think one is.obeying a rule and not be. The second horn 
seem a bit trivial: it' the ·rule is, "Remember X wh~never • o •• " 
then to say that the only way of failing to remember X is to 
fail to remember the rule is nonsense. In such a case the 
person involved has simply forgotten X i.e. failed to follow 
what the rule lays down he should do. It is true that it is 
31. Malcolm, op. cit. p.68_ 
32. Thomson, op. cit. P• 
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not possible to remember the rule and still break it un-
wittingly but it is none the less perfectly sensible to 
make a distinction between the fulfilment of what the rule 
lays down and ·remembering the rule. 
In Investigations 201 and 202 Wittgenstein dis-
tinguishes between the expression of a rule and obedience to 
the rule. And Thomson herself says that it is possible for 
any rule to be forgotten, and rules of type •t• are not 
peculiar in this. If, therefore, she means-to recommend 
that we never talk of breaking a rule of type 't' but only of 
forgetting it, then she i& prescribing a new usage, contrary 
to the ordinary one, but she is not really attacking the 
Wittgensteinian position that it must be possible for a rule 
to be broken. It is possible to verify whether a rule of type 
't' has been kept or broken by asking the individual involved, 
"Did you think, decide, remember, ima,gine, etc. ••••• as it is 
laid down that you should?" And it is possible to find out 
whether the meaning of the· rule has been grasped by the in-
dividual by his answer to this and to further questions. 
What then is the distinction between these cases 
and those of the so-called private rule following? After all 
Wittgenstein does say, nto think one is obeying a rule is not 
to obey a rule" and this could be reformulated, 11Saying one 
has obeyed a rule is not to have obeyed a rule."· The difference 
is this: we know what is meant by, "Imagine the picture when'"' 
ever ••••"• 11Think of cheese whenever ••••", "Remember Rosy 
whenever · •••• 1•, and we can verify whether these· things have or 
have not been· done. We know what must be done and we know the 
conditions under which it must be done. But the problem with 
private rules, whether private language rules or private rules 
for any other practice, is not so much that obedience to them 
can•t be verified but that the rules can•t be intelligibly 
formulated in the first place. Private·Rulei "Do X whenever 
Y occurs.u Qua private"obedience to this rule cannot be 
verified because conditions for following the rule cannot be 
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formulated. We cannot say what is going to constitute an 
occurence of Y because we have no language in which to say 
this. So the private rule cannot be formulated. 
Talking about the private rules for a private 
language Rush Rhees says, "I say I cannot know a language 
privately, for what would there be to KNOW? In language it 
makes a difference what you say. But how can it make any 
difference what you say privately? {I do not mean talking 
to yourself) It seems that in a private language everything 
would have to be at once a statement and a definition. I 
suppose I may define a mark in any way I wish. And if every 
use of the mark is also a definition - if there is no way of 
discovering that I am wrong, in fact no sense in suggesting 
that I might be wrong - then it does not matter what mark I 
use or when I use it." 33 • .Now in the case of rules of 
type •t• {the ones which were beginning to seem indistinguish-
able from private rule·s) it does make a difference what is 
done by the person to whom the rule has been given. What he 
does whenever •••• is either in accordance with the rule or it 
isn•t. This is not so with private rules. 
The point which Wittgenstein establishes is that a 
"private rule 11 only seems to be a rule. It is not so much 
that a private rule is a rule which one can't break. To 
put it that way is misleading because it makes it look as 
though there WAS such a. thing as a private rule which had this 
peculiar quality .about it: it can't be brokeno If we say 
that a private rule can•t·be. broken then we should add as 
qualification, that neither can it be obeyed, because it cannot 
be formulated i.e. conditions for rule governed behaviour 
cannot be formulated. As I said at the beginning of the 
chapter, the words "private rule" can have no intelligible , 
meaning if we are attempting to use them in the ordinary wayo 
This particular combination is being excluded from the language. 
33. Rhees, op. cit. p. 274 
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Much of the confusion about, and resulting dis-
agreement on, Wittgenstein•s treatment of privacy has re-
sulted from failing to distinguish between two statements 
in the Investigations. The statements are 202 (about 
thinking one is obeying a rule) and 259: "Are the rules of 
the private language impressions of rules?· - The balance on 
which impressions are made is not the impression of a 
balance." I formulate the distinction between them in this 
way: the reasons why thinking one is obeying a public rule 
not of type •t•; and thinking one is obeying a private rule, 
do not constitute obedience to a rule, are different. 
Thinking one is obeying a public rule is not the same as 
obeying it because there are objective criteria for de-
ciding whether the rule has been followed, and thus the 
possibility remains open that one may think one has obeyed 
the rule and yet be correctly judged not to have obeyed it. 
Thinking one is obeying a private rule involves a mistake of 
a different sort. In this case one mistakenly thinks that 
there IS a rule to be obeyed. The "rules" of the private 
language are not rules although they·may appear to be. So 
when we try to use a private languag~ we think we are obey-
ing rules, only there are no rules to be obeyed. When we 
use ordinary language the possibility exists that we may 
think we are obeying its rules, and not be. 
language nothing can be sa~d. 
\ 
In a private 
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C H A P T E R VI 
LINGUISTIC FORMALISM AND THE THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATION-INTENTION 
In the chapter on private languages I have tried 
to show that the idea that it is possible to follow a private 
rule has unacceptable consequences. It is not possible, I 
have argued, to enunciate clearly what one means by "follow-
ing a rule privately," any more than it is possible to say 
what measuring is if the measuring is being done with a piece 
of elastic. Or perhaps I should put it another way by say-
ing that it is possible to say what "following a rule private-
ly" means, or what "measuring with an elastic ruler" means, 
provided one accepts that the words are not being u·sed in the 
.. 
ordinary way. The game of measuring with a meter rule is 
not like the game of measuring with a piece of elastic. 
The conclusion I carne to in that chapter is pretty 
disasterous for any theory of language which claims that the 
rules of a language need not be public, and my concern there 
was chiefly to examine the arguments of philosophers who 
think that private rules for private languages do not entail 
such consequences. Now I want to take a look at a semantic 
theory which seems to me to result in the positing of private 
.rules. My purpose in doing this is not simply to try to· r e·· 
ject this theory because of its untenable consequences but 
(a) to show how these consequences follow from the nature of 
the theory (P) to suggest an alternative approach to languag0 
and linguistic meaning which is opposed to the first and 
which does not entail the privacy consequence (c) ·to show 
that the alternative is _{i) Wittgensteinian, (ii) that it 
needs to be supplemented as Wittgenstein saw by an account of 
intention and (iii) that it involves the notion of language 
as social practice -a notion implicit in Wittgenstein's 
later work. 
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A further, more general, intention behind this 
chapter is that it should serve to link up the main points rna~ •. 
in the thesis so f~r. The discussion will involve the ubiq~-­
tous notion of rules~ their function and what it means to 
follow them, the concept of a criterion will be invoked in 
dealing with the question of how we know when something , ~ 
been said, and perhaps most important of all, semantic theories 
of the formal type found in the Tractatus, will be criticised 
from the stand point of another theory. But before I go on 
with the discussion a word of explanation is necessary. A few 
lines earlier I spoke of an •alternative approach' to language, 
thus assiduously avoiding the imputation of advancing a theory, 
but now it may look as though I have come out in the open, so 
to speak and talked of criticising one theory from the stand-
point of another theory. How is this second, seemingly more 
ingenuous way of putting it,to be made to square with 
Wittgenstein 1 s intention not to "advance any kind of theory.n 1 • 
The answer lies I think in the descriptive character of the · 
Wittgensteinian treatment ("theoryn) of language. He is not· 
advancing an hypothesis as to how ·language is produced by us. 
He is saying that if by •language' we mean what we ordinarily 
mean (if we use the word in the ordinary way) then his is an 
accurate description of what using a language, or what saying 
something consists in. He is trying to give us the concept 
of language. He is not trying to EXPLAIN how language is 
acquired, or to explain the workings of the mechanism which 
enables us to use it. Such explanations are the business of 
the scientist, particularly the psychologist and the genetic 
epistemologist. In so far as they employ a hypothetico-
deductive method, and in so far as their explanatory theories 
are subject to verification at the descriptive an'd predictive 
level, Wittgenstein•s treatment cannot be applied to them. 
As he so often stresses, his treatment is a grammatical treat-
ment, his aim is nto bring words back from their metaphysical 
to their every day use." 2 • Pole can see nothing in this 
but destruction and the·.ha1t of all speculation, and in a way 
1 ~ P. I. 109 
2. P.I. 116 
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he is right. Metaphysical systems are being destroyed and 
metaphysical speculation is being halted. But it is quite 
incorrect, it seems to me, to contrast ordinary language 
with the technical languages of the sciences, in an attempt 
to show that Wittgenstein wants to stop scientific investi-
gation. He has no wish to make a contrast between ordinary 
and technical language, in fact he points out that the, 
·"Symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infintesimal 
calculus 11 3 • have become part of our language. The con-
trast he·makes is between ordinary language and metaphysical 
language. The latter is extraordinary not because its terms 
are technical or outre but because the language bears the 
( ~ 
mark of conceptual confusion and itself perpetuates 'and 
elaborates this confusion. Wittgenstein's technique is 
geared to the purpose of enabling "the reader to shift for 
himself when he encounters conceptual confusions." 4 • And 
in line with this, his aim in dealing with language is not 
to dispute any scientific hypothesis about how in fact • 
language is acquired, but rather to clear away certain con-
ceptual problems which arise in the discussion of language. 
For these reasons 11Wittgenstein's theory of language, 11 
is something of a misnomer. His general-intention is to 
describe the actual use of language, which description will 
include the use of tl:le word "language" in the language of 
every day. 5 • One of the things involved in this is a des-
cription of "meaning": the meaning of a word comes out in 
its use and so a description of the use of words involves 
talking about meaning. A semantic theory which separates 
word, use and meaning will result in the conceptual confusion 
which he warns against when he writes: 11You say: the point 
isn•t the word but its meaning, and you think of the meaning 
as a thing of the same .kind as the word though also different 
from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The. money, 
and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, 
3~ P.r. 1a 
4~ P.I. page 206 
5. P.I. 120 and 124 
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and its use.)" 6 • When we think about semantics in one v,·~. 
it seems as though the signs we use in language were lifeh· -. 
in themselves and that we put life, i.e. meaning, into them, 
through using them according to the rules dictated by the 
nature of a linguist'ic mechanism. The gap between word and 
meaning, is, as it were, closed by a mental mechanism which 
connects sign and syntax with meaning. Wittgenstein is con-
cerned to show that the hypothesis of a mental mechanism 
(which might or might not exist) will not help us in getting 
a clear view of the c?ncept of meaning in langua~. In so 
far as he believes that his treatment of confusions about 
language and meaning enable us to get a clear view of this 
concept, it may, I suppose, be regarded as a theory of 
semantics. 
The two theories which I have in mind are those 
discussed by Strawson in his inaugural lecture on "Meaning 
' 7 
and Truth" • and I shall follow his argument through here 
in some detail. 
The meaning of a sentence depends, in a systematic 
way, on the meanings of the words which compose it:.- Con-
versely a word has meaning if it contributes systematically 
to the meaning of any sentence in which it occurs. So far 
there is pretty common agreement among all schools of thought 
on the topic. But at this point disagreement breaks out 
between what Strawson calls the theorists of communication-
intention and the theorists of formal semantics. The former 
argue that there can be no account given of meaning without 
reference to an audience directed intention to communicate 
something, on the part of the speaker. They are quite will-
ing to grant that words and sentences are bounded by, or 
used according to, rules, but they insist that these rules 
can only be understood as rules for communicating and must 
therefore be understood in terms of an intention to do so. 
6~ P.r. 120 
7. Strawson, "Meaning and Truth" Logico Linguistic Papers. 
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The formal semanticists on the other hand, say that the 
intention to communicate, far from being essential to the 
concept of linguistic rules, is quite incidental to them. 
For them, lin.guistic competence can be dealt with, without 
any mention of communication. 
Taking these points of view in turn and starting 
with the communication-intention theorist, we must ask what 
sort of account is required of him. Firstly he must elu-
cidate the concept of communication-intention without making 
any reference to linguistic meaning. Then he must show 
that linguistic meaning must be explained in terms of an in-
tentional communication act, and this of course further im-
plies that the theory must contain as primary and essential, . 
the concept of a speaker's meaning something by an audience 
directed utterance. What the speaker means is related 
essentially (conceptually) to what he intends. Finally, 
since we speak according to rules, and since utterer's mean• 
ing, as Strawson calls it, is in this sense governed by 
rules, it must be analysed in terms of these rules of grammar. 
But the rules are rules for communicating and their nature 
can only be understood if they are seen as rules which enable 
those who follow them to get across some or other belief or 
wish or puzzlement or annoyance, etc. to an audience. 
Here the formal semanticist might object that since 
we communicate very complex things we must have very complex 
intentions to communicate, which, if we are to avoid circu-
larity must be posited independent of any means of communi-
cating them. We are called upon to posit a Shakespeare with the 
intention to communicate the ideas found in Hamlet, or an 
Einstein with the intention to tell the world about relativity, 
but with no means of actua~ly communicating. This, it might 
be argued is absurd. But the answer to this is that no such 
positing is required. All that is required is the concept of 
a primitive, pre-conventional (pre-rule governed) communication. 
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This concept of a pre-conventional utterance fi-'-s 
into what Strawson calls an account of the analytic-genetic 
variety. Such an account might run as follows: An utter~­
who has an audience directed intention successfully communi-
cates pre-conventionally by an utterance x. Let 1 s say he 
meant P by x. On the next occasion upon which a communica-
tion intention arises the utterer utters 'x 1 in order to 
communicate P. So •x• is uttered and works, then it is 
uttered because it works, and finally it works because 'it 
has become an established utterance. 
But what of syntactic structure, since the meaning 
of a sentence depends on the arrangement of its parts? 
Well a pre-conventional utterance could have a structure 
such that the utterer might go on to have another communi-
cation success by retaining one part and varying another, 
thus saying somethin'g which is partly the same and partly 
different from what was meant by the .first communication. 
If we step back at this stage of the discussion 
and make a general reconnoitre of the ground covered we can 
see the areas disputed by the two parties. They agree 
(i) that the meaning of a sentence is determined by semantic 
and syntactic rules of language; (ii) that all members of a 
community with linguistic competence can communicate with 
and influence one another; (iii) that communication is 
determined by convention; in that, what is intended one 
utterance should communicate is related to the conventional 
meaning of that utterance. They differ on the relation-
ship between meaning-determining rules of language and the 
function of communication: · Communication-intention theorists 
insisting that the nature·of these rules can only be determined 
by making reference to communication-intention and formal 
semanticists denying this. 
Formal semanticists define meaning in terms of the 
conditions under which any sentence is true, and even those 
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forms of expression such as imperatives, optatives, etc. 
which are not propositional in character can be dealt with 
in terms of some related set of conditions as Hare shows 
in "Meaning and Speech Actsn 8 • So when an account has 
been given of all the possible transformations (from truth 
conditional statements to say fulfilment conditional state-
ments, in the case of optatives), then the framework of 
semantic theory will be complete. The difficulty, that 
the sentences that we are talking about are type sentences, 
sentences not actually in use, and as such cannot be true 
or false, can be overcome by relativising their truth con-
ditions to the particular conditions pf utterance i.e. a 
general statemept can be given of the type of conditions in 
which a $entence may be utte~ed truly. 
The obvious move now for the formal semanticists 
.. 
is to say what truth is, in order to pe able to understand 
what meaning is.. He cannot evade this by saying truth is 
what is laid down in the rules governing truth conditions in 
a language- this'is j\lst ciroular. As account of truth 
must therefore be given in terms of existing states of 
affairs. Strawson has in mind here, I think, the sort of 
account which Wittgenstein gives in the Tractatus: 4.062 
"Can we not make ourselves understood with false proposi-
tions just as we have done up till now with true ones? -
So long as it is known that they are meant to be false. 
No1 For a proposition is true if we use it to say that 
things stand in a certain way, and they do; and if by 'P' 
we mean -p and things stand as we mean that they do, then 
construed in the new way, 'P' is true and not false." 
So we must say that tttrue" in the expression "true 
statement" refers to the circumstance that things are as 
the utterer of the statement states them to beo And the 
meaning of a sentence is determined by the rules for how 
things are stated to· be by one who makes a statement, (or 
by rules by how things are expressly supposed to be by one 
8. Hare, "Meaning and Speech Acts" In "Practical Infe::::-ence~' 
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who expresses a supposition) etc. The concept of a sta te.!r.:·.,·: 
only makes sense in terms of conditions of truth and falsity -
a sentence which is neither true nor false is not a statement. 
These truth conditions coupled with a rule or set of rules for 
the formation of sentence-statement, determine the meaning of 
the sentence. But as we have noted, sentence types are by 
their nature not subject to truth conditions and so we must 
relativise the formation rules for statements, to contexts, so 
that ntruthn and nfalsityn may become applicable. The ·mean-
ing of a sentence·must be·determined by those rules which 
state WHAT statement is made by one who in uttering a sentence 
in certain conditions makes a statemeqt. (And a si,milar form-
ulation of meaning can be given in th~ case of wish~sv orders, 
questions~ etc.) 
In case 'this is too abstract and unclear lets take 
this example. .In overcast conditions if I want to make a 
statement about the colour of the heavens then I must utter 
the sentence, 11The sky is grey", which sentence is composed 
of words put together in a way· determined by the rules of syntax. 
Unless we are given a set ·of circumstances we cannot determine 
what sentence must be uttered if a true statement is to be 
made, and for this reason truth conditions cannot be formu·la ted 
for type sentences. In this way, the formal semanticist 
argues, the meaning of the statement is determined by rules 
which specify what sentence is to be uttered in given circum-
stances and rules which specify how such a sentence is to be put 
together. Were there not such rules then the utterance "The 
sky is grey" would be a random s:tring of phones arbitrarily 
uttered, and as such would have no linguistic meaning. 
And of course they are right in what they say. The 
weakness in their position is more in the nature of an ommissior!" 
Their theory is partial in a way which makes a conceptual 
account of language in terms of it, impossible. The prota-
gonists of communication intention would point out that when 
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once reference has been made to the content of a speech act 
(what is said) we must refer also to some audience directed 
intention. For example, in the case of assertions: we 
have said that their meaning is determined by rules which 
say what statement is made by one who, in uttering a sentence 
in.given circumstances, makes a statement. Thus the rule 
would go something like this: "If you want to state that you 
are sweating and state it truly· then in circumstances in which 
perspiration forms on your body you must say, "I am swe·ating", 
which string of words is arranged according to· the following· 
rules of syntax •••••" In this case, as in the case of the 
cloudy sky, included in the rule must be a reference to some 
intention to state something on the part of the utterer. If 
the intention to communicate is excluded from the antecedent 
or if the rule is not stated in the form of a hypothetical 
such as we h~ve invented, then it does not fulfil the re-
quirement of a meaning-giving rule. 
will come out shortly. 9 • 
Further reasons for this 
Two ways of meeting this objection are open to the 
formal semanticists (a) he·can make meaning dependant on truth 
conditions without giving any further account of the latter. 
This we have seen is unsatisfactory. (b) Truth conditions 
can be subsumed under the notion of correlation, i.e. the 
elements of any given sentence can be correlated with any 
actual state of affairs. This notion of correlation, however, 
is too unspecific to be useful. There are many kinds of 
behaviour·which are .correlated to states of affairs, without 
this correlation conferring on the behaviour the character of 
truth or falsity. The notion of·correlation alone is in-
sufficient for the formulation of truth conditions. Secondly 
the hoary problem of the false sentence arises. Strawson 
gives the example of the sentences, 11 I am tired" and "I am 
not tired" both of which can be correlated to the same possible 
state of affairs viz. that of my being tired. Granted the 
9. Waismann, . "The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy" 
The Chapter on "The. Causal Interpreation. of 
Language contains an excellent treatment of 
language, meaning and intention. 
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correlations would be different the one yielding a true and 
the other a false assertion. But this only shows that the 
notion of ciorrelation alone is not sufficiently specific to 
give an account of what makes a sentence have the meaning of 
a true statement. And in the case of a sentence which can 
be correlated with many different states of affairs in which 
case it will have many different meanings, the notion of .. 
correlation is again insufficient. We need to be able to 
specify how, in each particular case, a true statement ·can 
be uttered. That is to say we need a method fo~ correlating 
sentences with s\ates of affairs in such a way as to yield a 
true statement every time. the notion of correlation alone 
does not equip us to qo this. 
Strawson formulates the formal semanticists dilemma 
at this point like this, nhe sees that he cannot stop now 
with the idea qf truth. ·That idea leads straight to the 
idea of what is said. The ~ontent of what is said, when 
utterances are made; and that in turn to the question of what 
is being done when utterances are maoen, viz. to the idea of 
the communication o~ some belief (in the case of assertions 
which we are taking as our model case). 
The only way out for the formal semanticists now 
would seem to be to give an account of truth conditions which 
involve the notion of an assertion, since correlation alone 
will not do. In other words he must use the idea that a true 
assertion is made when things· are as one states them to be. 
He must go along with the theorists of communication intention 
in accounting for assertion in terms of belief, saying that an 
assertion is made when a belief is expressed. But he must 
stop short of saying that a belief-expression need in any way 
be linked with. the intention ::to communicate the belief o And 
he might justify his stopping short here on the grounds that 
an audience directed intention to communicate a belief is 
merely an appendage to the expression of belief; what we do 
WITH the intention to communi~ate, we can do without such an 
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intention. 
But these grounds are unsatisfactoryo If there is 
a concept of belief expression independent of communication 
intention then we must be able to give an account of it, and 
how are we to give such an account when the expression may 
not be considered as having any communication goal? The 
striking lacuna in the formal semanticists theory becomes 
evident when we cons.ider that asking, "What is Jack trying 
to say?" is another way of asking "What does he rneari? 11which_ 
is another way of asking "What is he trying to tell us? 11 
Saying something is different from uttering a series of· signs, 
which series might or might not be subsumable under a set of 
I 
rules. Which brings us to a second, extremely closely re-
lated point, namely that the behaviour we are dealing with 
should be capable of being formalized in terms of rules, and 
these must be rules for the expression of something. What 
· the utterer does must be recognisable as an expression of 
belief if we are going to be able to ascribe to him the 
practice of following the rules for the expression of belief 
i.e. for making statements. But the formal semanticists 
theory makes it impossible for us to have the notion.of belief 
expression since there is nothing in terms of which we can 
say that the utterer intends to express belief. To take 
Strawson•s example: Say a man hoots whenever the sun rises. 
We can say that his practice might be systematically be re-
lated to his belief that it is rising (compare the case of a 
dog salivating when food is presented to it) but we could not 
say that he was expressing his belief. He might simply 
salute the rising sun in this way - why he does what he does 
we don't and can't know. Of course we might answer why 
having interpreted the question as one requiring an explana-
nation similar to the kind of explanation a zoologist would 
give to a dog salivating, or that a botanist would give for 
the behaviour of plants with respect to sunlight. Such an 
explanation would have nothing to do with a concept of lingu-
istic practice - language is not a pattern of organismic 
.. 
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responses to stimuli. This is what I think Rhees is driving 
at in a rather mysterious sounding way, when he writes of the 
people using Wittgenstein•s primitive language-games, "Those 
people are not just going·through a complicated trick;· what 
they say depends on what they find. ·They are not just carry-
ing out orders. They use the expressions they do because 
they have something to say and because that useis understood 
by all parties. Whereas you may train animals to make the 
•correct• responses to different words or signs, the animals 
themselves do not use different words." 10 • When a dog 
salivates or wags his tail, when he barks or when his hackles 
rise, he does not know what he means nor does he mean what he 
says because he does not say anything. If we say that he is 
telling us something then we say this by construing the be-
haviour of the dog on the model of intentional human behaviour 
and his meaning something by salivating or barking, is only 
intelligible if we think that he is communicating with us. 
The question of whether it makes sense to attribute intentions, 
and by implication communication intentions to a dog, we will 
deal with later. 
Now if despite all this we stick to the formal 
semanticists theory then it must follow that we believe that 
the rules that are employed in language are private. There 
must be nothing in the concept of a rule of language which 
makes it impossible conceptually for a speaker to speak a 
language which he and only he understands or can understand. 
Since this is so we must ask as we have asked before in what 
sense an utterer follows these rules, and in fact we must deny 
that these rules are linguistic rules at all - language is 
something more than mere·patterns of regularity which we 
describe. 
10. Rhees, op. cit.\ p.2761 
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C H A P T E R VII 
SCEPTICAL DOUBTS: THE INNER-OUTER DOUBT 
In the last chapter I mentioned that the discussion 
of private language takes place in the Investigations, in the 
broader context of a discussion of the notion of privacy 
itself • in particular of the notion that sensations are pri-
vate. In order to see the full significance of the treat-
ment of private language and in order to get a fuller under-
standing of what that treatment is, we must examine what the 
notion of privacy involve~. More particularly we will con-
centrate attention on the question, 11 In what sense are my 
sensations private?" 1 • From a scrutiny of this question 
the outlines of its· various senses will emerge as well I hope, 
as its various non senses. The statement that my sensations 
are private, when made by someone not doing philosophy (and 
it is seldom if ever made in that case) is quite prosaic, un-
exciting, platitudinous and easily translatable into a sent-
ence which makes no use of the word ''Private". Furthermore 
the sentence makes sense. When it is made philosophically 
it seems revelatory, profound and slightly puzzling. Un-
fortunately it makes no sense or at any rate very odd sense. 
To pass from non sense to sense in the case of the notion of 
privacy means to pass from profundity to platitude. This is 
the price which we must pay for getting rid of philosophical 
perplexity. From one point of view the investigation "seems 
only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is 
great and important." 2 • The reward of the investigation is, 
that it makes it possible for us to stop bumping our heads 
against the limits of language. 
In order to get a clear look at the philosophical 
idea of privacy we must follow the notion to its source in a 
1 ~ P .I. 246 
2. P.I. 118 
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disquietude. This disquietude is perhaps THE disquietude 
in philosophy. It is the disquietude produced by doubt. 
The argument that all sensations are private is used to bolster 
the argument that there is no way of knowing ·what sensations 
another has, if he has ani at all. Scepticism with respect 
to other minds goes hand in hand with the notion of private 
sensations. 
things: 
In this chapter I shall, therefore, try to do· three 
(a) discuss the character of the philosophical doubt; 
(b) deal with a specific form of this doubt, ioe. with the 
doubt about sensations of others; (c) show how this leads to 
the idea that sensations must be private and show precisely 
how this notion of privacy differs from, and how it is similar 
to, the ordinary notion of privacyo A fourth point will I 
hope emerge out of the other three, viz., the integral connect-
ion between the private language argument and the p~ivate 
sensation argument. This will ··mitigate somewhat the arti-
ficiality of my having dealt with private language in a separate 
chapter. 
In chapter 4 we discussed the problem of how criteria 
for Y are related toY. What, we tried to find out, would 
constitute such an evidence for Y anq how could it come about 
that any~hing should become an evidence. In chapter 3 the 
question a1~ose as to how we could ever know that a rule •,•muld 
be followed currectlyo Would one perhaps need rules for .the 
use of rules for the use of rules etc.? And again in 
chapter ~ ~ question came up as to what would constitute a 
sufficient verification of an empirical assertion, a problem 
which we had mentioned in chapter 1. The answer to _these 
questions tended to come in the form of a discussion of lang-
uage-games and the way they are embedded in social forms of 
life. This way of finding a solution might not seem very 
satisfactory, it has been too briefly and too vaguely stated 
at this stage even to merit the name of a solution. I shall 
try to remedy this in a later chapter. For the present I 
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want to ignore the solution aspect of these problems and 
concentrate on the problems themselves. They form part of 
a family of philosophic problems characterised by doubt, we 
may call them accordingly ''Philosophic doubts." 
This term indicates that philosophic doubts must be 
distinguished from the doubts that we ordinarily have. For 
instance, philosophic doubts seem, when we are not doing 
philosophy, to be pointless. I may doubt, whether the· 
creature I have glimpsed in the fading bushveld light was a 
lion or a cheetah - this is a quite natural doubt. But if 
I went into a zoo at noon and doubted whether what I was 
seeing was a lion then there would be grounds for thinking 
that I might be in the grip of a philosophical doubt. And 
here it is impossible not to invoke the name of Descartes and 
with the name the spectre of those amazing doubts which he 
sets out so methodically in his writings. Take this passage 
from the Discourse: 
11 (A)s I then desired to give my attention solely to 
the search· after truth, I thought ••••• that I ought tore-
ject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I 
could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascer-
tain whether after that there remained aught in my belief 
that was wholly indubitable. Accordingly, seeing that our 
senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that 
there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; 
and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralo-
gisms even on the simplest matters of geometry, I, convinced 
that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false 
all the reasonings I had hitherto taken as demonstrations; 
and finally when I consider that the very same thoughts which 
we experience when we are awake may also be experienced when 
I 
we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them 
true I supposed that all the objects" that had ever entered 
into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the 
illusions of my dreams." 3 • 
3. Descartes, "Discourse on Method." 
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For our purposes this quotation is interesting in 
two respectso For one thing it is the preface to Descartes' 
theory of the Cogitatio, a sense datum theory which is basic, 
4. . h f . as Kenny has shown to the Cartes1an t eory o pr1vacy. 
Secondly, and this is the asperit I·want to concentrate on now, 
the doubts which Descartes expresses in the passage quoted, 
are such as no one in their right mind would, in the ordinary 
course of events, entertain. And yet in philosophy they 
came to be accepted as perfectly understandable doubts - doubts 
all of which not every philosopher actually entertained or 
thought he should entertain~ but doubts which, nevertheless did 
not seem out of placeo This is so much the case that people 
who are not doing philosophy often tend to think (quite rightly) 
that philosophers spend most of their time wondering whether 
11the table is really there". And this has become something of 
a standing joke about philosophyo 
So one of the characteristics of the philosophic 
doubt is that it appears to question things which it ordinarily 
makes no sense to question. It, as it were, holds up the 
process of learning and of knowledge, by putting artificial 
barriers in the way. It is almost as if the philosopher does 
not know what it means to know, and therefo·re by implication, 
what it means to learn anything. Wittgenstein gives the 
example of a school boy who holds up the history class with 
doubts as to whether the earth has existed for more than a 
hundred years. 11The teacher", he says "would feel that this 
was only holding· them up, that this way· the pupil would only 
get stuck and make no progress. - And he would be right. It 
would be as if someone were looking for some object in a room; 
he opens the drawer and does not see it there; then he closes 
it again, waits, and opens it once more to see if perhaps it 
is not there now, and keeps on like that. He has not learned 
to look for thingso And in the same way this pupil has not 
learned how to ask questions. He has not learned the game 
we are trying to teach himo" 5 • When once the teacher gets 
4. Kenny, 11Cartesian Privacy" Pitcher. 
5. o.c. 315 .. 
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the pupil to stop asking these questions, to stop having these 
doubts, and makes him see that they are pointless and obstructive, 
then he has also put him in a position to understand what learn-
ing and knowing is •. The pupil can then continue or begin his 
course of education. 
The description which Wittgenstein gives is strongly 
reminiscent of Freud's description of the situatio~ which often 
occurs during psychoanalytic therapy in which the p~tient ob-
structs the course of an apparently smooth-running analysis by 
refusing to believe what he is telling the analyst: 11Then we 
discover that the resistance has fallen back on the doubts 
characteristic of the obsessional neurosis and is holding it 
successfully at bay from this vantage point." 6 • In a similar 
way the philosopher obstructs the course of knowledge by 
questioning and in fact doubting whether we know what we all 
know we know. It is interesting to notice how Descartes al-
most exactly reproduces Freud and Wittgenstein's portraits in 
his own actions. In part three of the Discourse he describes 
how he follows certain opinions and maxims in his daily life 
while suspending his judgment as to their truth. As soon as 
he begins to meditate, however, his normal practices including 
the acquisition of scientific knowledge comes to a halt, ob-
structed by the doubt. 
What I have been saying here clearly takes its in-
spiration from Wisdom, and ultimately from Wittgenstein. 
Wisdom points out both the similarities and differences between 
the purely psychogenic case of neurosis and the case of philo-
sophical perplexity. The philosopher like the neurotic clings 
to the problem or disquietude which is disturbing him so that, 
11in spite of his evident unhappiness and desire to come from 
hesitation to decision he also desires the discussion never to 
end and dreads its ending." 7 • But unlike the neurotic what 
the philosopher says about· the cause of his doubts and problems 
6. Freud, "Twenty Eight Lectures on Psycho-Analysis". page 244., 
·7. Wisdom,. uphilosophy and Psycho-Analysisn, page 172. 
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does not so much have the savqur of an empty rationalisation. 
Instead he gives something very much more like reasons, and 
impressive reasons at that. Only, the reasons he gives for 
holding a position can be countered by equally convincing 
reasons against his holding it. His position is thus para-
doxical - now one horn of the dilemma appeals to him, and now 
the other. Like Buridan's ass he stands between two equally 
attractive alternatives and just because of this he cannot 
move at all. He becomes a victim of what Wittgenstein·so 
aptly called "mental cramp." 
The paradoxes of philosophy· are, Wisdom argues, 
8
• 
rather more like riddle problems than like mathematical 
problems. Their solution lies in "seeing 
and then forgetting about the whole· story. 
good model of a philosophical perplexity is 
following problem: 
the point", grinning 
I think· a fairly 
provided by the 
Before setting out on a flight from Jan Smuts all 
the passengers take out life insurance policies with an inter-
national insurance company. The aircraft trag·ically crashes 
exactly on the border between South Africa and Botswana, so 
that the tail part falls into South African territory and the 
front section falls into Botswanan territory. Must the South 
African or the Botswanan branch of the company pay out the 
survivors? 
A decision seems to be called for and yet any reasons 
one could advance for the answer that the South African branch 
o must pay, could equally be advanced for the Botswanan branch 
having to pay. But of course the dilemma only remains for as 
long as one does not notice that the problem is a joke; for no 
one has to pay the survivors anything since they took out life 
insurance policies and since they have survived. 
This example is slightly off centre, although it is 
so in quite an illuminating way. There is a· fact in the story 
8. Wisdom, op. cit. pp.l76-7 
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itself which, when noted, enables us to see that no decision 
is called for and that the problem is a trick. In a philo-
sophical problem, the doubt as to which answer should be 
given cannot be resolved by noticing any stated fact internal 
to the problem itself. So it is not so much as though we 
overlook one vital sentence or phrase in the statement of the 
problem, as that we overlook the jokelike character of the 
problem as such. All analogous examples of the philosophical 
problem limp in one or another important respect it seems to 
me and the statements of the problems themselves; in the long 
run, best illustrate their own peculiar character. 
The doubt about the existence of other minds, like 
most philosophic do~bts is criteriological in character. It 
is a doubt as to how from the knowledge that X I can know that 
Y: 11Do I have sufficient -can I ever have sufficient, criteria 
.. 
for Y, short of being given Y itself? 11 11What constitutes my 
having sufficient criteria?" "How can I· make the leap from the 
criteria of Y to Y? 119 •In the case of sensations: Given thar. 
Jack is groaning,' writhing, etc. - are these not after all t r>e 
outward manifestations of what I HYPOTHESISE to be some inward 
state of Jack's?" As far .as the other-minds empiricist is con-
cerned the evidence for Jack's being in pain ioe. for his in-
ward state, is always some behaviour which is in principle 
observable by someone else. Now as Paul Ziff points out in his 
short article "About Behaviourism" 10• a phrase, 11you can in 
principle find· oritn does not have· a very clear meaningo . I 
will attempt a few· translations of it which more or less bring 
out what I think those who use the phrase mean by it. "You 
can in principle find out" - 11it is not inconceivable that you 
should find out" or "it is no't logically impossible that you 
should find out1• or "it is not self contradictory to say that 
you can find out" or· "it makes sense (it is not absurd) to say 
that you can find out·." 
9. Wisdom, "Other Minds," pp.l-2 (notes) 
10. Ziff, "Apout Behaviou;rism", Analysis XVIII (1957-58) 
;reprinted in The Ph;ilosophy of Mind" ed. by V.Co 
Chappell, page 148. 
- 91 -
The implication of this sort of talk is that in 
principle you CANNOT directly find out what Jack's INWARD 
state is. Our knowledge of one another's sensations is 
mediated by our knowledge of one another's behaviour and 
the situation is conceived to be something like that in 
which an uncle jingles a few coins in his fist and .then 
asks his nieces and nephews to guess what coins are there. 
But this fist cannot only not be prised open by niepes and 
nephews, it cannot be opened by all the energy in the uni-
verse, it is kept clenched by the muscles and sinews of · 
1 . 1 . . 
11 • s h h .ld 1 og1ca necess1ty. o t e c 1 ren can on y guess at 
I 
the number and the value of the coins but they can never 
KNOW unless their uncle tells themo Their guesses might 
become more and more informed as they play the game more 
and more often, but these guesses will only be based on in-
ductions from past jingling of the coins and subsequent 
confirmations or corrections of guesses. 
For some sceptics this analogy is more strictly· 
correct than for otherso But all protagonists of scepticism 
with respect to a ~owledge of another's mind would agree 
on the logical impossibility of the contents of another's 
mind ever becoming patent to anyone else. This of course 
raises the problem of how the mental objects ever got into 
the mind in the first place (the uncle must at some stage 
take the coins from his pocket)o This is an objection which 
I will not pursue. It has traditionally been met by say 
that the sensations ioe. the mental contents are the effects 
of the ~xterior causeso The welter of confusions and 
difficulties which this answer raises, and the various 
critiques and sophistications of it by empiricists them-
selves, I also shall not deal witho The main point is that 
the contents of other minds are hidden from me and can only 
be inferred by me from behaviour. 
Where the empiricist's argument leads into scepti-
cism is just the point at which the analogy with the uncle's 
11. See Wi ttgenstein on 11the hardness of t_he logical must" 
·· in F .M. 113-141 
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logically tight fist can be made to break down. We said 
that the children could never know the number of coins un-
less he told them and just sofone may think that the really 
only satisfactory way to know the mind of another is through 
what she tells us. But of course the radical philosophic 
doubt cannot stop sh~t at a verbal report and there is no 
good reason why it should. It is quite natural for the 
philosopher, hell bent for certaint.ies, to ask, "How do I 
know that she means what I mean by pain, ache, tingle, warm, 
blue, black, green, etc.?" or "True he CALLS it red, but how 
do I know he does not see· it as green?" These and a host 
of similar doubts begin to crowd in until the gentle but per-
sistent question can no longer be drowned out or circumvented: 
"How do I know that there A!S any other minds?" And with 
_that question as Joh~ Wisdom so poignantly puts it we, 
11 1 look down that lonely road• which leads past abandoned 
illusions to the security of Solipsism". 12 • 
Clearly.there is no valid case to'be made for an 
·induction from a set of behaviours, where "behaviouru is used 
in the very broadest sense,to mean observable movements, to 
the existence of a mind. What sort of probability could 
these observations yield if,in principle there is no possi• 
bility of an independent confirmation of the existence of 
another•~ mind? 13 • To the sceptic there can be no reason 
for thinldllg that what he calls 11another person" is anything 
more than a very co~plicated machine which responds in ways 
more or less predictable to various stimuli. For instance, 
when he observes a human organism responding to a stimulus 
such as a low temperature by shivering and saying, "it is 
freezing", this response is strictly on a par with the flash-
ing of a· light on·a car dashboard indicating that the radiator 
is about to boil over. And just as it is possible ··~to open 
the car bonnet and measure the temperature of the cooling 
system with a thermometer so it is, in theory, possible to 
12. Wisdom, "Other· Minds,np.l41 
13. See Malcplm "Knowledge of Other Minds", Pitcher p.371 
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correlate the verbal and non verbal behaviour of the human 
organism with some state possibly a brain state, of tha.t 
human organism. Now while this correlation of the sensa• 
tion responses of a human organism with a brain process 
might de facto be possible 14 • the firing of synapses the 
passage of neurons, the messages from the afferent and 
efferent nerves are not what we ordinarily refer to when we 
say of someone that she is in pain. We do not use the word 
•tpainn like this. . Wittgenstein puta it this way: 
11Could a machine ttlink? - <;ould it be in pain? -
Well, is the hqrnan body to b~ called such a machine? It 
surely comes as close as pos~ible to being such a machine. 
But a machine surely cannot think\ • Is that an empirical 
statement? No. We only say of a·hu~an being and what is 
like one that it thinks. W~ also S&Y it of dolls and no 
doubt of spirits too. Look at the word 11to think" as a 
tool." 15 • 
And in the Philosophical Investigations Part 2 he 
elaborat~s on the attitude we take up when we use sensation 
words about others, such as "Paddy is in pain" and writes: 
"Suppose I say of a friend: • He is not an automaton• • -
What information is conveyed by this; and to whom would it be 
information? To a HUMAN BEING who meets him in ordinary 
circumstances? What information COULD it give him? (at the 
very most that this man .always behaved like a human being and 
not occasionally like a thing.) •I believe that he is not 
an automaton,• just like that, so far makes no sense. My 
attitude towards him is an \attitude towards· a soul. I am 
not of the OPINION that he has a soul "• 16• 
I shall go on to deal with Wittgenstein•s position 
on this problem in the next chapter and I merely intersperse 
14. See·u.T. Place 11 Is Consciousness a Brain Process" 
reprinted rrpm The British Journal of Psychology in 
Chappel p.lol. 
15. P.I. 359-60 
16. P.I. page 178 
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these two remarks of his to show what the argument of the 
empiricist driven to scepticism comes to - how odd it can 
be made to sound. 
But if the mind and more particularly the sensations 
of others are hypothetical objects the existence of which it 
is logically impossible for me to verify, then by that very 
fact, I make no real hypothesis. What I assert about 
another's pain can be neither proved true nor false and so, 
to put it strongly, I assert nothing, or to put it less 
strongly, I say something which we would nor ordinarily des-
cribe as an assertion. 
From where then do we derive the concepts of mind, 
of consciousness, of sensation? 
And now the sceptic is ready with an answer which 
is both a solution to that last problem and, I think, the 
cause of his scepticism. It is in a sense, the alpha and 
omega of sceptical doubt about other minds. He says that 
he does and can only know about 'these things FROM HIS OWN 
CASE. This is not only true, he argues, but necessarily 
true. The only sensations he can know are his own, and what 
is more, he is the only one who can know them. He can hypo-
thesise about the behaviour of others that they have THE SAME 
as he has when he is in pain, but he can have no direct 
awareness of their pain.· He can perceive their behaviour 
but in his own case he can CONCENTRATE HIS ATTENTION INWARDS 
and directly and immediately know that he is in pain. His 
sensations are private in the sense that only he can have THEM. 
When these things have been said then any'resemblance 
between the ordinary (though infrequent) statement that sensa-
tions are private and the philosophical statement disappears. 
Imagine a doctor walking into his waiting rooms and saying, 
·uwell, whose aches and pains want attention first?" at which 
t . 
Robinson despe,rate for a pain killer. groans, 11Mine1 11 - That 
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is a perfectly ordinary use of the possessive adjective: 
his pain will not be alleviated by the doctor treating Smith 
or Jones, and because his pain is severe he wants it attended 
to before the doctor attends to the alleviation of Smith and 
Jones• pain. In this rather trivial sense Robinson's pain 
is private. He can identify himself as the one who·is in 
pain, and the relief of his pain is not the relief of anyone 
else•s. (Even this last point has to be very carefully watched} 
How would this example be handled by the sceptic. 
He would have to say that when Robinson said that his pain was 
most deserving of treatment, then-the doctor, who proceded to 
treat him was trying to eliminate a certain behaviour in 
Robinson, viz. his groaning, saying that he is in pain, call-
ing for an analgesic, etc. If he was a behaviourist then he 
would say that third person descriptions of pain were descrip-
tions of certain measurable behaviours, and in this he would 
be correct to a certain and rather inisleading extent. But he 
cannot be content to rest here, ·for the problem of the first 
person statement has to be.met with by him. What, he must 
ask, is the meaning of Robinson's description to Robinson, for 
clearly he does not decide on the basis of an observation of 
his own behaviour that he is in pain. It must be that the 
first person sensation statement is a description of Robinson's 
private inward state. So, when Robinson uses the word 'pain' 
of himself he uses a name which refers to a private object the 
existence and character of which only he can know. Of course 
here one wants to ask how someone else could know that 
Robinson was describing any inward; private state, and as 
usual the question drives the sceptic into solipsism. He 
then grants that he can1 t KNOW that Robinson describes his in-
ward state, or for that-matter that he has any inward state to 
describe, strictly all he can say is that this is what HE 
HIMSELF does. When he turns his attention inwards he recog-
nises something which he knows to be pain. 
Although the que~?tion is premature (I want to reserve 
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any criticism until the next chapter) one wants to ask the 
sceptical philosopher what this "something" is that he 
recognises. 
"If you say that he sees a private picture before 
him which he is describing, you have still made an assumption 
about what he has before him. And that means that you can 
describe it or do describe it more closely. If you admit 
that you haven'.t any notion what kind of thing it might be 
that you have·before him- then what leads you into saying 
in spite of that, that he has something before him? Isn't 
it as· if I were to say of someone: 'He HAS something. But 
I don't know if its money, or debts, ·or an empty till.'n 17 • 
The reply to this is usually, that we do know what 
our own private pain is like and can describe it to our own 
satisfaction although this description is in a language as 
private as that which we described in chapter 5. In fact, 
he argues, this knowledge is one of the best examples of 
knowledge which we have, for here, when I say I know I am in 
pain then I can't be wrong. I make an identification of my 
inner state to which I attach a name·- "pain," 11hot 11 , "itchy 11 , 
etc. These names when used about another are descriptions · 
of overt behaviouz:, used o£ myself they are names in a private 
language. Whether they mean for others what they m,ean for me 
I can never know. And in an attempt to be fully consistent 
the privacy argument has been extended by some philosophers, 
Hume for example, to cover descriptions o£ the external world 
including those very descriptions of the behaviour of others. 
For when I have an experience of the blue sky there is no way 
for me to know whether any other organism has the same ex-
perience which I have or any experience at all. The language 
I use about the noutside world" is as private as that which I 
use to describe my sensations.· This, it goes without saying 
is an extremely "philosophical" idea. Wittgenstein both 
sketches its out"lines very vividly and captures its atmosphere 
in these paragraphs from the Investigations: 
17. P.I. 294 
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11Look at the blue of the sky and say to yourself 
'How blue the sky isl 1 - When you do it spontaneously -
without philosophical intentions - the idea never crosses 
your mind that this impression of colour belongs only to you. 
And you have no hesitation in exclaiming that to someone else. 
And if you point at anything as you say the words you point 
at the sky. I am saying: you have not the feeling of point-
ing-into-yourself, whicq accompani~s 'namin9 the sensation•· 
when one is thinking abQ4t 1 •pr:j.va~~ :).angua.g'P·', Nor do you 
. . 
think that really you 01.Jght ·pot to point to the colour with 
your hand, b4t with .your attention. (Consider what it means 
•to point to something with the attention•.) 
11But don 1 t we at least MEAN something quite definite 
when we look at a colour and name our colou·r-impression? It 
is as if we detached the colour-IMPRESSION from the object, 
like a membrane. {This ought to arouse our suspicions) •o••• 
it is easier to produce'this experience when one is looking at 
a bright colour, or a:t an impressive colour~scheme." 18• 
Of particular significance in this passage is his 
reference to "naming the sensation" which takes place in 
private language. This idea marks the reappearance of that 
atomistic theory of language which he deals with right at the 
outset of the Investigations. (see Cho 1) Accordi"ng to this 
theory the meanings of my words are the objects for which 
these words stand. Only propositions have sense, and there 
is only one way ~n which a proposition can be taken; the 
elements of a proposition. must be correlated with the world 
in such a way that there is a one~to-one correspondence be-
tween those elements (names) and the objects ·which occur in 
the fact (the state of affairs) which the proposition depicts. 
There is only one way in which a proposition can be projected 
onto a state of affairs if it is to be meaningful, and that 
way is such that the names in the proposition must stand for 
objects: "A name means an object. The object is its 
. . ).9. 
mean~ng.n 
1a. P.r. 275-6 
19. Tractatus, 3.203 
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No cognisance is taken here of the way in which the words 
are used. If the objects are private then the meanings of 
the words are private. The connection between my words and 
the world will be private if I construe the world qS somehow 
inside me i.e. as an internal·possession. 
But to use Wittgenstein's favourite way of putting 
I 
it there is no way in which this connection can be set up. 
And this statement, to use another typically Wittgensteinian 
expression does not refer to an empirical difficulty but to 
a grammatical impossibility viz. to the fact that there can 
be no intelligibly formulable rule for the correlation of 
names with private sensation and to the further fact that the 
concept of a private sensation is not intelligible. There 
may seem to the philosopher in the grip of a disquietude 'to 
be a gap bet~een my words and the mental objects to which the~ 
are supposed by the,private language argument to refer. But 
as Melden remarks in another context "•••• the appearance of a 
gap is symptomatic of confusion." 20 •· And in this case the 
conceptual confusion results from mixing up the categories of 
physical object.s and sensations. This confusion makes it 
seem as though there is an unbr.idgable gap between the names 
I .use for sensations and the sensations themselves (a quasi 
physical gap). Of course there does•nt appear to be a gap 
to the uncritical exponent of the private language argument, 
but there is a paradoxical position in the philosophical 
twilight between acceptance and rejection of that argument, 
in which the attempt to use language to describe private 
mental objects does seem unsatisfactory, - there IS a gap 
between the name of a pain and the painful sensation, but 
\ 
the nature of thegap and why it is there is not clear. 
20. Melden, "Free Action", P• 57 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SCEPTICAL DOUBTS: WITTGENSTEIN 1 S "TREATMENT" 
I have attempted to outline the argument that 
sensations must be private without saying what is objection-
able about it. Apart from one or two quotations from the 
Investigations which put the argument in a rather odd l.ight 
I have given no systematic critique of it as such. The 
critique of the private language argument, though closely 
connected with the problem of private sensations, will not 
entirely serve as therapy ·for the latter. In fact all the 
compelling force of the idea of a private language comes 
back into play· when the ground is switched from the rather 
abstract discussion of rule-following, speech acts and ling-
uistic meaning to sensations and the language we use in 
connection with them. So long as the idea of private 
sensations has a hold on us we will never really rid ourselves 
of the hankering to propose that sensation language must in 
some way be private. When we come to think about sensations. 
then we are shocked back into a way of thinking about language, 
which, to use Wisdom's Freudian idiom,we unsuccessfully re-
pressed when we countered the private language argument. 
There still lingers in our philosophical unconscious a desire 
to resurrect private language, and the notion that sensations 
must be private serves as an opportunity for bringing the old 
arguments into the light. ttAfter alltt, we want to say, 
npeter·knows his pain in a way which Susan does 1 nt simply 
because Peter is Peter and Susan isn• t Peter. ·And of course 
\ . 
the converse applies which only makes the gulf between his 
and her pain the more obvious.n If we have thought quite 
hard about the problem ·and have read the current literature 
on it we will even dismiss w.i th sophisticated scorn the naive 
idea that the barriers to Susan knowing Peter's pain are 
;physical or even psychological. Ayer, for example, referring 
to Stace•s empiricist arguments in favour of privacy says that 
' 
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his criticism of Stace•s propositions, 11 •••• is not that they 
are false, or even dubious, but that they are trivial. For 
what is it after all, that prevents one person from having the 
experiences of another? •••• This is not a case of physical 
incapacity, like my inability to see through a brick wall, or 
of a psychological incapacity, such as my inability to remember 
the events of my childhood. The barriers that prevent us 
from enjoying one anothers experiences are not natural but 
logical." 1 • 
There is something peculiarly subtle and at the same 
time particularly dangerous about this suggestion. It repre-
sents what might be termed a false. advance on the problem. 
As though one had gone through all the motions of taking a 
great stride forward while being unaware that one was trying to 
ascend a down-going escalator.· I shall try to show that Ayer 
and those who argue like him have not really freed ·themselves 
from the power of the physical metaphor (which clearly has a 
strong hold on Russell); that had they done so they would not 
speak of a nlogical barrier u preventing us from· enjoying one 
anothers sensations. Instead they would have investigated the 
grammar of our sensation language~ as is actually used and dis-
covered in that the sources of confusion which lead to the 
privacy argument, for it is an argument which Wittgenstein has 
shown, I think, to be irremediably confused. It is permeated 
by analogies and metaphors which often cease to be what they 
were intended to be and become instead the very basis of the 
argument. And the difficulties of dealing critically with 
these sorts of argument are increased by the fact that they DO 
give.important insight into the nature of our thinking, feeling, 
talking and the things we think, talk about. and feel. This 
means that to dismiss them for the wrong reasons is· as bad and 
possibly worse than accepting them. 
The argument with which Wittgenstein deals in the 
Investigations is well summari~ed by Cook in the following 
1~ Ayer, "The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge", page 138 
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three premi'ses: 
(Pi) · No one can feel (experience, be acquainted 
with) another personJs sensations. 
; 
(Pii) The proper ·and necessary means of coming 
to know what sensations another person is 
having is to feel that person's sensations. 
(Piii) Anyone who has a sensation knows that. he 
has it because.he feels it, and whatever 
can be known to exist by being felt cannot 
be known (in the same sense of "known") 
Conclusion: 
to exist in any other way. 
No one can know what sensations another person 
. h . 2. l.S avl.ng. 
These premises are countered by Wittgenstein in the 
much quoted section 246 of the Investigations: 
11 In what sense are my sensations private? - Well, I 
can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only 
surmise it. - In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. 
If we are using the word •to know• as it is normally used (and 
how else are we to use it?) then other people very often know 
when I am in pain. - Yes, but all the same not with the certainty 
with wh~ch I know it myselfl - It can't be said of me at all 
(except perhaps a:s a joke) that I KNOW I am in pain. ' What is 
it su~posed to mean - except perhaps that I AM in pain? 
110ther people cannot be s8:id to ~earn of my sensa-
tions ONLY from my behaviour, - for I cannot be said to learn 
of them.. I HAVE them. 
"The truth is: it makes sense to say about other 
people that· they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it 
about myself." 
2. Cook, 11Wittgenstein on Privacy" in Pitcher pages 289-90 
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This then is the crux of Wittgenstein•s position. 
Where 11 I known is used·as an expression of the fact that in-
formation has·been acquired (and not as an expression of ex-
asperation, 11Damn it I know I've got a headache but I can't 
go running off to the·doctor for that") then it makes sense 
to say, (i) that I came to know throu·gh the exercise of 
• 
certain perceptual and cognitive faculties; 
in a good position to experience the object 
(iii) that I have learned to recognize this 
(iv) that I could on this occasion correctly 
(ii) that I was. 
of knowledge; .. 
object as an ••• ; 
identify this as 
an •••• These instances recall the variety ?f meaningful 
' 
answers which Austin suggests can be given to the question 
"How do you know?" In his example the question put is, 
11How do you know there• s a bittern at the bottom of the garden?" 
and he lists.the possible answers as: 
(a) I was brought up in the fens. 
(b) I heard it. 
(c) The keeper reported it. 
(d) By its booming. 
(e) From the booming noise. 
(f) Because it is booming. 3. 
I would suggest a further retort (g) which emphasises 
(i) above, namely (g) I've got eyes in my head haven~t I? · 
The first three answers and (g) say how one is in a 
position to know and the last three say how one can tell at 
the time i.e. how one justifies the identification of this· 
particular instance as an instance of X. 
But the central point to notice, it seems to me, is 
that Austin•s philosophic and verbal acumen can only be exer-
• 
cised here because there is a primitive sense of 11to know 11 
which implies, •'Where I know I can be mistaken, 11 or better 
•'Where I thought (said) I knew, I could have been mistakeno 11 
3. . Austin, "Other Minds" in Philosophical Papers, page 79. 
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Just because of this it makes sense'to justify that one knows 
in ways (a) to (g) above.. I would not go so far as to say 
that where "I know" means "I can 1 t be wrong" then it is an 
incorrect employment .of "known, but it is, at any rate, a use 
carefully to be distinguished· from the primitive one. Where 
"I known means 11 I can't be wrong" then there is clearly nothing 
like an· objective test of whether I DO know: I say I know and 
in this case rule out the possibility of a falsification and 
therefore of verification. This use of "I known occurs ~n 
Moore's "Proof of an External World", and·wittgenstein gives a 
most brilliant illumination to this· use in ~'On Certainty" 
where he says: 
"Moore's view really comes down to this: the concept 
1 know 1 is analogous to the concept~ 1 believe 1 ~ •surmise,• 
•-doubt•-r •be convinced•, in that the-statement 1 I know ••• 1 
canf't be a. mistake. And if this IS so, then there can be an 
inference from such an utterance to the truth of an assertion. 
And here the form 1 I thought I knew' is being overlooked. -
But if this latter ··is inadmissible, --then a mistake in the 
asser.tion must be logically impossible too. And anyone who 
is acquainted with the language-game must realize this -
an assurance from a reliable man that he knows cannot con-
tribute anything.'-' 4 • In the game which Moore is playing 
with "I know" there is no move which is discovering that he 
is mistaken,· and so far his use of 11 I know" is something in 
the nature of an emphasis. 
The case is somewhat similar with 11 I know" used in 
first person sensation statements. Here there is no room for 
"I ·doubt". Doubt makes no sense here and neither therefore 
\ 
does knowledge in the ordinary use of that word. It is just 
this which makes (Piii) unsatisfactory, and which destroys the 
whole edi£ace of sceptical argument against knowledge of 
another's sensations. What am I adding when I preface 11 I am 
in pain" with "I know", .. nothing. Pain-is neither discovered 
4. o.c. 21 
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nor observed by the one who is in pain. He may well observe 
how long it lasts, remember that it was worse last time, 
notice the ravages it produces in his constitution, but none 
of these constitute "knowing painu and none of them could be-
cause, as far as the' sufferer is concerned, that latter con-
cept makes no sense. If I can identify my pain then I can 
also misidentify it, but neither concept makes sense in the 
first person language-game of pain. Of course this does not 
mean that self-diagnosis is infallible, but then diagnosis 
does not. consist in identifying pain but in tracing its 
causes. I might well diagnose a pain in the ear as ear-
ache and mean by this .that there is something wrong with my 
ear when in fact the pain is alleviated by treatment of an 
infected molar.. However, it is quite absurd to imagine that 
I make any sort of identification error in my ·first person 
pain language. And this is not because I am in a very good 
position to judge, or because I have superbly sharp and re-
liable introspective faculties, but because WHAT I SAY is the 
criterion of the intensity, nature, duration and location of 
my pain. 
Pain language in t~e first person is not descriptive 
in character. When I say, "I've a stabbing tooth ache 11 I am 
in no way identifying, naming and describing anything. · I am, 
Wittgenstein maintains, replacing a primitive pain behaviour, 
such as crying and clutching my cheek, with a new, verbal, be-
haviour which expresses my pain. 5 • And this ~hould not be 
taken ~:to mean that ttpainn means crying, since it does not 
describe it but replaces· it. Nor should it be taken that the 
behaviour is the pain, as certain sorts of behaviourists, bent 
on reductionism, might argue. But why should it not be .taken 
in that way? Can there be any safe passage between the Scylla 
of private pain and the Charybdis of mechanistic reductionism? 
When a physicist says that terrestial bodies have 
weight, or fall because of gravity they use these terms to 
s. P.r. 244 
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describe the behaviour of bodies near the earth e.g. that the 
acceleration of their fall is 9,8 m: sec
2
• When we say of 
someone that he is in pain why should we not mean that he is 
behaving in a certain way. 
What.I shall call the strong behaviourist might 
answer in this way: When we say of someone that he is in pain 
we mean no more than that he exhibits specified behaviours 
which are in principle publicly observable. The supposition 
that ''Pain" refers to a mental process or event, or to the 
presence in the person of a mental object, is logically im-
possible to verify and is, therefore, unintelligible as an 
hypothesis~ Among the behaviours which form the class "pain 
behaviour" are the verbal behaviours in which the person says 
"I am in pain" etc. The latter is not a report on a mental 
state (and here they agree with Wittgenstein). Furthermore 
our understanding of :"pain" is neither dependent on our having 
had pain, in the sense of being in a certain mental condition, 
since this is unintelligible, nor is it dependent on our ever 
having exhibited any pain behaviour ourselves, any more than 
our understanding of the behaviour of a billiard ball is dependent 
on our having rolled around a table. Pain simply means a re-
sponse of a certain type to a stimulus. 
The mistake in this theory is that it ignores the 
fact that one who has never been in pain does NOT understand 
the statement "I am in pain" in exactly the way that one who 
does feel pain· does. This· might seem ·to beg the question 
since the strong behaviourist denies that feeling pain means 
anything more than exhibiting pain behaviour, which can include 
among other things electro-~hemical and neurological behaviour 
in the nerves and brain. It is not question-begging however. 
This criticism of strong behaviourism merely points to the 
inability of that theory to adequately distinguish between 
first person and third person pain language. When I say "I 
am in painu I am not describing a mental event nor am I des-
cribing my· behaviour. There are cases in which one could 
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imagine "I am in pain" being an intelligible description 
of his behaviour by one who utters the sentence. Say a 
drama teacher walks into a room in which a student is re-
hearsing Claudius• death agonies in Hamleto He stops the 
scene and says to·the student, 11What in God's name are you 
doing?n arrl receives as an explanation the offended reply, 
"I am in pain", meaning, nr am portraying Claudius• pain ••• 
am behaving in a way appropriate to an imitation of someone's 
death agonies." Here the surface grammar is identical with 
the grammar of· the statement uttered by someone who is in 
pain, but that is where the similarities end. The function 
of the sentence in the latter case is expressive not des-.. 
criptive, and as far as the depth grammar goes the 'former 
use is more correctly assimilable to the third person 
statement, "He is in pain." 
But how far does this take us? Left at that, not 
very far. What I am presenting as the Wi ttgensteinian a::tter-
native to behaviourism is still open to objections both fro@' 
behaviourists and mentalists. When Wittgenstein says that 
first person pain language is expressive the behaviourists 
counter with, "Well, if you say it is expressive then the 
verbal behaviour which consists in saying, 'I am in pain•· must 
be taken by you as the expression of something else viz. ·the 
presence of some mental object, process or event. And the 
private-mental-sens~tion faction will say the words which 
Wittgenstein puts into their mouths: '''But you will surely 
admit that there is a difference between ··pain-behaviour 
accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without pain?• -
Admit it? What greater difference could there be? - And yet 
you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation 
is a nothing." 6 • ••••"Are you not really a behaviourist in 
disguise?" 7 • · 
Now is the time to take stock of the position. I 
said earlier that we were trying to steer between behaviourism 
6~ P.r. 304 
7. P.r. 307 
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and the theory that sensations are private affairs ~n t~e 
mind. In fact putting it like that makes the difference 
between them appe,ar too great. Both positions suffer from 
too restricted a diet. Both have the idee fixe that either 
one denies sensations or one thinks of them as etherial 
things existing in the medium of a mind. But as Wittgenstein 
might have said, the first mistake is to ask the question as 
to what sort of things sensations are, and the second is to 
try to answer it. His actual remark about pain is, "It· i.s not 
a SOMETHING, but not a NOTHING eitherl The conclusion TNas 
only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something 
about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the 
grammar which tries .to force itself upon us here". 8 • This 
grammar ·suggests to us that pain must be a something (another 
entity) accompanying pain-behaviour. If we have thisidea 
then the rejection of the behaviourists in the last paragraph 
but one, in wh ic_h it was said that someone A who has never 
himself had pain, ·will not understand another B saying 1 I am 
in pain', in the same way as someone C who has felt pain, will 
be misunderstood by us. We will take it that the difference 
lies in A's having something which B has not got and never had? 
but which-c has got or has had. To obviate this misunder-
standing we must reiterate that pain is not something. When 
we say, "his pain" or "her pain" we are not using the possessive 
pronoun in the way it is used when we say "his hat 11 or 11her 
room"• It is just t:his which, if ignored·, leads philosophers 
to say either that pain IS behaviour, or that pain is a 
logically private object. 
When it is said, as Ayer does, that it is logically 
impossible literally to have another's pain, the grammatical 
confusion about the way the genitive··is used is clearly in 
evidence. Cook argues quite correctly that to say what Ayer 
says is equivalent to saying that the SENSE of 11 I have her 
painn is SENSELESS. The meaning of 11the literal sense" is 
usual.ly explained he says through, "presenting the parts of 
a. P.I. 304. See also P.I. 293 - "the beetle in the box" 
example. 
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the sentence (either words or expressions) in som8 fani.liar 
context in which they have the desired meaning and then 
specifying that it is when the sentence in question combjr.es 
the words or expressions as used i:J;'l these contexts that it ~,~,. 
its literal sense. But what could it mean to speak of trans-
ferring a word or expression AND ITS MEANING from a context .in 
which it has a particular use to a sentence in which it ha.s no 
use at all (except as a part of speech) - and certainly ne>t 
the use it had in the context from which it was allegedly 
transferredn. 9 • In a most effective reductio. ad absurdL.a 
he shows that s_aying that I logically cannot, literally havE· 
) . 
another's pain, for the reason that they have got somethinq 
which I haven't, is equivalent to saying that I cannot have my 
fa.ther' s build o His argument is that if builds are as simi-
lated grammaticailyto say overcoats.then it will seem that 
since it is possible to misidentify the owner of an overcoat, 
and since.it is impossibl~ to misidentify the owner of a 
build, builds must be things like overcoats which we possess 
but unlike overcoats whey must be among the most clearly 
marked and inviolable forms of private propertyo (This is an 
extreme compression of his most lucid argument) The obvious 
absurdity resulting from this assimilation of the grammars o"' 
possessives (his coat/his build) reduces us to saying that no 
one can have anyone ~lse•s build. Now what should be strong-
ly noted is, that if it is senseless to say that I have anyon2 
else•s build then it is equally senseless to say that I have 
my own build, in which case it is senseless also to say thaT 
a build is some private possession of mineo This can all be 
applied mutatis mutandis to 11my· pain" where this is·. taken to 
mean a ttlogically private" possession of mine. 
In the +anguage-game played with pain it makes 
sense to say that I have a pa;in, but not to say that I possess 
a pain. It makes sense to talk of my pain, her pain and 
their pain. It also makes sense to talk of her having the 
same pain as I have, provided this is not taken to mean that 
9. Cook, op. cit. page 301. See also Zettel 448. 
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she and I possess the same object. Pain, like joy, is not 
a thing in the sense of an object, which is why Wittgenstein 
writes in Zettel: 
" •But I do have a real feeling of joyt' Yes, when 
you are glad ·you really are glad. And of course·joy is not 
joyful behaviour, nor yet a feeling round the corners of the 
mouth and eyes. 
" ' But rtjoyn surely designates an inward thing (etwas 
Inneres) .• -· No. 1 Joy1 designates nothing at all. 
inward nor any outward thing." 10• 
Neither any 
The suggestions put .forward here dispose once for 
all, I think, of the idea that pain is an object and con-
sequently of th~ argum~nt that it is a private object. It 
still remains to deal with the question of whether pain is 
pain behaviour, since it would seem that having shown pain 
not to be an object one is committed to the view that it must 
be a behaviour. And yet as the quotations from Wittgenstein 
have shown he does not say this. 
To deal with this problem I should like to turn to 
,Wittgenstein•s writings in Zettel, which to date, possibly 
due to their-comparatively recent publication, have received 
far less attention than have the Investigations. In this 
work the character of his philosophical technique is more ex-
plicitly stated_than anywhere else. He says for example: 
"Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. 
The essential thing about metaphysics: it obliterates the 
distinction between factual and conceptual investigations." 11 • 
' 
As is evident from the way he treats the problems of the 
philosophy of mirld in this book, he means by "conceptual 
investigation" an examination of how words are used in ordinary 
language. It is vital to keep this in mind when dealing with 
the question of sensations and behaviour. Wittgenstein is 
not concerned to answer the question, "What is pain?", he 
10. Zettel 487 
11. z. 458 
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would characteristically follow this with another, ·far more 
philosophically viable question, "How is the word 1 pain 1 
used? 11 Now we have already said· that in' first person state-
ments· it is used expressively, and have further argued against 
the picture bf pain as an inward process or object. If we 
say in addition that it is not behaviour then the temptation 
to ask, 11Well, WHAT is it?" becomes almost irresistible. The 
hardest thing as Wittgenstein says on a number of occasions is 
to stop asking a particular sort of question, and yet this is 
what we must do ~f we are to make any progress in clearing up 
the philosophical problem about the concept of pain. 
A remark in Zettel about fear (in the section on 
emotion - predicates which immediately preceeds the remarks 
on pain-language) is extremely useful in coming to grips with 
this problem. He says: "It might be asked whether this 
word would realy relate·simply to behaviour, simply to bodily 
changes. And this may be denied. There is no future in 
simplifying the use of this word in this way. It relates to 
the behaviour under certain circumstances. If we observe 
these circumstances and that behaviour we say that a man is 
h 12. or as •••••" This remark drives out the idea that the 
concept of pain is simply related to bodily movements. Only 
in appropriate circumstances is human behaviour expressive 
of pain: "The concept of pain is characterised by its pecu-
liar function.in our life". 13 • "Pain has THIS position in 
our life; has THESE -connections; ·(that is to say: we only 
call 'paint what has THIS position, THESE connections)" 14 • 
"Only ··surrounded by certain normal manifestations of life, is 
there such a thing as an expression of pain. Only surrounded 
by an even more far reaching manifestation of life such a 
thing as the expression of sorrow or affection. And so on." 15 • 
These statements give an important insight into what Wittgenstein 










theme is taken up a few pages further on: 11Being sure-that 
someone .is in pain, doubting whether he is·, and so on, are 
s~ many natural, instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards 
other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary 
to, and further extension of, this relation. 
game is an extension of primitive behaviouro 
language-game is behaviour) 1116 ·-
Our language-
(For our 
What disquiets us about the statement that "painn 
means pain-behaviour (and it is a well founded disquietude) 
is that it is possible to simulate pain behaviour. Some-
one can exhibit pain behaviour without being in pain, and 
yet we do not want to say that in that case there is an in-
gredient, pain, lacking, for to say that would be to re-
introduce the idle picture of pain and the idea that you can 
give yourself a private exhibition of it. The quotations 
from Zettel above imply that the CONTEXT in which behaviour 
occurs is a vitally important factor in differentiating be-
tween someone who is in pain (the victim of a motor smash) 
and someone simulating pain, but at first sight context may 
seem relatively unimportant -. everyone can be in pain any-
where, anytime, or all the time. But is this so? - Is it 
conceptually possible? 
To answer this I. suggest the following case: 
Let us suppose that the world is a vast stage and that all 
the people in the world are superlatively good actors, with 
the exception of one or two who comprise the "audience"._ 
Suppose that you fall into the latter group. You watch 
the scenes of life as you watch the scenes of a play. You 
come upon a motor accident ''where a man is lying. writhing on 
the ground, moaning and sometimes screaming 110 my 'leg, my 
leg." Let us assume you are a doctor. oo·you give the 
man a morphine injection? Well you might, but it would be 
a mistaken thing to do - one might say that the script 
didn~. t call for it. No play script calls for the audience 
to act in the play& But say you did what the script didn'.t · 
call for and administered a pain-killer, and say the actor 
16. z. 545 
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stopped his writhings - then we would also make a mistakeo 
He would have forgotten that the play must go on. 
But would he be mistaken in all circumstances? 
What if the play were performed in order to get you, the 
audience to do something? ("The Murder of Gonzagon in 
11Hamlet") What if the playwright and players intended you 
to think that the play was reality? In that case the actor 
would have missed his cue if he did not respond to your 
treatmento But note also that if he does respond then it 
begins to be uncertain who is directing the play - the play 
is ceasing to be a play. 
from his job as director. 
The mal genie has been fired 
If you strike someone and she 
goes on laughing and chatting as the script demands, then 
you will know that she is acting. Her behaviour is not 
normal. 
The point of this example is to show the primary 
importance of context for the grammar of pain language. 
{It has other, _broader implications for our notions of con-
cept, grammar and forms of li£e, which will be discussed in 
Part III). In certain problematic cases only the context 
can enable us to decide whether someone is in pain. I£ an 
actor is playing the part of someone who has a headache and 
he has a very, very bad headache himself then only the 
further context of his off-stage behaviour will enable us to 
say of him, "He wasn'.t acting after all." So while it is 
true that someone can be in pain at any time, the question 
of how it is to be decided whether he is in pain cannot be 
answered without reference to context. And further, it is 
obvious that we couldn't all be in pain all the timeo - It 
is not conceptually possible. Similarly it is nonsense to 
say that we could all simulate pain all the time. -~ The 
language-game of lying, or acting has to be learned, and the 
preparation for learning it consists partly in acquiring the 
:concept of pain, ~hich means among·other things, understand-
' ing the difference between suffering pain and not suffering it. 
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The sceptical argument, whether o£ the 11private 
sensation" type or o£ the "strong behaviouristu type, turns 
on the refusal to supply any criterian for the· correct ascrip-
tion of pain predicates to a person. The rules o£ ordinary 
language are abrogated by the sceptic who then finds to his 
surprise that the game cannot be playedo He is rather like 
someone who, whenever shown something which is claimed to be 
a diamond always declares it to be a fake, and who says, even 





LANGUAGE AS INTENTIONAL ACTION 
Having tried to show the Wittgensteinia~ technique 
at work in the field of arguments for and against the privacy 
of sensation, it is necessary that certain other but related 
investigations of his should be briefly covered. In the 
following three chapters I propose to deal with the topics of 
(a) meaning and intentional action; {b) the concept of a 
person; and (c) language-games and forms of life. The 
choice of these topics was guided by a number of considerations. 
Firstly, they all feature prominently in Wittgenstein 1 s 
later writingso The investigation of intention forms a large 
part of the end sections of Investigations Part 1 and re-
appears frequently in Part IIo Considerable.attention is also 
given to intention in Zettel {227ff and 570ft). The im-
portance and fertility of these investigations can in part be 
gauged by the amount of literature on the topic of intention 
and human action which has appeared since the publication of the 
Philosophical Investigations. Very much the same applies to 
his treatment of the concept of a person - and I think here 
particularly of Strawson 1 s work in this area. Wittgenstein is 
hard to pin down textually here and the importance of the sub-
ject in his thought is more often implicit than explicit, but 
it does seem prett~ clear that as far as his conceptual studies 
' 
in the philosophy of mind are concerned he held the·investi-
gation of the concept of a person to be of very considerable 
importance. As for the third topic, its importance is apparent 
even from the most' cursory reading of the later works. Not 
only is the technique of using language-games as illuminatino 
examples employed in the Investigations, Zettel and On Certainty, 
·but the relationship between these games and what Wittgenstein 
calls forms of life, is constantly adverted to by him. 
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In the second place I have selected these topics 
because of the close connection which they have with one 
another. I might for instance have chosen the quite lengthy 
treatments of colour concepts or emotion-predicates in Zettel, 
but they do not have the same intimate and fundamentally im-
portant relationship with each other or with any of the three 
chosen topics which the latter have with each other. That 
human action and the concept of a person are related is ob-
vious from the very phrases themselves, but their connection 
with the third topic may seem at first a little tenuous. I 
hope to show, however, that the investigation of language-
games and the conceptual structure which they imply greatly 
facilitates the investigation of the concepts dealt with in 
the other two chapters. 
Thirdly my choice was dictated.by certain important 
lacunas in Part 11. To be specific: in Chapter six I spoke 
constantly of iqtentions in connection with communication in 
order to suggest an alternative to what Waismann calls the 
causal interpretation of language, but it was beyond the scope 
of that chapter to deal with the concept of intention as sucho 
Consequently the question of the meaning of sentences such as, 
"I intended he should leave when I said 1 Get out' n, or, 11 I 
mean THAT table not that one", or "Her words mean· nothing she 
is just babbling," still remain largely unclarified, and I 
hope to go some way in remedying this. Another loose end 
whic~ needs to be tied up is the problem raised by Wellman and 
Ayer which I mentioned in Chapter five, of where a verification 
stops, why it must stop s~mewhere, etc. This is part of a 
more general problem - I shall call it the problem of conceptual 
limits - which greatly occupied Wittgenstein and which we have 
mentioned in discussing rules for the use of rules for the use 
of rules o ••••• , and explanations of explanations •••••• o, and 
similar problems. This area will be dealt with in discussing 
language-games and forms of lifeo The chapter on the concept 
of a person is meant to supplement the discussion of sensation 
particularly where it touched on the behavioural criteria of 
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sensation. It will also be used to give another slant on thP 
problem of conceptual limits in that it will deal with the 
question of why we do not predicate psychological terms of 
amoebae or even of worms, whereas we do use some of them of 
dogs and employ the full range,of human beings. 
One further point might be made before I begin: 
these chapters, like those in the other two parts of the thesis 
are meant, above everything, to illustrate the strictly-con-
ceptual character of Wittgensteinian philosophisingo Toulmin, 1 • 
in stressing the unity of Wittgenstein's thought, makes this 
point strongly. He argues, for example, that the transition 
from the Tractatus to the position in the Investigations was 
a shift in the method of handling conceptual problems in their 
connection with language - the shift from the conception of 
language-as-Gleichnis to the concept of language.:.as-Handlungo 
In my opinion the radical nature of this split should not be 
underestimated or clouded by an unbalanced emphasis on the 
unity of Wittgenstein•s thought, but this much at any rate is 
clear: in the Tractatus he had already broken with the con-
ception of philosophy as a ·supra-scientific discipline which 
dealt with factual matters of a subtle and rari.fied kind: 
He writes there: 
4.111 Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. 
4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification 
of thoughts. · 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an 
activity. 
A philosophical work consists essentially of 
elucidations. 
Philosophy does not result in philosophical 
propositions but rather in the clarification 
of propositions. 
Van Peursen who presents an account of the runture in 
1'A7i ttgenstein.' s work 2 • at the same time never suggests that 
Wittgenstein -·had at one time regarded his philosophy as a 
1~ Toulmin, "Ludwig Wittgensteint•, Encounter VOL.XXXII No~le .Jar:..~As. 




metaphysic and then later decided to reject that view. So 
however different, and significantly so, his later work was 
from his earlier, he was all the time working within the 
framework of philosophy as a conceptual discipline. In 
this way Wittgenstein•s practice reflects Engels' conviction 
. . 3 
that philosophy has been "expelled from nature and history 11 o 




3. Engels• "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical 
German Philosophy", Part 4. 
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C H A P T E R IX 
INTENTION 
We have said in Chapter 6 that the meaning of a 
word is given by the rules for its use. But this, as we 
saw, needs further qualificationso In general a word can 
only be said to mean something when it is combined with other 
words to form a sentence. Therefore the rules which de-
termine the meaning of a word can be divided into two sorts: 
formation rules from which sentence schemata can be derived 
i.e. the formal rules of syntax; and rules for the actual em-
ployment of the sentence in a given context. We saw further 
that the formulat.ion of this latter sort of rules is only 
possible if reference is made to what the utterer w,ishes to 
communicate. Together these two sorts of rules determine 
the meaning of what is said by an utterer. Thus a machine 
so constructed as to articulate sentences in accordance with 
the formal rules of syntax cannot yet be described as SAYING 
anything, since in this case no reference is possible to the 
intention with which the sentences are articulated. We may 
say of the man that he means what he sayso We do not say of 
a machine that it says anything at all or that it means any-
thing by the sounds which it articulates. 
But is this true? Don 1 t we often say· things like, 
"The clock tells me it•s time to leave", or "According to 
the speedomete:~;: we' ~e hitting 90", or .,,The pressure gauge 
says that the locomotive has got· up a good head of steam"o 
How is the meaning of such sentences, which are grammatically 
similar to a sentence such as 11He tells me it is time to 
leaven, to be distinguished from a sentence of this last sort? 
Here it would only be a partially satisfacto~y answer to say 
that the difference lay in the different objects to which the 
words nthe cl ockn and "he" referred: we have not yet dealt 
with the difference between the concept of a person and the 
concept of a machine. Before we can make that distinction 
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we must clear the conceptual ground by.making certain others. 
We will approach this task by way of investigating the logic 
or. grammar of the two sentences, 11He tells me ••• o. 11 and 
"the clock tells me •••o" 
The first major difference between these sentences 
is that there is a certain sense of the question "Why?" 1 ~ 
in which it is proper to ask, "Why does he tell me o •• ·.? u 
and in which it is not proper to ask, "Why does the clock 
' 
tell me •••• o ? 11 in order to clarify thi~ difference, and at 
the risk of cluttering the investigatioq with prior quali-
• 
fications, we must first distinguish th6 use of the question 
1'Why? 11 in which it .£illl properly be asked of both statements .. 
The sense in which it can be used in both cases is what is ~~i~­
called 11the causal sense". If I ask, "Why does the clock te-~2. 
me it i-s time to leave? 11• and mean by this, 11How do the clock• s 
workings come to be poised it+ this way", then someone mig.1 ·::. 
answer, "Because it has been running fast for ages", or 
"Because· the workings have j~st been adjusted". In other 
words he gives a causal explanation "in order to satisfy my 
question. Similarly in answer to "Why does he tell me it .! • .;; 
time to leave?" someone might say, "Well a certain set of synA::.,~2:s 
' c 
have just fired in his brain", or even "Poor chap, he has jus_ 
had a brain operation you know, and he keeps coming out with 
these embarrassing orders "• · 
Now explanations of this sort are usually called 
causal in order_to distinguish them from explanations which, 
it is said, give a reason as opposed to a cause. But this 
is not quite good enough because there is a use of "reason" 
1n which it is proper to say that 11He has just had brain 
surgery" IS giving a reason for his behaviour. At the same 
time it· is necessary to distinguish between what, to be pedantic, 
we might then term "causal re·asons 11 and reasons of another sort, 
and having done this we will find that the distinction 
corresponds to the distinction between our two uses of the 
lo Anscombe, "Intention". 
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question "Why?u How is this distinction to be made? 
Wittgen~tein invented a technique for solving this 
type of grammatical.problem (which occupied a great deal of 
his attention). 11What is the difference between cause and 
motive? 11 he asked,· and he.:then suggested a method for answer-
ing by putting a further question: "How is the motive 
DISCOVERED, and how the cause?" 2 • · (Unfortunately however, 
the introduction of a concept of a motive raises a number of 
thorny problems which it is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to cope with; 3 • for instance, we might ask questions as to 
the relation of motive to intention. But we will not deal 
with this area of problem) Turning to Wittgenstein 1 s remark 
and following through its implications we can come up with 
the following points: 
One of the ways in which we discover the difference 
between an intentional behaviour and an unintentional one is 
by asking why it occurred. (a) If the explanation given in 
answer to the question is of a sort which says that the par-
ticular behaviour is the effect of a prior cause then it is 
always logically possible (i.e. it makes sense) to ask why 
the cause occurred. So the question "Why?" interpreted 
causally can, in principle, generate an infinite series of 
questions of a similar causal nature. {b) But if the question 
is interpreted as an attempt to discover the intention with 
which the behaviour occurred (and I use the awkward locution 
11intention and behaviour occurring" with a purpose) then it 
does not always make sense to continue asking 11Why? 11 of the 
explanations given. 
Here are two examples which illustrate (a) and (b) 
but which also show the inadequacy of (a) and (b) for establish-
ing how we discover the difference between causal reasons and 
that other sort of reasons which are bound up with intention 
and motive. 
2~ P.I. page 224 
3. See Kenny, "Action, Emotion and Will", pages 76-99. 
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Example {a): A steam pressure gauge registers a high pressure 
Q. Why does the gauge register so high? 
A. Because the steam is exerting great pressure 
in the boiler. 
Qo Why is it doing that? 
A. Because the fire has been burning for many hours. 
Q. Why has it been? 
A. Because the stoker lit it early. 
Q. Why did he do that? 
Ao Because his brain behaves in a certain way. 
Q. Why? 
A. oooo• {this leads off into a series of questions 
as to the causes and effects of neurological 
phenomena.) 
Now this does not, of course, constitute a proof that 
the series can be infinite, but it does indicate how misplaced 
it would be to look for an explanation of this sort which could 
stop all further questions. 
Let us look at anotper question and answe·'r series -
Example (b): Jack shakes his fist at Jill. 
Q. Why did Jacl< do that? 
' 
A. I don• t know, ask him. 
Q. Jack, "Why did you shake your fist at· Jill? 
A. o, I don 1 t know, I just wanted to. 
Q. Thank you Jacko I simply was curious to know 
In example {b) the questioner might have pressed on 
with, ••Why did you want to?n If Jack answers quite soberly, 
nYou know I really can•t say, but I DID want to shake my fist 
at her,n then the questioner will realise that nothing more 
can be done by way. o,f question and· answer to find out from 
Jack why he wanted to. 
But is this true? Yes and no. And it is precisely 




(b) for distinguishing between causal reasons and intention 
reasons comes out. For let us assume that the questioner 
is a psychiatrist, .then he might either go on to ask Jack 1 s 
friends and family why he wanted to shake his fist or ask 
Jack, not why he wanted to shake his fist, but why say he 
keeps staring at a paper knife lying on the tablet But now 
an important difference between example (a) and example (b) 
comes out. In order to continue asking 11why" in example 
(b) the focus of interest has to be changed and with it·the 
direction of the question asked. The questioner cannot 
sensibly persist with the question, '~hy did you want to 
shake your fist Jack?" When once Jack has said he doesn't 
know. But at this stage somebody might counter that it 
would not be sensible of someone to persist in questioning 
Jack as to why volcanos erupt when once he has said he doesn't 
know. Yet here one wants to say 11But this is different" ioe. 
the difference between sensibly persisting with the question 
about volcanos and not sensibly persisting with it is different 
from the difference between sensibly persisting in the question 
"Why did you do X?" and not sensibly persisting with it. 
How is it. different? 
When we said that there had to be a change in the 
direction of the question "Why?" if the series of question 
and answer was to coqti~ue· in example (b) we said something 
which was slightly but very importantly inaccurate. It is 
not so much that the change in direction enables the original 
series to continue but that it enables a new sort of series 
to begin. Having elicited from Jack that he shook his fist 
because he wanted ·to, we have established the connection be-
tween two things, his wanting to and his shaking his fist, 
which is not of a causal sort. We have satisfied ourselves 
from the point of view of finding out whether Jack's action 
was intended that it was so intended. Having discovered this 
we can go on to discover the causes of this intention, but 
then the kind of explanation given will be of a different sort. 
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For instance, an important difference betwee:- :::. 
explanations and the giving of intention-type reasons :i.s ·::-
it is quite possible to give a mistaken causa:·~ '--x:-;::.:._2,r:etio:r: 
whereas it is not possible for someone tell in'] 
with which his action was performed to maLE: e-. . -,·.., . ~· 
is why we want to say that the series in eY.;,·.c.·: · ,:- -,·--'; ;::..::,:: .. :::_ 
a halt, even when more information can stij_ ~- ., 
The information· acquired about why Jack wan tee' 
fist, if it is in the form of causal explan2_-;.;:i.or.s, ~_,­
a corrigible nature, whereas it makes no se::-"se to sc:.-
is in error when he tells us the intention or ffiot~ve je 
his action.So if we want to find out whether someon~ re~. 
do something and what it was they meant to do, we ~~nt 
out something different from what we want to fir:d -::;u-c ·, 
ask what caused him to do it. 
..... There is another difference between t~e ~wo 
explanation. · In example (a) it is always possible to 
stitute "How? 11 for "Why?n and further to put the interr,: 
into the· third person passive. Thus: 
Q. How is the needle on the gauge moved to ~: · 
A. By the pressure of. the steam in the cylJ.r;'-;"" ... 
Q. How is that pressure exerted? 
A. By the motion of molecules. 
Q. How •ooo••••o etc. 
But, and this point is made by Melden, 4 • w.;,;._: -~ vie: 
.... ~- :. ·: 
to discover whether an action was intentional and h'hat t: . ...: 
tent ions ~ere we cannot sensibly ask ouest ions li.:~c, ~~~.-:~')W , 
your fist clenched?" The answer to this quest:.:. c. -:_s a :•.a.J.- · _ 
for a physiologist.· Still less can we ask, s:r-lo;.;; ,---; ic jOt. 
clench your fist?n This question i-s only intell:i-:_;}.bl<::. if t~ 
is something the matter with the fist e.g. that t1~e pt. . .:son -~.~ 
painful arthritis in the joints of his fingers. Or, ~n 
another cas.~, it ~an be asked when there is an .: .. JStdCl-2: :·_:-
way of the fist being clenched - powerful springs hold:.:..~·.; .. 
4. Meld en, "Free Action 11 , p. 26 ff. 
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fingers out straight. In these cases "How did you clench 
your fist? 11 can always be substi t"uted by, "How did you ma_nage 
to clench your fist?" But when we want to know the in-
tention with which the fist was clenched we neither have to 
consult a physiologist (nor even a psycho-physiologist) nor 
do we want to know how the fist clenching was achievedo So 
when we enquire a"Qout intentions we enquire after reasons 
which, as Waismann puts it, will JUSTIFY the action. 5 • This 
is very important for our discussion of what it means to say 
of someone that he says something, as opposed to saying this 
of a clock. It connects for one thing with the rules for the 
actual, contextual use of a sentence. 
To sum up so.far: (i) there are different senses 
of the question 11Why?" (ii) the ones we are interested in are 
the causal use and the use in which a reason is demanded; 
(iii) the series of causal questions and answers cannot be 
terminated in the way that the series demanding a reason ca~ 
be; (iv) answers to questions about causes are corrigible in 
a way in which first person giving of reasons are not; (v) tne 
causal use of "Why?n permits of a translation which is effected 
by substituting "Hot-v" for "Why" and putting the rest of the 
sentence into the passive v'oice. 
There is another feature which we must examine which 
differentiates the two uses of 11Why?" namely the difference 
between the relation of cause to effect, and the relation of 
intention to action. This, of all the differences we have 
dealt with, is the most important and the most obvious - for 
which reason, as so often happens, it is the most easily over-
looked. Wittgens~ein treats the problem like this: 
"I should not say of the movement of my arm, for 
example; it comes when it comes, etc. And this is the region 
in which we say significantly, that a thing doesn't simply 
happen to us, but that we DO it. I don 1 t need to wait for 
5. Waismann, "The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, page 122~ 
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my arm to go up - I can raise it. 11 And here I am making a 
contrast between the movement of my arm and say, the fact that 
the violent thudding of my heart will subside. 
"In the sense in which I can ever bring anything 
about, (such as stomach-ache through overeating), I can also 
bring about an act of willing. In this sense I bring about 
the act of willing to swim by jumping into the water o Do.ubt-
less I was trying to say: I can 1 t will willing; that is it 
makes no sense to speak of willing willing. "Willing" is not 
the name 0f an action; ahd so not the name of· any voluntary 
action either. And my use of wrong expression came from our 
wantina to think of willina as an immediate non-causal brina-
ing about. A misleading analogy lies at the root of this idea; 
the causal nexus seems to be established by a mechanism connect-
ing two parts of a machine. The connection may be broken if 
the mechanism is disturbed 11 o (P.r.) 6 • 
If we think of the connection between the intention 
to do something and the doing, as being of a quasi-causal sort 
.then the matter becomes extremely puzzlingo The difficulties 
in Pritchard's treatment of voluntary action 7 • all arise from 
his approaching the subject 'in this way. If the intention is 
construed as operating as a causal agency for action then there 
seems to be a miraculously invariant relationship between ln-, 
tention and action. And yet this harmony seems queer and un-
canny. For instance, why. is it in the case of intentions that 
when we ask someone the intention with which he performed an 
action, his answer can never be wrong? Is it because his in-
trospections have yielded him overwhelmingly strong empirical 
evidence that whenever he intends to do X, the intention results 
in the action x? No - this is incorrect for two reasons. 
Firstly we qriite often intend to do, or say som~thing and yet 
do not do or say it. Secondly, no amount of empirical· evidence 
of the relation of a cause,to its effect can be so overwhelming 
6. P.r. 612-13 
7. Pritchard,· 11Duty and Ignorance of Fact", and 11Acting, 
Willing, Desiring 11 ·in "Moral Obligat:;i.on 11 • · 
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that it is not possible to correct the statement that in a 
given case an effect e is the result of a cause c. 
So take the first point. When I intend to do 
something I may or may not do it. I may intend to go to 
beach and not manage to get there. But if I do go it is 
the 
not 
as though I inferred from my intention that it was likely that 
I would go. The intention to go doesn't produce the action 
of going, in the way that the action of·the cue produces a 
movement in the billiard ball. If we are tempted to think of 
11willing 11 as a sort of producing - not however as a case of 
causation, but I should like to say, .as a direct, non-causal 
producing 8 • then we should try to give up this picture by 
remembering Wittgenstein's little example: 
11 If someone meets me in the street and asks 'vJhere are you 
going? 1 and I reply 1 I don't know,' he assumes I have no defini~~ 
INTENTION, not that I do not know whether I shall be able to 
t · t· 8 • d ' carry ou my ~nten 10n". The case where I o not KnOw vJile"thPr 
I shall be able to carry out my intention is one where someon8 
at the snooker table asks 11Are you going to get position on 
the black? 11 and I say "I don't know 11 • And here the uncertair.t:.· 
arises because causality is involved~ viz. my inexpert use of 
the cue to propel the white ball towards the red, etc. 
The second point is connected with the first. In tl--,c~ 
case of cause and effect I DISCOVER that THIS is the effect nf 
THAT, through observation of a more or less sophisticated kind. 
In the case of voluntary action I do not discover that this 
action of mine is the result of that intention of mine (I DIS-
COVER this about other people.) That this must be so v:e c.<>. n 
see from the grammar of the language-s~ame played with i;:-
tentions. Certain grammatical features mark it off from the 
language-game of causality. For example I cannot sensibly say 
11 1 intend" but I can say "I push". Even though 11intend 11 is 
a finite verb when considered as· a part of speech", it r.mst al-
ways be completed by an object - "I intend to push 11 • Thus :10 . . 
description can be given of an intention independent of wh2~ 
8. z. 580 
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is intended. Whereas I can describe my action of pushing 
independent of whether I am pushing a rock over a cliff or 
a mower over a lawn. This grammatical rule accounts for 
the· "queer 11 feeling that one gets if one thinks about in-
tentions as being ACTIONS which CAUSE movements: there seems 
to be such a wonderful harmony between ~he cause and the 
effect - as though the effect was already 11 in some way" 
present in the cause. But the harmony between the two, like 
all metaphysical harmonies is found in the grammar of the 
langua0e. The connection between intention and action is 
logical not causal 
9
• So we can say "I intend to wri te 11 a.nd 
11 I write intentionally" and "I intend to write a letter of 
thanks." We do not discover that we are doing something in-
tentionally. Were we to do this there would be occasions on 
which we were surprised or astonished that THIS action was l· .... _ " 
tentional. This is what Wittgenstein means when he says: 
"Writing is certainly a voluntary movement and yet 
an automatic one. And of course there is no question of a 
feeling in each movement of writing. One feels something, 
but could not possibly analyse the feeling. One's hand 
writes; it does not write because one wills, but one wills 
what it writes. 
One does not watch it in astonishment or with in-
terest while writing, does not think 'what will it write now?' 
But not because one had a wish it should write that. For 
that it writes what I want might well throw me into astonish-
t 10. men • " 
The intention is neither a feeling which accompanies 
the action nor is it any other peculiar experience, although 
it would be psychologically interesting if certain feelings 
occurred in someone who acted intentionally or if certain 
immages occurred to him. 
9. See Meldent s treatment of this topic in "Free Actionu~ 
10. z. 586. See also P.I. page 185 on anaesthetic sensations. 
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We are now in a better ppsition to return to our 
ori0inal problem of what it means to say of someone, that he 
means what he says or, to put it in the form 'in which the 
question was first posed, of what the difference is between 
a man telling me something and a clock telling me something. 
Quite simply the difference is this: the reason 
why the clock shows eleven o'clock is that it is caused to 
function in a particular way by the construction and adjust-
ment of its mechanism; the reason why a man tells.me this 
might be that he intends that I shouldn't miss my train. 
Because we say of a man that he has intentions to communicate 
we teach him ways to use language, we teach him strategy of 
verbal action. We do not teach these to a clock because a 
clock does not act, it moves. So when we ask a man why he 
says what he says, he answers by giving a justification in 
terms of what he intends by his utterance (what he wants the 
utterance to achieve) and by connecting this intention with 
the rules for the actual employment of the sentence which he 
is uttering (communication-intentions rules). This is a way 
of discovering the meaning of an utterance which for some or 
other reason we don•t understand. 
circle. 
This discussion has in a sense brought us full 
Throug;.1 an analysis of the difference between the 
two senses of the question 11Why? 11 we have seen why the notion 
of intention is essentially· connected with the language-game 
in which we say of people that they mean something by what 
they utter. But having come back to the original point we 
are forced into . a new topic o. 
Earlier I said that the locution "such - and - such 
and intentional behaviour occurred in someone" was odd. We 
do not normally say this. We say "He DID such-and-such 11 or 
uSuch-and-such an ACTION was performed. 11 Clearly there· is 
something in this which connects with the fact that we cannot 
translate the intention-seeking question into the "How?" .form. 
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And this in turn connects with the statement that machines 
cannot act, but only move. Finally this last point is ~eant 
to serve as a contrast to the fact that vre only attribute 
feelings, thoughts a.nd intentions to human beings and what 
resemble them. So it is to the question of what the concept 
o:f a human being involves. that we must now turn. 
\ 
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£..liAPTER X 
HUMAN BEINGS 
There frequently appear in Wittgenstein 1 s later 
writings remarks such as the following: 
11We only say of a human being and what is like one 
h . h" k 1 • t at 1t t ln s.n 
11Say to yourself, for example: 1 The children over 
there are mere automatons; all their liveliness is mere auto-
matism.' And you will either find these words_becoming quite 
meaningless; or you will produce in yourself some kind of un-
canny feeling, or something of the sort." 2 • 
"••••• only of a living human being and what resembles 
(behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensa-
tions; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or un-
. 3. consc1ous.n 
HThe human body is the best picture of the human 
1 4. sou ·" 
uour criterion of someone 1 s saying something to him-
self is what he tells us and the rest of his behaviour; and we 
only say that someone speaks to himself if, in the ordinary 
sense of the word .he CAN SPEAK. And we do not say it of a 
f h 5. parrot; nor o a grammap one." 
How are these remarks and the many others like them 
to be interpreted? ' 6.' Some philosophers like Chihara and Fodor 
have seen in them evidence that Wittgenstein is arguing for a 
sort of behavioural criteriology with a strong operationalist 
bias, and in consequence they attack what they term his 
"logical behaviourism". These interpreters often make the 
mainstay of their argument Wittgenstein 1 s statement that an 
1. P.r. 360 
2. P.r. 420 
3. P.r. 281 
4. P.r. page 178 
5. P.r. 344 
6. Chihara and Fodor, op. cit. 
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inward process (a mental process) stands 1n need of outward 
criteria. In apparent oppositio~ to this argument, other 
philosophers have sought to defend Wittgenstein by arguing 
for the correctness and coherence of what they take to be 
lltheory n of criteria in the ·field of the problem of other 
minds. · A third school dismiss the whole debate on the grounds 
that (a) its protagonists pose the problem of other minds and 
the question of what a human being is in the wrong way (b) that 
they completely misinterpret Wittgenstein by placing his writ-
ings in the Cartesian problematic, when this was just the prob-
lematic from which he so radically parted company. Among the 
proponents of the third view are Strawson 7 • Cook 8 • and 
Reinhardt. 9 • I take their position to be the correct one. 
In 11Persons 11 Strawson discusses the fac.:t that philo-
sophers have found it· puzzling that we ascribe both material 
(M-predicates) and personal psychological (P-predicates) predi-
cates to a certain class of entities, namely human beings. 
Their ways out of this puzzlement have taken two superficially 
different forms. The Cartesian way out has been to suggest 
that since M-predicates are ascribed to both human and non-
human entities, but since psychological words are only pre-
dicated of human beings, the defining criterion of a human 
being must be that psychological words can be predicated of 
him. Therefore, Descartes argued, there is no way of deduc-
ing from the fact that there is present to us, what, in the 
ordinary way we call a human body {the subject of M-predicates) 
the fact that a person is present. In this, as critiques of 
l\1ill• s attempt to make such an inference have shown: he was 
correct. Descartes was thus forced to say that only the think-
ing subject himself could know that he was a thinking subject, 
i.e. a person. This knowledge is gained from introspection 
and is private and incommunicable • 
. The apparent alternative to'this line of approach 
has been to say that P-predicates have meaning if and only if 
the statements in which they are used,·are translatable into 




Strawson, 11Persons" in nindividuals" 
Cook, "Human Beingsn in ·Studies in.the Phil. of Wittgenstein 
ed. Peter W1nch. ~ · · 
Reinhardt, 11Wi ttgenstein and Strawson on Other Minds u in ''J."< ~:·. 
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ourely physical description of what we call the human body. 
This description will, of coursef not contain any reference 
to feeling, intention or action. A behaviourist such as 
Hull :for example, wishes to describe what in the ordinary way 
we would call upurposive behaviouru as "colourless movements". 
F'or him there is a logical and cri teriological relationship · 
between P- and J'vl-predicates, which Cook describes ·when he says: 
11 'It is Hull's stated aim to begin from colourless movements 
and mere receptor impulses as such' and build up (or 'deduce') 
such concepts as purposive action, ·intelligence, intention and 
other mental verbs and predicates." 10 • 
Both the behaviourist and the Cartesian approaches 
have a noteable common feature - they involve a radical de-
parture from the ordinary use language. To be fully con-
sistent Descartes should not talk about it, and the behaviour-
ists should not really have to talk (except by way of abbrevi-
ating a language of bodily movements constructed in terms of co-
ordinate Geometry) of the human mind. 
Another feature which the behaviourist shares with 
the Cartesian is his preparedness to work in a problematic in 
which the concept of a person is dealt with in terms of a body -
mind dichotomy. For the Cartesian the body hides the mind 
(the person) in the sense that it is an irrelevant and a decep-
tive appearance. For the behaviourist the mind hides the body 
in the sense that it is a superfluous ·unverifiable and confused 
hypothesis which tends to bar us from seing clearly that all 
P-predicates are reducible to J'vl-predicates. 
Wittgenstein, as we have seen rejects this way of 
conceiving a human being. Of a human being he says: 'My 
attitude towards him is an attitude towards a saul. 11 (P .I. 
page 178) 11 • and 11 •I noticed that he was out of humour'. 
Is this a report about his behaviour or his state of mind? 
('The sky looks threatening.' Is this about the present or 
10. Cook, uHuman Beings 11 , page 131. 
11. P.I. page 178. 
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the future?) Both; not side-by-side however, but ahout the 
( ) 
12. 
one via the other." P.I. pa<Je 179 
From this last quotation as well as from the many about be-
havioural criteria (P.I. 171,2,3 for example) it would be 
quite easy to interpret Wittgenstein as a logical behaviour-
ist. But as we tried to indicate in the chapter on criteria 
th?.t term can be used in an extremely misleading way. 
~~!i tt<Jenstein uses it in the other minds problem, NOT for the 
purposes of showing how we get from what is observable ( 11colour-
ll'?ss movementsll) to what is hidden. Had he used it in that 
way his work would still fall within the compass of the 
Cartesian conception of the human being. Cook and Reinhardt 
argue explicitly and Strawson implies that the Cartesian 
approach vvas precisely the one from which vJittgenstein broke. 
Cook puts the position most accurately and succinctly when he 
writes a propos of Investigations (164 ): 
110ne point to gather from this passage is that in 
so far as Wittgenstein uses the concept of criteria to oppose 
the notion of 'the hidden', this is NOT the notion that arises 
in the problem of other minds, the problem that grows out of 
Descartes• metaphysical use of 'body' but ratl1er that notion 
. . 
of the hidden that arises out of looking for a common element 
and finding none. I take it that Wittgenstein 1 s opposition 
to this 'notion of 'the hidden' does not make him a behaviour-
ist." 13 • 
This I think is the correct interpretation. The 
danger of a criteriological argument is firstly that it tends 
to be simplistic knd essentialistic, secondly it oft·en in-
volves a misunderstanding of the role of paradigm cases in 
language and thirdly it ignores the importance of context in 
deciding whether this is to count on an instance of that. 
I shall illustrate these points by reference to 
things which we only predicate of human beings. 
12. P.r. page 179. 
13. Cook, op. cit. page 136. 
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We only say of a human being that he has an opinion, 
but there is no strictly determinable set of behavioural signs 
which enable us to infer 11 the presence of an opinion in some-
one" - (the very oddness of the quoted phrase makes one suspi-
cious). That there is no defining criterion or set of criteria, 
nevertheless this does not mean that all we ever have are symp-
toms from which we induce more or less probable judgments about 
the presence of an opinion in someone. Wittgenstein suqgests 
the following questions which will yield criterial answers: 
11What, in particular cases, do we regard as criteria for some-
one's being of such-and-such an opinion? When do we say: 
he reached this opinion at that time? When: he has.altered 
his opinion? And so on. The picture which the answers to 
these questions give us show what gets treated grammatically as 
a STATE h~re. 14 o Here we are walking along a knife 
.·.•Ve seen tha. t Cook, Reinhardt and Strawson reject 
the notion, attributed to Wittgenstein by Chihara and Fodor, 
that there is a criterial relationship between P- and M-predi-
·cates, and yet the passage just quoted suggests that we must 
seek out the behavioural criteria from which we learn (build-
up) our concept of human predicate like "being of the opinion 11 o 
All we can say with assurance at the moment is that Wittgenstein 
rejects, in most cases in ordinary language, the view that we 
must discover a definina criterion before we can know what any-
thing is. But there is a further implication that "behaviour" 
is not used by him to denote one sort of thingo It' is not a · 
grammatically homogeneous word. This point is of crucial im-
portance to the whole concept of a human being and we shall re-
turn to it later. 
As far as paradigm cases are concerned the confusion 
into which a behavioural criteriology leads occurs like this: 
Quite often we are taught how to use a word, say 11expe~ting", 
by being shown a case in which a man c6nsults his· appoint~ent 
book, puts the kettle on, sets out tea cups, and then frequently 
looks anxiously up and down the streeto We are told that 
14o P.I. 573 
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these are th~ behavioural criteria of the state of expectation. 
Now if we misconstrue this training in the use of this word, 
we will come to think of these behaviours as being definitive 
of a state of expecting someone for tea. So in a case where 
a man does not behave in an analO<]cus way at all we will be 
puzzled to hear him or someone else saying that he is expect-
ing someone for tea. And we might justify our puzzlement by 
referring to Wittgensteinrs statement that an inward process 
stands in need of outward criteria. However, what he ~eans 
by this is not that in every case in which we predicate an in-
ternal state of a man there must be accompanying observable 
behaviours, but rather that if there never were any publicly 
observable behaviours which we could point to as cases of say 
"expecting someone for tea" then the word could not be part of 
our language. It could neither be taught nor used for 
communication. This is one of the major points of the argu-
ment against private language. The paradigm case is used on 
the preliminaries of ustage setting 11 • It prepares us for 
using the word in other ·cases which· bear a family resemblance 
to this one. It is not conceptually limitina in the sense 
that it defines once for all the cases in which we may say 
that a man expects someone for tea. 
These two confusions about defining criteria and 
paradigm are closely tied up with a third blind spot viz. the 
importance of context for the use of a word. The great 
temptation in relying too heavily upon a criteriological form 
of argument is to treat certain behaviours in isolation from 
the context in which they occur, as being logically adequate 
criteria for the predication of psychological words. The 
language-game in which these predicates are used is learned on 
the basis of contextual behaviours. One might say that the 
ontological context in which a behaviour occurs finds its gramma-
tical counterpart in the language-game in which we communicate 
about that behaviour. Just as someone who says when shown a 
section of an arithme~ical progression "Now I can go on" and 
yet can't, does not know the series, so·we do not SAY of such 
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a person that he knows the series. If we found a tribe of 
people who did accept the assurance that someone understood 
the rule of the series, but who never bothered to find out 
whether he could continue it, we should have to say of them 
that the language-game which they played with "understanding 
a rule" was different to ours. Their "concept 11 of under-
standing would be different - possibly because their interests 
were different. They might for instance be interestP.d in 
the feelina which a section of a numerical series produced in 
someone, and therefore the context within which the sentence 
11 I understand the rule of the series" occurs in which they . 
were interested would be different from the context in which 
we were interested. If they did not have our concept, if 
they never played our language-game, we might say of them 
that their FORM OF LIFE was different, to this extent, from 
ours. (Perhaps they do not have our concept because they do 
not calculate in our way when building roads and bridges and 
so do not place the significance we do on understanding 
formulae.) 
The importance of context for the use of P-predicates 
is suggested by Strawson in this passage: 
11 If one is playing a game of cards, the distinctive 
markings of a certain card constitute a logically adequate 
criterion for calling it say, the Queen of Hearts; but in 
calling it this, in the context of the game, one is ascribing 
it to properties over and above the possession of these mark-
ings. The predicate gets the meaning from the whole structure 
of the game. Criteria on the strength of which we ascribe 
P-predicates to others are of a logically adequate kind for 
this ascription, i~ not to say that all there is to the ascrip-
tive meaning of these predicates is these criteria. To say 
this is to forget that they are P-predicates, to forget the rest 
of the language structure to which they belong." 15 • 
15. Strawson, op. cit. page 110. 
' 
- 137 -
This passage casts light on Wittgenstein's use of 
the word 11behaviour 11 and its connection with the concept.of. 
criteria ~nd the concept of a person. Strawson's statement 
is in line, I feel, with method of approach to the investi-
gation of that concept. He does not make the fatal Cartesian 
mistake of contrasting what is publicly observable - the body, 
with what is only privately accessible - the mind, and then 
showing the unbridgable gap between behaviour and the event. 
He dismisses that conceotion of the matter. The human body 
for him is precisely that, a human body, not an elaborate 
machine from whose MOVEMENTS we either infer the presence of 
a psychological state or build up the concept of such a state. 
To see the question of what a person is as answerable solely 
in the Cartesian way can only result in a conceptual blind alley: 
"It seems paradoxical to us that we should make such 
a medly, mixing physical states and states of consciousness up 
together in a SINGLE report: 'He suffered great torments and 
tossed about restlessly'. It is quite usual, so why do we 
find it paradoxical? Because we want to say that the sentence 
deals with both tangibles and intangibles at once. But does 
it worry you if I say: •These three struts give the building 
stability•? Are three and stability tangible? - Look at the 
16. 
sentence as an instrument, and at its sense as the employment.'' 
So if we are going to talk about Wittgenstein•s use 
of the notion of criteria in connection with the concept of a 
person, we will have to say that he uses both bodily and 
psychological .properties as being criteria of human beings. 
And this surely means that it is quite incorrect to classify 
him as a logical behaviouristt As far as ~e is concerned our 
concept of a person can only be described with any adequacy if 
we review the lanouaae-oame as a whole in which 1ve talk about 
peopleo And it is characteristic of this language-game that 
we talk of act ion as well as of movement. We say both, "He 
moved his arm" and "His arm was moved". This implies that 
the body - the subject of M-predicates is conceived quite 
16. P.I. 421. 
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differently from a machine. We do not usually see the move-
ments of an arm as action - we see the movements of a puppet 
AS actions, (and it is grammatically, conbeptually, interest-
1n0 that·a human being can imitate a puppet, i.e. act so that 
the action is seen as the movements of a puppet which is be-
ing manipulated so as to seem as to be acting)o Wittgenstein 
says in his investigation of seeing something as something: 
" 1 Now I see it as a ••o•o goes with 1 I am trying 
to see it as ·a •oo•o or 1 I can't see it as a •• ~.o yet.' But 
I cannot try to see a conventional picture of a lion AS a lion, 
any more than F as that letter (though I may well try to see 
it as a gallows, for example o) 11 17 • 
This of course is a conceptual statemento To see 
something as something requires that one has learned to do 
certain things. To have the experience of seeing something 
as ••••• involves being the master of a technique. "But }}ow 
queer for this to be the logical condition of someone1s 
having such and such an experiencet After all, you don't say 
that one only has toothache if one·is capable of doirig such 
and such. From this it follows that we cannot be dealing 
with the same concept of experience here. It is a different 
though related conceptn 18 • A few lines further on \"7i ttgenstein 
makes a remark.directly relevant to the question we are dealing 
with. He says, "For how could I see this posture was hesitant 
before I knew it was a posture and not the anatomy of the 
animal?" His point is that one cannot move from the body, con-
sidered· anatomically, to "seeing hesitation" in his posture". 
To do this we should have· to see a machine ·(the body from the 
anatomist's point of view) AS a human body, and then see in the 
gestures and postures of that body, hesitation, grief, surprise, 
horror, etc. This is possible, as in the case of watching 
puppets, but it is a possibility founded on the giveness of the 
body as a human body. Or rather, on the giveness of the form 
17. P.I. page 208, see also Zettel 208-225o 
18. Poi. page 208 
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of life which determines our concept of the human, and this 
oiveness of forms of life as far as the philosopher is con-
cerned, "has to be acceptedo" 19 o We might possibly be 
able to imagine a people (one of Wittgensteints 11 tribes 11 ) 
who had a different concept of human beings like~ say, the 
tribe he talks about in Zettel whose concept of suffering 
pain is different from ours. But in order to do that we 
have to imagine attitudes, projects, methods of deal~ng with 
the world rather different from our owno Reinhardt sug0ests, 
correctly, I think, that we "grow into a mastery of the sys-
tem· of P-predicates, i.eo into a mastery of the language-game 
which we play with human beings, and this system is, so to 
speak, groundless. Its found at ion is a form of life .11 200 
But it would be a mistake to see the conceptual· 
system of P-predicates as a sharply defined one: the limits 
of the concept are penumbralo We have what the difference 
is between a man and a machine, but what would we say of a 
machine that winced when you hit it? This is the sort of 
question with which we proposed to deal at the beginning of 
the chapter on intentional actiono That chapter was designed 
to show that the problems which arise concerning the use of a 
particular P-predicate (problems concerned with using words 
like nactn, ~'mean" and ttintend 11 ) arise when we make a gramma-
tical· confusion between· two sorts of questions. Similarly 
here, when trying to indicate the conceptual boundaries be-
tween men and machines, a problem arises only if certain sorts 
of QUESTIONS are uncritically accepted. For instance the 
question as we raised it a few lines back. Let me repeat it: 
"We know what the difference is between a man and a machine, 
but what would we say of a machine that winced when you hit it? 11 
·" 
From a Wittgensteinian point of view the question is doubly 
dangerous because IT LOOKS LIKE A WITTGENSTEINIAN QUESTION. It 
seems to raise a question about how we talko In fact it 
conceals an important confusion, which comes out if the second 
part of it is reformulated in a truly Wittgenstein way, namely: 
19. P.r. page 226. 
20. Reinhardt, op. cit. page 157o 
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II . . . . but would we say of a machine that it winced when you 
hit it?" The wronq formulation nresunposes that the state-
ment, 11 A machine winces 11 has an application, but it never 
supplies pne. At most· it calls on us to try to imagine 
something -a machine's wincing. Wittgenstein deals with 
exactly this demand for images in connection with stones. 
"Could one imagine a stone's having consciousness?~~ he asks. 
"And if one can do so - 1A7hy should that not merely· prove 
that such image-mongery is of no interest to us?" 
21
• 
Assuming that we could imagine something - say fraq-
ments of the stone flying off, looping the loop, and return-
ing to their original position - we would have advanced no 
further because we are still. faced with the problem of what 
application this picture is to have. \-\That does it mean? 
l.\7hat possible function can it have in the language-game of 
?-predicates? How can it be integrated into the concept of 
a person? It is no answer to say that the phenomenon of fly-
ing chips of stone are going to count as a criterion of the 
stone•s being conscious, and this, for a previously mentioned 
reason. A criterion serves as a sort of conceptual marker. 
It indicates to us that a certain language-game is played here, 
rather in the way a red robot indicates to us that a certain 
form of traffic procedure is to be followed. But to say that 
flying chips of stone are a criterion for the stone's being 
conscious, so far tells us nothing, or to put it another way, 
leaves everything of importance unsaid. 
Because criteria are conceptual markers, pointing 
to an area in which a language-game is played, and because, 
. . 1 . . . f f l.f 22 • th "to 1mag1ne a anguage J.S to 1mag1ne a arm o 1 e 11 e 
introduction of a new criterion, or the movement of·what former-
ly counted as a symptom to the role of a criterion, implies an 
alteration l.n a form of life (or at least at the speculative 
leve 1, the imagining of a different form of life.) Criteria, 
21. 
22. 
P. I. 390. 
P.I. 19. 
See also P.I. 282-88. 
See also the remark on language-games in P.I. 23. 
-------..:...------'---~- ..... - . 
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thought of in this way, cannot be simply introduced not 
11s imply 11 , because their introduction implies either an actual 
transformation of material conditions of existence or implies 
the desire to transform these conditions of existence. The 
picture of a "conscious·stonett or of a "machine wincinatt is 
idle until a context (in terms of a form of life) is supplied, 
either in imagination or in f"act, in which it can function. 
Therefore saying that a stone is conscious is little better 
than uttering senseless sounds, until we indicate an al t.ered 
language of P-predicates in which this utterance will have 
meaning. This, I hope, makes clearer that passage from 
Wittgenstein quoted earlier, where he says that, in a certain 
sense of experience, to experience something requires that we 
do something. A society in which human beings and machines 
were not distinguished, would not only have a different con-
cept of a'person, it would engage in a different form of 
activitv from what we do. 
Having said this I am in a slightly better position 
for trying briefly to point to what seems to me to be one of 




C H A P T E R XI 
LANGUAGE-GAMES Ai\TD FORMS OF LIFE 
It was, I think, Spinoza who once wrote that the 
concept of a dog could not bark. The remark is extremely 
pertinent to any discussion of Wittgenstein's writings on 
language-games and forms of life, because, if suitably ln-
terpreted it lays the ghost of a simple 11picture 11 theory of 
meaning, once for all, and opens the way· to a far more viable 
road of investigation. For a Wittgensteinian the reason why 
the concept of a dog cannot bark, is not because the concept 
is an imperfect reproduction of a real dog, or the represent-
ation of some shadowy entity called 11 the class of all dogso 11 
If we take a definition of 11concept n· such as that given by · 
Geach we can see that it is· patently absurd to treat concepts 
as intellectual mirror-images of things. I am not at all 
sure that his definition exactly squares with Wittgenstein, 
but it contains sufficient obviously Wittgensteinian features 
to make it a useful starting point for this very brief dis-
cussion of the relations between concepts, language-games and 
the given material conditions of existence, which Wittgenstein 
termed, "forms of life" 1 • Geach writes: 
"The ability to express a judgment in words thus pre-
supposes a· number of capacities, previously acquired, for in-
telligently using the several words and phrases that make up 
the sentence. I shall apply the old term 'concepts' to these 
special capacities- an application which r·think lies fairly 
close to the historic use of the term. It will be a 
sufficient condition for James's having the concept of so-
and-so that he should have mastered the intelligent use 
(iricluding the use in made-up sentences) of a word for so-and-
so in some language. Thus: if somebody knows how to use the 
English word •red' he has a concept of red; if he knows how 
1. Stephen Toulmin suggest possible sources for this term. 
nEncou'ntern, January 1969, p.71. 
- 143 -
to use the first-person pronoun, he has a concept of self; 
if he knows how to use the negative construction in some 
language, he has a concept .of negation. 11 2 • 
So "concept 11 fo·r Geach as for Wi ttgenstein means the 
c.bility to perform certain actions in certain conditions, and 
these actions are linguistic and their aim is to communicate 
(here "communicate" is not confined to the passing on of in-
formation, but includes linguistic behaviours such as those 
which Austin calls 11performative utterances"). Little more 
need be said to establish the connection between concepts and 
games. When someone can act in accordance with the rules of 
poker he can play that game, and when someone can exercise his 
conceptual capacity by using words in accordance with given 
rules then he can speak a language. So far there is no diffi-
culty.- The problems begin to arise when we ask ourselves 
where the rules of language come from. We have spoken about 
11using words in accordance with GIVEN rules 11 and we must be 
prepared to face the question of how these rules are given and 
of why some are given and not others. The answer we give to 
this question must be directed at illuminating the logical 
features of language-rules. It might well be enhanced, as 
far as interest goes, by philological and sociological con-
siderations, but these are empirical sciences which are not 
directly relevant t9 the sort of investigation which Wittgenstein 
made of this problem. In place of accurately described factual 
social situations we can invent a social situation such as that 
in Investigations 2 and 8, where we are in a sense, in total 
control of all the possible variables. From these social situ-
ations we can attempt to formulate various linguistic behaviours, 
suitable to the imagined intentions of the people in our 
nsocietyn, e.g. the builder and his assistant in Investigations 
2 and 8,- or the primitive tribes which Wittgenstein dreams up 
in Zettel. But when we do this we come to realise that.the 
logical structure, or grammar, of the language-games which we 
imagine are not reflections of a logic hypostatised in the 
material (though imagined) situation. The later Wittgenstein 




rejected the view that logic was a picture of the world: 
rather he held that the various rule systems in accordance 
with which we act come into existence because of a dialectic 
between the given conditions of material exi~tence at one or 
other point in history and our needs in projects in those 
conditions. 
Taking an example from mathematics - why is it that 
we count "a~cording to a rule 11 i.e. in just THIS v1ay and· not 
a pastime. 
11Counting and calculating are not - e.g. - simply 
·Counting (and that means countin0 like this) is 
a technique that is employed daily in the most various opera-
tions of our lives. And that is why we learn to count as we 
do: with endless practice, with merciless exactitude; that 
is why it is inexorably insisted that we shall all say •two• 
after 1 one•, 'three' after 'two' and so on - 'But is counting 
only a~; then; isn't there also some truth ·corresponding 
to this sequence?' - The truth is that counting has proved to 
pay. - 'Then do you want to say that 11being true" means: 
being usable (or useful)?' - No, not that, but that it can't 
be said of the series of natural numbers - ANY MORE THAN OF 
OUR LANGUAGE (capitals mine ) - that it is true, but: that it 
is usable, and, above all, it is used." 3 • 
The grammar of our language neither mirrors (or shows) 
the logic of the world, nor is it arbitrarilv chosen by us. 
Language is an instrument - it is either appropriate or in-
appropriate, useful or useless, used or unused. For instance, 
(to turn again to mathematics) if objects always multiplied 
when placed in groups the equations of our arithmetic would 
prove unusable. It would not be correct so say in such cir-
cumstances, that it was no longer true that 112 + 2 = 4. 11 We 
could only say that those equations were no longer appropriate 
in that they did not facilitate certain projects which we have. 
It is, of course, not necessary to confine our 
examples to mathematics, as van Peursen points out: 11Clearly, 
3 • F. M. pp • 3 , 4 , Sec • 4 • 
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what has been said here is of importance not only for the 
understanding of the sciences and their methodology, but also 
for the understanding of the m~asures employed in our ordinary 
lanf)Ual]e - we too use these words in a variety of ways - and 
thereby in our thinking." He goes on to mention what I re-
ferred to at the end of the last chapter as one of Wittgenstein 1 s 
greatest insiahts. He writes: "The implications for 
epistemology and for philosophy generally will become clearer 
if we look at two aspects. The first is that a measurej a 
methodoloay, must aqree with a general feature of the reality 
that is measured and explained. The second is that reality 
itself is plastic, because it, in turn, is affected by the 
manner in which it is measured and approached, and 6an there-
fore be remoulded by language and thought. Both aspects will 
be seen to come together in the theme of the forms of life to 
which language refers. n 4 • 
Wittgenstein puts it like this: 11If we imagine the 
facts otherwise than as they are, certain language-games lose 
some of their importance, while others become important. And 
in this way there is an alteration - a gradual one - in the 
use of the vocabulary of a language ••••• When language-games 
change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the con-
cepts the meanings of words change." 5 • There is a constant 
interplay between what one might ca·ll the natural world and the 
conceptual world. But the interplay does not consist in 
11deriving by abstraction 11 concepts from empirical evidence, 
rather it is of the form· suggested by Wittgenstein in his dis-· 
cussion of the relation of concepts to experience: 
nit might be.imaginedthat some propositions, of the 
form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned 
as channels for such empirical propositions as were not 
hardened but fluid, and that this relation altered with time, 
in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. 
4. van Peursen, op. cit. p.l03 
So O.Co 63, 65o 
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11The mythology may change back into a state of :flux, 
the river-bed o:f thoughts may shi:fto But I distinguish be-
tween the movement o:f the waters on the river-bed and the shift 
of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division o:f the 
one from the othero 
11But if someone were to say 11So logic too is an em-
pirical science" he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the 
same proposition that may get treated at one time as something 
to test by experience, at another as a rule o:f testing". 6 o 
For example one might test whether two plus two 
equalled four by putting tv.,o pairs of counters together and 
seeing whether they multiplied; 2 + 2 = 4 then gets treated 
as an hypothesis and a predictiono On the other hand one 
might decide that, so to speak, the :facts were irrelevant and 
that :four was just to be taken as the sum o:f two pairs. In 
which case 2 + 2 = 4 is a rule, a,1d it in no way describes the 
expected state of affairs. It prescribes a way of talking 
about the facts of experience, and in this way sets limits on 
the empirical, by telling us that THIS is going to count as 
THIS, or that THIS is THIS ( 11Ess~nce is expressed by grammar 
•••• Grammar tells us what kind o:f object anything is 11 ) 7 • 
When once a concept has been :formed i.e. when once 
a particular way o:f talking is adopted certain limits are set 
on the worldo In the language-game played with "doubt", 
"knowledge", and 11certainty 11 certain concepts are· employed 
i o eo these· words ·are used in accordance with certain rules. 
And Wittgenstein says about these ways of using the words that 
they are 11given 11 , ioeo they ·are groundless to the extent that 
they can in no way be tested against the facts, in the way we 
test a scientific hypothesis. The only kind of test which 
they are subject to is the test of time - in which their use-
fulness as ways of handling the world is tried. 
6o O.C. 96, 97; 98. 
7. Poi. 371 and 373. 
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Time and again throughout his later writings 
\!Jittgenstein repeats, in various ways, the remark, which is 
inseparably connected with his name: 1.1But ordinary language 
is all right 11 ~" This remark has been taken by some critics, 
as bespeaking, reactionary conservatism, and an uncritical 
approach. \~at in fact it indicates is the insight 
l:Ji ttgenstein had into the relationship between concepts and 
the material conditions in which they appear., When he tells 
us that we may in no way interfere with the actual uses of 
language he is cautioning us against an inappropriate method 
of reform., The logic of ordinary language, and thus the 
conceptual.structure within which we operate cannot be altered 
by the strokes of a philosopher's pen. Our concepts form the 
river-bed of our thought and that river-bed depends, for its 
shape and course on both the waters running along it, and on 
the geo-morphology of the countryside. Concepts are formed 
in the dialectic between man and the existing conditions in 
which he lives .. They alter when those conditions alter, and 
because they are a means by which we come to grips with the 
world, they often help to effect the alteration of the very 
conditions which gave rise to them. The analogy with tools 
and machines ioeo the means of production, is too strong to 
be avoided, and indeed it was Wittgenstein•s favourite way 
of talking about words and language to compare them with tools, 
machines ·and engines o In doing so he was able to establish 
with great clarity the meaning of that phrase which could so 
well have been the motto for his later works: 
"•. o o the sneakino of language is part of an activity, 
or of a form of life.,n 9 • 
So BoBo page 28. 
9.. P.I. 23 .. 
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